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Abstract
Traditionally, consistency is the only criterion for the quality of a theory in logic-based
approaches to reasoning about actions. This work goes beyond that and contributes to
the meta-theory of actions by investigating what other properties a good domain de-
scription should satisfy. Having Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) as background,
we state some meta-theoretical postulates concerning this sore spot. When all pos-
tulates are satisfied, we call the action theory modular. We point out the problems
that arise when the postulates about modularity are violated, and propose algorith-
mic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to overcome them. Besides
being easier to understand and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy’s sense, mod-
ular theories have interesting computational properties. Moreover, we also propose
a framework for updating domain descriptions and show the importance modularity
has in action theory change.
Keywords: Reasoning about actions, modularity, dependence, theory change.
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Re´sume´
Traditionnellement, la consistance est le seul crite`re pour de´cider de la qualite´ d’une
the´orie dans les approches logiques pour le raisonnement sur les actions. Ce travail
va au dela` de cela et contribue a` la me´ta-the´orie de l’action en proposant d’autres pro-
prie´te´s qu’une bonne description de domaine doit satisfaire. En utilisant la logique
dynamique propositionnelle (PDL) comme logique de base, nous e´nonc¸ons quelques
postulats me´ta-the´oriques. Lorsque ces postulats sont satisfaits, nous disons que la
the´orie d’action estmodulaire. Nous pre´sentons les proble`mes qui surviennent lorsque
nos postulats de modularite´ sont viole´s, et proposons des algorithmes pour aider le
concepteur de la the´orie a` les re´soudre. En plus d’eˆtre plus faciles a` comprendre et
plus tole´rantes a` l’e´laboration au sens de McCarthy, les the´ories modulaires ont des
proprie´te´s inte´ressantes d’un point de vue computationel. Dans ce travail, nous pro-
posons e´galement une me´thode de mise a` jour de descriptions de domaine et mon-
trons l’importance de la modularite´ pour le changement de the´ories.
Mots-cle´s : Raisonnement sur les actions, modularite´, de´pendance, mise a` jour de
the´ories.
xix
Resumo
Tradicionalmente, consisteˆncia tem sido o u´nico crite´rio de qualidade de teorias em
abordagens lo´gicas para raciocı´nio sobre ac¸o˜es. O presente trabalho tem por obje-
tivo ir ainda mais longe e contribui com a meta-teoria de ac¸o˜es investigando que out-
ras propriedades uma boa descric¸a˜o de domı´nio deve satisfazer. Usando a lo´gica
dinaˆmica proposicional (PDL) como formalismo de base, enunciamos alguns postu-
lados meta-teo´ricos. Quando uma dada teoria de ac¸o˜es satisfaz todos os nossos pos-
tulados, chamamo-a modular. Aqui no´s mostramos os problemas que podem surgir
quando os postulados de modularidade sa˜o violados e igualmente propomos algo-
ritmos que auxiliam o projetista da teoria de ac¸o˜es a soluciona´-los. Ale´m de mais
fa´ceis de entender e mais tolerantes a` elaborac¸a˜o, no sentido de McCarthy, teorias
de ac¸o˜es modulares apresentam tambe´m propriedades interessantes do ponto de
vista computacional. Ale´m disso, no´s aqui tambe´m apresentamos operadores para
atualizac¸a˜o de descric¸o˜es de domı´nio, e mostramos a importaˆncia da modularidade
na modificac¸a˜o de teorias.
Palavras-chave: Raciocı´nio sobre ac¸o˜es, modularidade, dependeˆncia, modificac¸a˜o de
teorias.
xxi
Chapter 1
where we try to convince the reader this work is worth reading
Introduction
“Well,” said Pooh, “what I like best...” and then he had to stop
and think. Because although Eating Honey was a very good thing to do,
there was a moment just before you began to eat it which was better
than when you were, but he didn’t know what it was called.
—A.A. Milne, from The House at Pooh Corner
In logic-based approaches to knowledge representation, knowledge concerning a
given domain is usually described by logical formulas, also called axioms. A set T
of such formulas is called a (non-logical) theory. Theories used in applications are
abstractions modeling observed phenomena with the goal of explaining and making
predictions about them. That is also the case for reasoning about actions, where we
are interested in theories describing the behavior of particular actions on properties of
the world, called fluents. We call such theories action theories (alias domain descriptions).
Following the tradition in the reasoning about actions community, action theories
are collections of statements that have the particular form: “if context, then effect after
every execution of action”; and “if precondition, then action executable”. The first type
of statement is used to express effect laws, i.e., formulas that relates an action with
its outcome, given a particular context. The second kind of statement denotes exe-
cutability laws, those formulas establishing the sufficient conditions under which an
action is executable. Their dual gives us the necessary conditions for an action to be
executable: “if precondition, then action impossible”. (Such statement can also be seen
as a special case of effect laws whose effect is a contradiction.)
Finally, in a representation of a dynamic domain, we also single out statements
mentioning no action at all. These can represent laws about the static part of the
1
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world, i.e., the constraints that determine which states are possible, or represent facts
observed in a given state. We call the former static laws or domain constraints, while
the later are referred to as simple observations.
1.1 What Are Action Theories for?
When describing action theories, the goal is to give a reasoning agent the ability to rea-
son about a dynamic domain and perform rationally in the environment that its action
theorymodels. Hence, action theories are made essentially to perform reasoningwith.
Among the different types of reasoning an agent can perform when interacting with
its environment, we identify:
• Checking consistency of its theory;
• Predicting the effects of actions;
• Explaining the observation of a given effect;
• Establishing a plan to achieve a goal;
• Check the executability or inexecutability of a given action; and
• Revise and update its knowledge about the behavior of an action.
We here briefly discuss about each of such tasks.
Consistency Check
Look at all the sentences which seem true and question them.
—David Reisman
Inconsistent theories are useless outside the realm of paraconsistent logics. Hence,
given a theory, an important task is to check its consistency (Figure 1.1).
?
base
Knowledge ⊥
Figure 1.1: Checking consistency of a theory.
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That is also the case for theories in reasoning about actions: an agent with incon-
sistent beliefs about the behavior of actions can perform unpredictably and be unsafe
in real world applications. For instance, if the knowledge base of an agent conceived
for an on-line flight reservation system becomes inconsistent, the agent may book a
flight for a new passenger even if the flight is already full, producing an overbook for
the company.
Historically, logical consistency is themost used criterion for evaluating how good
a given theory is. Consistency of theories in general has been extensively addressed in
the literature on logic-based knowledge representation. In a more or less tacit way, it
has also been studied for action theories [9, 99, 74, 96]. More recently, different notions
of consistency specific to domain descriptions in reasoning about actions have been
proposed [118, 72].
Our main claim in the present work, however, is that mere consistency is not
enough to evaluate an action theory. We may have consistent domain descriptions
that are not intuitive, and also intuitive theories that, although consistent, may be-
have unpredictably and be difficult to manage and change. In order to capture these
subtleties, something beyond consistency is required. We will come back to this point
in the sequel.
Progression, Regression and Plan Generation
When performing reasoningwith an action theory, one is naturally interested in doing
progression, i.e., the prediction of action effects; regression, i.e., explaining the state of
the world before a sequence of actions has taken place; and planning, which amounts
to finding a sequence of actions whose outcome is the intended goal.
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.
—Niels Bohr
Progression (Figure 1.2), also known as temporal projection, is the prototypical rea-
soning problem for dynamic systems. Technically, it is the problem of determining
whether a given set of fluents is true after the execution of a sequence of actions. For
example, in an on-line booking system, querying the knowledge base whether the
flight is booked after the customer has executed the action of paying is an instance of
the progression problem.
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actionsInitial
state
Result
state
?
Figure 1.2: Progression: reasoning about the future.
The longer the explanation, the bigger the lie.
—Chinese proverb
Regression (Figure 1.3), also known as temporal explanation, consists in finding the
set of fluents that hold at the initial situation before a sequence of actions were carried
out. In the example above, given that the action of paying has been executed with the
result that the flight is now booked, deducing that the client had a valid credit card
number is an example of regression.1
state
Current
state
Initial actions
?
Figure 1.3: Regression: reasoning about the past.
Nothing happens unless first we dream.
—Carl Sandburg
Plan generation (Figure 1.4) is the task of knowing whether there exists a sequence
of actions leading to an intended state of the world and, if that is the case, what that
sequence is. In our running example, in order to get a flight booked, the agent must
1This is an example of deductive regression [72].
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be able to find the actions necessary to achieve its goal. An associated task is plan vali-
dation: given a sequence of actions and a goal, decide whether the actions constitute a
plan for the goal.
?
actions
state
Current
state
Desired
Figure 1.4: Plan generation: what to do to achieve a goal.
Tests for Executability and Inexecutability
Try not. Do, or do not. There is no try.
— Yoda
All tasks of progression, regression and plan generation depend uponwhether the
involved actions are executable or not. Many approaches in the literature [83, 84, 72]
assume that actions are always executable. They follow the so-called “tentativist” ap-
proach, according to which one can always attempt to execute an action, whether its
outcome is the expected one or not. We here prefer to adopt the “effectivist” approach,
in which the execution of an action may fail. This allows us to differentiate action pre-
conditions, i.e., the context in which the occurrence of the action is guaranteed, from
the action’s effect preconditions, i.e., the context in which the action, if executable, pro-
duces the expected effect. For instance, having a gun is a precondition for shooting,
while the gun being loaded is the precondition of the effect that the victim dies.
Then, an important reasoning task in action theories is determining executabil-
ity/inexecutability of an action in a given context. In our example, the agent must be
able to detect that without a credit card number, the action pay is not executable (and
consequently its effects do not apply).
It turns out that such tasks can have a very high complexity when carried out in
formalisms with a minimum of expressivity. One of our goals in this work is to show
that we can simplify such a task if we have a theory satisfying some design principles.
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Revision and Update of Action Theories
When we are no longer able to change a situation,
we are challenged to change ourselves.
—Viktor Frankl
Just being consistent does not mean that the information coded in an action theory
is intuitive. Nor does it mean that even being intuitive it will remain so along the
evolution of the world. It is not difficult to conceive action theories describing laws
about actions that are completely out of line with respect to the intuitive behavior of
the world. In this sense, the agent must be able to revise its beliefs about the behavior
of actions. In the same way, it can be the case that the world has just evolved, and
then the action theory in the agent’s knowledge base is out of date and need thus to
be changed. Such situations are depicted in Figure 1.5.
?
operationsϕ baseKnowledge
Figure 1.5: Theory change: how to accommodate new information in a knowledge base.
For instance, let the agent in the flight reservation system believe that always after
booking a flight to a passenger, this one is confirmed to that flight. Now, if the agent
learns that in the casewhere the flight is full, after booking it the passengermay go to a
waiting list, it should be able to make this information fit together with its knowledge
about the behavior of booking.
Such cases of theory change are very important when one deals with logical de-
scriptions of dynamic domains: it may always happen that one discovers that an ac-
tion actually has a behavior that is different from that one has always believed it had.
It is important to note, however, that independently of the method to carry out a
change in the theory, deciding on its intuition remains a knowledge engineer’s task.
1.2 Modular Logic Project
The design of theories in knowledge representation has much more in common with
software engineering than onemight think. In AI applications, a theory representing a
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knowledge base is a piece of software. Hence in the same way as for software projects,
one can talk about correctness and evolution of domain descriptions.
Besides that, action theories play an important role when integrated into more
complex knowledge representation systems. Those may involve representation and
reasoning ability for e.g. knowledge, beliefs, desires and intentions. In order to the
components of such an heterogeneous knowledge base fit together, some principles of
good design should be considered prior to integrating all those components. Among
the principles of the object-oriented paradigm in software development are the fol-
lowing [108, 98]:
1. Work with modules;
2. Minimize interactions between modules;
3. Organize the modules into well-defined layers to help minimize interactions.
The goal is to have components of one layer using only components from im-
mediate neighbors, wherever possible; and
4. Anticipate what kind of extensions ormodificationsmight bemade in the future,
and support this at design time so that one can extend the systemwith minimal
disruption later.
There seems to be an agreement that such principles for object-oriented program-
ming or design are the same as for knowledge representation in general [38, 22, 110,
59] as in reasoning about actions [2, 57, 64, 77]. All the principles above can be applied
to the design of domain descriptions, too. We argue that a good domain description
should be one whose consistency check andmaintenance complexities are minimized,
so that any further modification is localized, with a bounded scope. Moreover, we ex-
pect that good design of a theory should improve its general performance.
With this in mind, one can see the specification of domain descriptions as a task
similar to project development in software engineering: Item 4 above is what has been
called elaboration tolerance [88]. In this way, a representation is elaboration tolerant to
the extent that the effort required to add new information (a new action or effect) to
the representation is proportional to the complexity of that information [105]. Items 1,
2 and 3 reflect the concept of modularity, which means that different modules should
have as few elements as possible in common.
A commonly used guideline in software development is to divide the software
into modules, based on their functionality or on the similarity of the information they
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handle. This means that instead of having a “jack of all trades” program, it is prefer-
able to split it up into specialized subprograms. For instance, a program made of a
module for querying a database and a module for checking its integrity is more mod-
ular than a single module that does these two tasks at the same time.
The major benefits of modular systems are reusability, scalability and better man-
agement of complexity. Among the criteria commonly used for evaluating how mod-
ular a piece of software is are the notions of cohesion and coupling [98, 108]. Roughly,
cohesion is about howwell defined amodule is, while coupling is about howmodules
are interdependent. A common sensemaxim in object-oriented design ismaximize co-
hesion of modules and diminish their coupling, and this paradigm can also be applied
to reasoning about actions [3, 56, 57].
1.3 Objectives and thesis organization
Apriori consistency is the only criterion that formal logic provides to check the quality
of action theories. Our objective in this work is to go beyond that, and argue that we
should require more than the mere existence of a model for a given theory.
Here we claim that all the approaches that are put forward in the literature are
too liberal in the sense that we can have satisfiable action theories that are intuitively
incorrect. We argue that something beyond the consistency notion is required in order
to help us in evaluating a given theory.
Our starting point is the fact that in reasoning about actions one usually distin-
guishes several kinds of logical formulas. Among these are effect axioms, precondi-
tion axioms, and domain constraints. In order to distinguish such non-logical axioms
from logical axioms, we prefer to speak of effect laws, executability laws, and static
laws, respectively. Moreover we single out those effect laws whose effect is ⊥ (the
contradiction), and call them inexecutability laws.
Given these types of laws, suppose that the language is powerful enough to state
conditional effects of actions. For example, suppose that some action a is inexecutable
in contexts where ϕ1 holds, and executable in contexts where ϕ2 holds. It follows
that there can be no context where ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 holds. Now ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) is a static law
that does not mention a. It is natural to expect that ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) follows from the set
of static laws alone. By means of examples we show that when this is not the case,
then unexpected conclusions might follow from the theory T , even in the case that T
is logically consistent.
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This motivates postulates requiring that the different laws of an action theory
should be arranged modularly, i.e., in separated components, and in such a way that
interactions between them are limited and controlled. In essence, we argue that static
laws may entail new effects of actions (that cannot be inferred from the effect laws
alone), while effect laws and executability laws should never entail new static laws
that do not follow from the set of static laws alone. We formulate postulates that
make these requirements precise. It will turn out that in all existing accounts that al-
low for these four kinds of laws [78, 83, 112, 23, 14, 119], consistent action theories can
be written that violate these postulates.
We here give algorithms that allow one to check whether an action theory satisfies
the postulates we state. With such algorithms, the task of correcting flawed action
theories can be made easier.
The ideas we are going to develop in this thesis are not intended as the final word
on how action theories should be formalized in reasoning about actions; indeed, they
hardly constitute the initial word on how to do that!
The present work is structured as follows: in Chapter 2, we establish the formal
background needed to the core of the thesis. Chapter 3 makes a systematic analysis of
some modularity approaches when applied to the case of reasoning about actions. In
Chapter 4, we propose another view of decomposing a theory into modules, present-
ing it in a simple framework that abstracts from the frame problem. We then present
the solution to the frame problem we will rely on in the rest of this work and shows
that it subsumes Reiter’s regression technique (Chapter 5). After that, we investigate
the behavior of existing solutions to the frame problem, including ours, in more com-
plex scenarios (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, we revisit our concept of modularity by
giving a more fine grained account of it with the solution to the frame problem. We
then generalize our modularity principle (Chapter 8) and present the main properties
its satisfaction gives us. In Chapter 9, we make a step toward action theory update
and present operators for contracting action laws. Before concluding, we make some
discussion and address related work in the field (Chapter 10).
Part of the material here presented have appeared earlier elsewhere: Chapter 4 is
a joint work with Andreas Herzig that was published as [58]. Chapter 5 is the result
of a joint collaboration with Robert Demolombe and Andreas Herzig that appeared
in [25, 26]. A preliminary version of Chapter 6 appeared as [55]. Parts of Chapter 7 are
an improvement of the preliminary works published in [56]. Chapter 9 is the result of
a joint work with Andreas Herzig and Laurent Perrussel appeared in [52] and [51].
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Chapter 2
where we get acquainted with the formal
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Let these describe the indescribable.
— Lord Byron
In this chapter, we present the logical foundations which will serve as the basis
for developing the central ideas of this work. As our base formalism, we have chosen
modal logics [60, 16], and we describe action theories in ∗-free PDL, i.e., PDL without
the iteration operator ∗. We here establish the ontology of dynamic domains and
formally define what an action theory is. For more details on PDL, see [49, 50]; for the
benefits of dynamic logic as a formalism for reasoning about actions, see [14, 43, 121].
2.1 Dynamic Logic
LetAct = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of all atomic action constants of a given domain (Act 6= ∅).
Our main running example is in terms of the Walking Turkey Scenario [112], depicted
in Figure 2.1. There, the atomic actions are load, shoot and tease. We use a as a variable
for atomic actions. To each atomic action a there is an associated modal operator [a].
This gives us a multimodal logic [97]. Here we suppose that the underlying multi-
modal logic is independently axiomatized (i.e., the logic is a fusion and there is no
interaction between the modal operators [69, 70]).
LetProp = {p1, p2, . . .} denote the set of all propositional constants, also called fluents
or atoms. Examples of those are loaded, alive and walking. We use p as a variable for
propositional constants.
We suppose from now on that both sets Act and Prop are finite.
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Figure 2.1: The Walking Turkey Scenario.
We use small Greek letters ϕ,ψ, . . . to denote classical formulas, also called boolean
formulas. They are recursively defined in the following way:
ϕ ::= p | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ↔ ϕ
The set of all classical formulas will be denoted by Fml.
Examples of classical formulas are walking→ alive and ¬(bachelor ∧ married).
Given ϕ ∈ Fml, by valuations(ϕ) we denote the set of all propositional valua-
tions making ϕ true. We view a valuation as a maximally-consistent set of literals.
For instance, if Prop = {alive,walking}, then there are four valuations: {alive,walking},
{alive,¬walking}, {¬alive,walking} and {¬alive,¬walking}. A classical formula ϕ is clas-
sically consistent if and only if valuations(ϕ) 6= ∅, i.e., there is at least one valuation in
classical propositional logic that makes it true. We denote |=
CPL
the standard logical
consequence in classical propositional logic.
The set of all literals is Lit = Prop ∪ {¬p : p ∈ Prop}. Examples of literals are alive
and ¬walking. We will use ℓ as a variable for literals. If ℓ = ¬p, then we identify ¬ℓ
with p.
A clause χ is a disjunction of literals. We say that a literal ℓ appears in a clause χ,
written ℓ ∈ χ, if ℓ is a disjunct of χ.
We denote complex formulas (possibly with modal operators) by capital Greek
lettersΦ1,Φ2, . . . They are recursively defined in the following way:
Φ ::= ϕ | [a]Φ | 〈a〉Φ | ¬Φ | Φ∧Φ | Φ∨Φ | Φ→ Φ | Φ↔ Φ
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whereΦ denotes a complex formula. The dual operator of [a] is 〈a〉 and it is defined by:
〈a〉Φ =def ¬[a]¬Φ. Sequential composition of actions is defined by the abbreviation
[a1; a2]Φ =def [a1][a2]Φ. Examples of complex formulas are loaded → [shoot]¬alive and
hasGun→ 〈load; shoot〉(¬alive ∧ ¬loaded).
If T is a set of formulas (modal or classical), atm(T ) returns the set of all atoms
occurring in T . For instance, atm({¬¬¬p1, [a]p2}) = {p1, p2}.
For parsimony’s sake, whenever there is no confusionwe identify a set of formulas
with the conjunction of its elements. The semantics is that for multimodal K [97, 10].
Definition 2.1 (PDL-model)
A PDL-model is a tuple M = 〈W,R〉 where W is a set of valuations (alias possible
worlds), and R : Act −→ 2W×W a function mapping action constants a to accessibility
relations Ra ⊆W×W.
As an example, for Act = {a1, a2} and Prop = {p1, p2}, we have the PDL-model
M = 〈W,R〉, where
W = {{p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2}},
R(a1) =
{
({p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2}),
({¬p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2}), ({¬p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2})
}
R(a2) = {({p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1,¬p2}, {p1,¬p2})}
Figure 2.2 gives a graphical representation of M .
M :
p1, p2 ¬p1, p2
p1,¬p2
a1
a1
a2
a1
a1
a2
Figure 2.2: Example of a PDL-model for Act = {a1, a2}, and Prop = {p1, p2}.
Given M = 〈W,R〉, a ∈ Act, and w,w ′ ∈ W, we write Ra instead of R(a), and
wRaw
′ instead of w ′ ∈ Ra(w).
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Definition 2.2 (PDL truth conditions)
Given a PDL-model M = 〈W,R〉, the satisfaction relation is defined as the smallest
relation satisfying:
• |=
M
w
p (p is true at world w of model M ) if p ∈ w;
• |=
M
w
[a]Φ if for everyw ′ such that wRaw
′, |=
M
w′
Φ; and
• the usual truth conditions for the other connectives.
Definition 2.3 (Model of formulas)
A PDL-model M is a model ofΦ (noted |=
M
Φ) if and only if for all w ∈W, |=
M
w
Φ. M is
a model of a set of formulas T (noted |=
M
T ) if and only if |=
M
Φ for everyΦ ∈ T .
In the model depicted in Figure 2.2, we have |=
M
p1→ [a2]¬p2 and |=Mp1∨ p2.
Definition 2.4 (Global consequence)
A formula Φ is a consequence of the set of global axioms T in the class of all PDL-
models (noted T |=
PDL
Φ) if and only if for every PDL-model M , if |=
M
T , then |=
M
Φ.1
We suppose that the logic under consideration is compact [33].
Having established the formal substratum our presentation will rely on, we
present in the next section the different types of formulas we will henceforth use to
describe dynamic domains.
2.2 Describing the Behavior of Actions in PDL
Before elaborating a theory, we need to specify what we are about to describe, i.e.,
what the formulas are supposed to interpret. Following the tradition in the literature,
we identify a domain (alias scenario) with the actions we take into account and the
fluents they can change. More formally, we have:
Definition 2.5 (Domain signature)
A domain signature is a tuple 〈Act,Prop〉.
An example of a domain signature (domain, for short) is the well-known Yale
Shooting Scenario [47], whose signature comprises the actions load, wait and shoot,
and fluents loaded and alive.
1Instead of global consequence, in [14] local consequence is considered. For that reason, a further
modal operator 2 had to be introduced, resulting in a logic which is multimodal K plus monomodal S4
for 2, and where axiom schema 2Φ → [a]Φ holds.
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The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names.
—Chinese proverb
Given a domain 〈Act,Prop〉, we are interested in theories whose statements de-
scribe the behavior of actions of Act on the fluents of Prop. PDL allows for the rep-
resentation of such statements, that we here call action laws. We distinguish several
types of them. We call effect laws formulas relating an action to its effects. Statements
of conditions under which an action cannot be executed are called inexecutability laws.
Executability laws in turn stipulate the context where an action is guaranteed to be ex-
ecutable. Finally, static laws are formulas that do not mention actions. They express
constraints that must hold in every possible state. These four types of laws are our
fundamental entities and we introduce them more formally in the sequel.
Static Laws
Frameworks which allow for indirect effects of actions make use of logical formulas
that state invariant propositions about theworld. Such formulas delimit the set of pos-
sible states. They do not refer to actions, and we suppose here that they are expressed
as formulas of classical propositional logic.
Definition 2.6 (Static law)
A static law2 is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml.
In our running example, the static law walking → alive says that if a turkey is
walking, then it must be alive. Another one is saved ↔ (mbox1∨ mbox2), which states
that an e-mail message is saved if and only if it is in mailbox 1 or in mailbox 2 or in
both [15].
In some action languages, such as AR [65, 44] for example, we would write the
statement always alive → walking, and in a Situation Calculus [90] variant, it would be
the first-order formula
∀s.(Holds(walking, s)→ Holds(alive, s)).
2In the literature, static laws are often called domain constraints or integrity constraints. Because the
different laws for actions that we shall introduce in the sequel could in principle also be called like that,
we avoid these terms.
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At first glance, no requirement concerning consistency of the static laws is made.
Of course, we want them to be consistent, otherwise the whole theory is inconsistent.
As we are going to see in the sequel, however, consistency of the static laws alone is
not enough to guarantee the consistency and even the intuitiveness of an action theory
as a whole.
Effect Laws
Logical frameworks for reasoning about actions contain expressions linking actions
and their effects. We suppose that such effects might be conditional, and thus get a
third component of such laws.
InPDL, the formula [a]Φ states that formulaΦ is true after every possible execution
of action a.
Definition 2.7 (Effect law)
An effect law3 for action a is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, with ψ classi-
cally consistent.
The consequentψ is the effect which obtains when action a is executed in a state where
the antecedent ϕ holds. An example of an effect law is loaded → [shoot]¬alive, saying
that whenever the gun is loaded, after shooting, the turkey is dead. Another one is
⊤→ [tease]walking: in every circumstance, the result of teasing is that the turkey starts
walking. For parsimony’s sake, the latter effect law will be written [tease]walking.
Note that the consistency requirement for ψmakes sense: if ψ is inconsistent, then
we have an inexecutability law, that we consider as a separate entity and which we
are about to introduce formally in the sequel. On the other hand, if ϕ is inconsistent,
then the effect law is obviously superfluous.
For the first example above, in action languages one would write the statement
shoot causes ¬alive if loaded,
and in the Situation Calculus formalism one would write the first-order formula
∀s.(Holds(loaded, s)→ ¬Holds(alive, do(shoot, s))).
3Effect laws are often called action laws, but we prefer not to use that term here because it would also
apply to executability laws that are to be introduced in the sequel.
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Inexecutability Laws
We consider effect laws with inconsistent consequents as a particular kind of law
which we call inexecutability laws. (Such laws are sometimes called qualifica-
tions [85].) This allows us to avoid mixing things that are conceptually different: for an
action a, an effect law mainly associates it with a consequentψ, while an inexecutabil-
ity law only associates it with an antecedent ϕ, viz. the context which precludes the
execution of a.
Definition 2.8 (Inexecutability law)
An inexecutability law for action a is of the form ϕ→ [a]⊥, where ϕ ∈ Fml.
For example, ¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥ expresses that action shoot cannot be executed
if the agent has no gun. Another example is dead → [tease]⊥: a dead turkey cannot
be teased.
In AR we would write the statement
impossible shoot if ¬hasGun,
and in the Situation Calculus, our example would be
∀s.(¬Holds(hasGun, s)→ ¬Poss(shoot, s)).
Executability Laws
With only static and effect laws one cannot guarantee that the action shoot can be
executed whenever the agent has a gun. We need thus a way to state such conditions.
In dynamic logic, the dual 〈a〉ϕ, defined as ¬[a]¬ϕ, can be used to express exe-
cutability. The formula 〈a〉⊤ thus reads “execution of action a is possible”.
Definition 2.9 (Executability law)
An executability law for action a is of the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, where ϕ ∈ Fml.
For instance, hasGun→ 〈shoot〉⊤ says that shooting can be executed whenever the
agent has a gun, and ⊤ → 〈tease〉⊤, also written 〈tease〉⊤, establishes that the turkey
can always be teased.
Some approaches (most prominently Reiter’s [99, 100]) use biconditionals of the
form ϕ ↔ 〈a〉⊤, called precondition axioms. This is equivalent to ¬ϕ ↔ [a]⊥, which
highlights that they merge information about inexecutability with information about
executability. Here we consider these entities to be different and keep them separate.
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In action languages in general, such laws are not represented, they are rather im-
plicitly inferred from inexecutability statements (cf. Section 8.2). In the Situation Cal-
culus, our example would be stated as
∀s.(Holds(hasGun, s)→ Poss(shoot, s)).
Whereas all the extant approaches in the literature that allow for indirect effects of
actions contain static and effect laws, and provide a way for representing inexecutabil-
ities (in the form of implicit qualifications [42, 78, 112]), the status of executability laws
is less consensual. Some authors [102, 28, 83, 112] more or less tacitly consider that
executability laws should not be made explicit but rather inferred by the reasoning
mechanism. Others [78, 23, 14, 119] have executability laws as first class objects one
can reason about.
It seems a matter of debate whether one can always do without executabilities. In
principle, it seems to be strange to just state information about necessary conditions
for action execution (inexecutabilities) without saying anything about its sufficient
conditions. This is the reason why we think that we need executability laws. Indeed,
in several domains one wants to explicitly state under which conditions a given action
is guaranteed to be executable, e.g. that a robot never gets stuck and is always able to
execute a move action. And if we have a plan such as load; shoot (load followed by
shoot) of which we know that it achieves the goal ¬alive, then we would like to be sure
that it is executable in the first place!4 In any case, allowing for executability laws
gives us more flexibility and expressive power.
2.3 Action Theories
An ounce of action is worth a ton of theory.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
Given a domain 〈Act,Prop〉, let L denote the language of our formalism, i.e., all
well formed sentences of the logic under consideration built upon the objects in the
signature and the logical connectives. Let T be the theory (set of non-logical axioms)
describing the behavior of the actions of the domain, i.e., T is a set of global axioms in
4Of course, this would require a solution to the qualification problem [85].
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Fitting’s sense [33] of the types defined above. Let |≈ be a consequence relation (possibly
nonmonotonic) defined on L. We thus define action theories:
Definition 2.10 (Action theory)
An action theory (alias domain description) is a tuple D = 〈L, |≈,T 〉, where L is a
language, T a set of formulas of L, and |≈ a consequence relation defined on L.
As an example of an action theory, consider Dwts = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉, where LPDL is
the set of all PDL-formulas, |=
PDL
is the consequence relation in PDL (cf. Definition 2.4),
and the theory T is given by:
T =


walking→ alive,¬loaded → [load]loaded,
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive, hasGun→ 〈shoot〉⊤,
¬hasGun→ [shoot]⊥, [tease]walking,
〈tease〉⊤, 〈load〉⊤


Then Dwts is an action theory in PDL formalizing the Walking Turkey Scenario [112].
Figure 2.3 below shows a PDL-model for the theory component of the domain de-
scription above.
¬l, w
a, h
¬l, w
a, ¬h
¬l, ¬w
¬a, h
¬l, ¬w
¬a, ¬h
¬l, ¬w
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a, ¬h
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Figure 2.3: A model for the Walking Turkey Scenario: l, w, a, and h stand for, respectively,
loaded, walking, alive and hasGun. Actions shoot, tease and load were abbreviated, respectively,
to s, t and l.
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Definition 2.11 (Action theory entailment)
Let D = 〈L, |≈,T 〉 be an action theory, and Φ ∈ L. D entails Φ (noted D |= Φ) if and
only if T |≈ Φ.
(To avoid confusion, we remember that we denote entailment in classical proposi-
tional logic by |=
CPL
.)
In our action theory example, we haveDwts |= loaded → [shoot]¬walking andDwts |=
[tease]alive.
Let Cn(D) = {Φ : D |= Φ} denote the set of all consequences of action theory D .
We define when two action theories are equivalent:
Definition 2.12 (Action theory equivalence)
Action theories D1 and D2 are equivalent if and only if Cn(D1) = Cn(D2).
In the rest of this work, we analyze the design of action theories as defined here
and see how difficult it can be to achieve the desired intuition.
Chapter 3
where we take a look at the grass in the neighbors’ garden
Modularity in
Reasoning about Actions
To know the road ahead, ask those coming back.
—Chinese proverb
We here identify two main trends on modularity of descriptions: one pragmatic,
programming language driven, and one logical theoretic driven. We point out that
both proposals are inadequate as accounts of modularity when applied to theories in
reasoning about actions. We show that they are either too weak or too strong and
do not completely avoid unwanted interactions between modules. We also claim that
modules designed following their directives may be as complex as whole theories.
3.1 The Need for Modules
Modularity has become one of the words of order in many areas of software devel-
opment. That is also the case for knowledge representation and reasoning, where
monolithic descriptions have shown to be of high complexity for dealing with.
The last years have seen the flourish of plenties of papers [2, 46, 68, 57, 64] that
in a more or less tacit way talk about concepts as modules, reusability, intelligibility,
evaluation, maintainability, independence and self-content, elaboration tolerance and
many others. Most of these terms are borrowed from software engineering, sometimes
without a clear notion of the impacts that they can have when transplanted to domains
where their use is not a matter of intuition, but rather they have to accommodate with
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well established formal settings. Here we point out that this is not a simple task,
especially when logic is the formal substratum in which knowledge is represented.
Despite the apparent fragility of the well-known toy scenarios commonly used in
this domain to illustrate typical problems in the area, things get more seriouswhenwe
move to the “real” world. One can expect that action theories describing the behavior
of actions for applications of real interest will be of very high complexity. By this we
mean amount of information being represented, the internal relationship among data,
the feasibility of inferences in a huge set of formulas, as well as the difficulty for future
amendments.
Thus, the question that naturally arises is “how can we ease the knowledge en-
gineer’s task in describing a domain”? One answer, of course, following the divide-
and-conquer trend, is “modularizing the action theory”. But what does it really mean
to modularize an action theory? For that we give a (general) definition of a module
prototype.
Definition 3.1 (Module prototype)
A module prototype of an action theory D = 〈L, |≈,T 〉 is a description D ′ =
〈L ′, |≈ ′,T ′〉 such that L ′ ⊆ L, |≈ ′ ⊆ |≈ and T ′ ⊆ T .1
A module prototype is just a syntactic-based fragment of a description D . Like in
structural and object-oriented programming, tomodularize an action theory is not just
a matter of cutting the description in a whole bunch of slices. Such a decoupling must
be done so that the resulting theory has interesting properties regarding the above
requirements. We are going to see in the rest of this work that to be really considered
as a module, pieces of descriptions are usually required to satisfy some desiderata.
We can find in the literature several proposals on modularization of action the-
ories that are quite close to software engineering and object-oriented programming.
Some examples are the object-oriented first-order logic (OOFOL [1]) and its Situation
Calculus variant [2], Gustafsson and Kvarnstro¨m’s framework for elaboration toler-
ance [46], and Lifschitz and Ren’s modular action description language [77]. Despite
the well developed formal background, such approaches are more focused on the
implementation level (which is of course important) and either do not take into ac-
count or make too restrictive assumptions about in order to get rid of an important
issue when describing a domain: unforeseen interactions between modules, or even
between components of a single module.
1Module prototypes are thus seen as sub-descriptions, and action theories in our sense are themselves
module prototypes.
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In the sameway, we see goodwork in the logician’s community concerningmodu-
larity (or similar notions) of logical theories in general [38], and of theories in descrip-
tion logics [22]. However, as we are going to see, when bringing such definitions to
the case of reasoning about actions, we get a too restrictive notion of modularity with
which either there is no way to modularize a description or the modules are difficult
to understand.
3.2 OO-driven Logical Modularity
Regarding the titles of this and the next section, we do not want to say that the ap-
proaches we analyze here are not logical. We just have put them apart because they
are more engineering-oriented, in the sense that their respective formalisms have been
mainly developed with the aim of serving as engineer tools.
There are several proposals on modularization of action theories that are quite
close to software engineering and object-oriented programming [2, 46, 77]. The main
feature of these approaches is the decomposition of descriptions in a way similar to
that programmers usually do in decomposing software applications. Given a domain,
their parts are associated with sub-domains. Action theories are thus composed of
sub-descriptions that interact in some way, e.g. by sharing common information, in-
heriting properties [46, 77], or message passing [5, 6].
We here take the OOFOL formalism [1] and its Situation Calculus flavor [2] as
our guiding paradigm in this section. The reason is that it is representative of this
category, and the fact of being oriented to reasoning about actions will ease further
comparisons.
Amir [2, 4] focuses on design andmaintainability of domain descriptions applying
many of the concepts of the object-oriented paradigm in the Situation Calculus. In that
work, guidelines for a partitioned representation of a given theory are presented, with
which the inference task can also be optimized [5, 4, 6], as it is restricted to the part of
the theory that is relevant to a given query. This is observed specially when different
agents are involved: the design of an agent’s theory can be done with no regard to
others’, and after the integration of multiple agents, queries about an agent’s beliefs
do not take into account the belief state of other agents. Such a feature of a description
is called conditional independence [2].
The original approach is first-order, but we here present it using the syntax of PDL,
which has no harm on its basic intuitions.
24 Modularity in Reasoning about Actions
In the OOFOL approach, an action theory 〈L, |≈,T 〉 is decomposed in module
prototypes 〈L1, |≈,T1〉, . . . , 〈Ln, |≈,Tn〉 such that
• Li ⊆ L is a PDL language ;
• for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ti = 〈Ai, Ii〉, where Ai is a set of formulas (axioms) such
that L(Ai) = Li (Li contains only the symbols appearing in formulas ofAi), and
Ii ⊆ {ℓ : ℓ ∈ Li} is the module’s interface, i.e., the literals it shares with other
modules; and
• T =
⋃
1≤i≤nAi.
Sub-descriptions are thus seen as objects in the object-oriented sense2, each one
having its own data (the set of axioms Ai) and a communication link with other ob-
jects (its interface Ii). Two distinct objects do not necessarily need to have distinct
languages, unless they are completely disconnected, i.e., atoms or actions in one of
them are never taken into account in the others’ inference. Given two distinct objects
that are supposed to interact, their interface links establish (semantical) equality or
equivalence between symbols in their respective languages and are restricted to only
the symbols appearing in the interface (see below).
For the case of reasoning about actions, each Ti is designed so that the respectiveAi
component contains formulas of a specific type, i.e., descriptions are partitioned into
a module for effect laws, a module for static laws, etc. As an example, the action the-
ory Dwts = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 formalizing the Walking Turkey Scenario (cf. Section 2.3)
would be decomposed in
Dwts1 = 〈L1, |=CPL , 〈{walking1→ alive1}, {walking1, alive1}〉〉
Dwts2 = 〈L2, |=PDL , 〈
{
⊤↔ 〈tease2〉⊤,
hasGun2↔ 〈shoot2〉⊤
}
, ∅〉〉
Dwts3 = 〈L3, |=PDL , 〈


¬loaded3→ [load3]loaded3,
loaded3→ [shoot3]¬alive3,
[tease3]walking3

 , {walking3, alive3}〉〉
together with the equivalences |=
CPL
walking1 ↔ walking3, and |=CPL alive1 ↔ alive3,
and the equalities tease2 = tease3 and shoot2 = shoot3. These say, e.g. that walking1
2Do not confound with objects in the domain signature. In object-oriented programming, an object,
roughly speaking, is an instance of a class that models an entity of the world [108, 98].
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in object Dwts1 should be understood as having the same semantics as walking3 in
object Dwts3, and action shoot2 in object Dwts2 should be interpreted as shoot3 in ob-
ject Dwts3. This means, for example, that inferences regarding walking1 in Dwts1 also
concern Dwts3. (For more details on how reasoning is carried out in descriptions that
are decomposed that way, see [5, 6]. We here concentrate only in the modeling aspect
and the impact it has on what we expect from modules.)
Notice the modifications that we had to carry out with respect to the original
formulas in Dwts in order to decompose it with the method defined in [2]. Exe-
cutability laws and inexecutability laws are mixed together: hasGun → 〈shoot〉⊤ and
¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥ have been combined in the biconditional hasGun ↔ 〈shoot〉⊤.
This is reminiscent of the principle of maximization of executabilities commonly used
in the literature [78, 44]. We argue (cf. Section 8.2) that such assumption gives us less
flexibility in the design of dynamical systems.
If we want a better decomposed description, we should rather have defined
Dwts1′ = 〈L1, |=CPL , 〈{walking1→ alive1}, {walking1, alive1}〉〉
Dwts2′ = 〈L2, |=PDL , 〈
{
〈tease2〉⊤,
hasGun2→ 〈shoot2〉⊤
}
, ∅〉〉
Dwts3′ = 〈L3, |=PDL , 〈


¬loaded3→ [load3]loaded3,
loaded3→ [shoot3]¬alive3,
[tease3]walking3

 , {walking3, alive3}〉〉
Dwts4′ = 〈L4, |=PDL , 〈{¬hasGun4→ [shoot4]⊥}, ∅〉〉
with |=
CPL
walking1 ↔ walking3 and |=CPL alive1 ↔ alive3, and the equalities tease2 =
tease3 and shoot2 = shoot3 = shoot4.
In order to correctly make inferences in such a description, it has to take into ac-
count a solution to the frame problem [90] (cf. Chapter 4). In [2] this is done by pro-
viding another object containing Successor StateAxioms [99] connectedwith themod-
ules above. We do not show this explicitly here and just assume the above description
together with such a solution provides a way for deriving all frame axioms. Then,
because the tease action does not change the status of literal ¬alive, from the above the-
ory with its respective solution to the frame problem, we are able to derive the frame
axiom ¬alive → [tease]¬alive. Because we have [tease]walking and walking → alive, we
also conclude [tease]alive. Joining these results gives us the implicit inexecutability [42]
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¬alive→ [tease]⊥. That is an intuitive result. However, with this and the executability
〈tease〉⊤, we conclude alive: the turkey never dies (Figure 3.1)!
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Figure 3.1: A model of the immortal turkey.
The way the proposal in [2] gets rid of such a problem is by imposing a syntactical
condition on the antecedents of executabilities and effect laws in order to preclude
them of getting in conflict. Roughly speaking, whenever there is an inexecutability
ϕ → [a]⊥ and an executability ϕ ′ → 〈a〉⊤, then ϕ∧ϕ ′ is inconsistent. So, in order to
have a safe description, we should change Dwts2 in the following way:
Dwts2′′ = 〈L2, |=PDL , 〈
{
alive2↔ 〈tease2〉⊤,
hasGun2↔ 〈shoot2〉⊤
}
, {alive2}〉〉
That is to say, decomposing the description in its more elementary entities like we did
above is not allowed.
3.3 Strong Logic-driven Modularity
Some researchers have tried to capture what modularity in formal logic means [38,
115, 114, 22] at an elementary level. Here we focus on the works of Garson [38] and
Cuenca Grau and colleagues [22].
Inspired by Fodor’s claims [34], Garson seems to have been the precursor of
proposing a notion of modularity in logical systems. In his work, he has given an
account of modularity motivated especially by issues as correctness and efficiency of
a reasoning system.
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In Garson’s approach, in order to be a module, a module prototype (alias sub-
description) must satisfy two properties:
1. Local correctness: every formula entailed by the sub-description is also entailed
by the whole description.
2. Local completeness: every formula in the scope of the sub-description that is
entailed by the whole description is also entailed in the sub-description alone.
(A formulaΦ is in the scope of the module Di = 〈Li, |≈,Ti〉 if Φ ∈ Li.)
Local correctness requires the module prototypes to be “smaller” than the original
description, i.e., givenD = 〈L, |≈,T 〉 andD ′ = 〈L ′, |≈ ′,T ′〉 amodule prototype ofD ,
we must have L ′ ⊆ L, |≈ ′ ⊆ |≈ and T ′ ⊆ T . (This is indeed our definition of module
prototype, cf. Definition 3.1. In practice, we should claim for the strict inclusion ⊂,
since in modularizing a description we generally do not expect to get the original
description as a result.) To see the need for such a property and the motivation behind
our definition, if at least one of these inclusions does not hold, then the sub-description
can prove more things than the whole description, contradicting the intuition of the
concept of module.
LetD = 〈L, |≈,T 〉 be an action theory andD1 = 〈L1, |≈,T1〉, . . . ,Dn = 〈Ln, |≈,Tn〉
be module prototypes of D . Local completeness states that
T = T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tn, such that Cn(D) =
⋃
1≤i≤n
Cn(Di)
and
Cn(Di) ∩ Cn(Dj) = ∅,∀i, j, i 6= j
In other words, the collection of all logical modules should be a kind of ‘partition’ of
the original logical theory.
It is not difficult to see that such a notion of modularity in its own is too strong.
First, because each module’s theory Ti by definition entails all logical tautologies. Sec-
ond, because it holds only for consistent descriptions: it may be the case that an incon-
sistent domain description has nomodule that is itself inconsistent, and then there can
be formulas entailed by the whole description that are not entailed in their respective
module, violating local completeness.
Both these problems have been addressed in [38] and [22]. We can relax local
completeness by considering only substantive entailments of the theory, i.e., non-
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tautological ones. In what concerns consistency, Garson argues that classical logic
is not a good setting for an account of modularity. Besides the complexity of consis-
tency check, the very main reason for that, he says, is the principle of explosion:3 in
classical logic, a contradiction entails any sentence, which makes consistency check
very costly. As a manner of overcoming that and guaranteeing local completeness
even for inconsistent descriptions, Garson proposes to use relevant logic [30] instead
of classical logic. Cuenca Grau and colleagues, on the other hand, rely on the tractable
consistency check methods for description logics [8] and do not care about the princi-
ple of explosion.
Nevertheless, even relaxing local completeness, if we apply such a notion of mod-
ularity to domain descriptions in reasoning about actions, we can have some annoy-
ances. To witness, consider the following example (we illustrate with PDL, but it
could also be adapted to other frameworks in the literature that allow for the four
types of laws that we use to describe dynamic domains): suppose a domain with,
say, two actions a1 and a2, and only one atom p. Let D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉, with
T = {p → [a1]⊥, p → 〈a1〉⊤, 〈a2〉⊤}. Notice that D is consistent. So, because actions a1
and a2 are independent, i.e., they do not interact one with the other, it is reasonable
to start by requiring that the laws describing the sub-domain of a1 to be in a separate
module than those describing the domain of a2. Lets suppose that is the case, i.e., we
have D1 = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T1〉 and D2 = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T2〉, with
T1 =
{
p→ [a1]⊥,
p→ 〈a1〉⊤
}
, T2 = {〈a2〉⊤}
(Note that the description is still consistent.) We point out that such a modularization
does not satisfy the principle of modularity above: there is a formula, viz. [a2]¬p that
is entailed by the whole description but is not entailed by the module D2 alone. This
means our decomposition of D in D1 and D2 is not good. But where is the problem?
We said that a1 and a2 play no role together. So why D2 alone is not enough to derive
all conclusions in the domain of a2? Because there is an implicit logical interaction be-
tween laws for a1 and a2 that cannot be avoided. Zooming in inside T1, we see that
it entails ¬p, i.e., ¬p is a static law (hence, valid in every possible state of the world),
and, because the same happens in T , we have T |=
PDL
¬p and then T |=
PDL
[a2]¬p. Such
a global implicit entailment “gets lost” when we decompose the description, and that
3Ex falso sequitur quodlibet, the law of classical logic according to which “anything follows from a
contradiction.”
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is what makes the result to violate modularity. In order to overcome the problem, we
should rather join both modules. However, this gives exactly D as result!
Here we argue that formulas in reasoning about actions are so coupled, so related
that it is infeasible to have at once local completeness and intelligibility with scala-
bility. For applications of real interest, modules have to be so huge that we will find
inside the module the original problem about the initial description: it is big, diffi-
cult to understand and whose pretended independence from the other modules falls
down if a change in some other module forces an implicit law.
To summarize, either sub-domains are put together, giving us huge modules, with
lots of different types of formulas mixed and whose intelligibility is doubtful, or we
redefine modularity, probably relaxing it, to allow the (natural and unavoidable) cou-
pling among different formulas. Here we chose the second way and that is the issue
we henceforth address.
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Chapter 4
where we show how we cut the grass in our garden
The Modularity’s New Clothes
Take what you can use and let the rest go by.
—Ken Kesey
In this chapter, we make a step further through the notion of modularity of an
action theory and analyze some of its properties. We propose a way to overcome the
problem of implicit laws that we saw in the last chapter. For the sake of simplicity,
we suppose that no solution to the frame problem is given. We propose algorithms
to check whether a given action theory has implicit laws and that also catch them.
Completeness, correctness and termination results are demonstrated.
4.1 A Natural Decomposition
We start by observing that it is often the case that a set of axioms T containingmultiple
modalities a1, a2, . . . can be naturally partitioned into a union of theories T
∅ ∪ T a1 ∪
T a2 ∪ . . . such that T ∅ contains no modal operators, and the only modality appearing
in each T ai is ai.
For example, consider an action theory Dmarriage = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 such that:
T =


¬(married ∧ bachelor),
¬married→ 〈marry〉⊤,
[marry]married


We can see such a theory as composed of twomodules, one for expressing the dynamic
part of the theory, and another one to formalize the static constraints of the domain.
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The module
Dmarriage1 = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,
{
¬married→ 〈marry〉⊤,
[marry]married
}
〉
formalizes the behavior of the action of getting married, in this case the precondition
for executing marry (viz. ¬married) and the effect that obtains after its execution (viz.
married). The module
Dmarriage2 = 〈LPDL, |=PDL , {¬(married ∧ bachelor)}〉
formalizes the static law according to which it is not possible to be married and bach-
elor at the same time.
Let the underlying multimodal logic be independently axiomatized (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1), and suppose we want to know whether D |= Φ, i.e., whether a formula Φ
follows from the action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,T 〉. Then it is natural to expect that
we only have to consider those elements of T which concern the modal operators oc-
curring in Φ. For instance, the proof of some consequences of action a1 should not
involve laws for other actions a2. Note that this is not the case if the logic is not inde-
pendently axiomatized and there are interaction axioms such as [a1]Φ→ [a2]Φ.
Here we propose a modality-based decomposition of an action theory D .
Let act(Φ) return the set of modal operators (actions) occurring in formula Φ,
and, for given D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉, let act(T ) =
⋃
Φ∈T act(Φ). For instance,
act([a1](p1→ [a2]p2)) = {a1, a2}. For given a ∈ Act, we define
T a = {Φ ∈ T : act(Φ) = {a}}
For formulas with no modality, we define
T ∅ = {Φ ∈ T : act(Φ) = ∅}
For example, if
T =


¬(married ∧ bachelor),
¬married → 〈marry〉⊤, [marry]married,
married → 〈divorce〉⊤, [divorce]¬married


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then
T divorce =
{
married → 〈divorce〉⊤,
[divorce]¬married
}
and
T ∅ = {¬(married ∧ bachelor)}
We henceforth make the following hypothesis:
{T ∅} ∪ {T ai : ai ∈ Act} partitions
1 T (H)
We thus exclude T ai containing more than one modal operator.
Given this, we are now able to formally define modularity of a theory.
4.2 Modularity
We are interested in the following principle of modularity:
Definition 4.1 (Modularity)
An action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 ismodular if and only if for every formula Φ,
D |= Φ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T
∅ ∪ T act(Φ)〉 |= Φ.
Our notion of modularity means that when investigating whether Φ is a conse-
quence ofD , the only formulas ofD that are relevant are thosewhosemodal operators
occur in Φ and the classical formulas in T ∅.
This is reminiscent of interpolation [21], which more or less2 says:
Definition 4.2 (Interpolation property)
An action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 has the interpolation property if and only if for
every formulaΦ, if D |= Φ, then there is a module DΦ = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,TΦ〉 such that
• act(TΦ) ⊆ act(T ) ∩ act(Φ);
• D |= Φ ′ for everyΦ ′ ∈ TΦ; and
• DΦ |= Φ.
1{T ∅} ∪ {T ai : ai ∈ Act} partitions T if and only if T = T
∅ ∪
S
ai∈Act
T ai , and T ∅ ∩ T ai = ∅, and
T ai ∩ T aj = ∅, if ai 6= aj . Note that T
∅ and each T ai might be empty.
2We here present a version in terms of global consequence, as opposed to local consequence or mate-
rial implication versions that can be found in the literature [69, 70]. We were unable to find such global
versions in the literature.
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Our definition of modularity is a strengthening of interpolation because it requires TΦ
to be a subset of T . Properties similar to interpolation for reasoning about actions in
PDL have also been investigated in [120].
Contrary to interpolation, modularity does not generally hold. Clearly if the
Hypothesis (H) is not satisfied, then modularity fails. To witness, consider D =
〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 such that
T = {p1→ [a1][a2]p2, [a1][a2]p2→ p3}
Then D |= p1→ p3, but 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T ∅ ∪ T act(p1→p3)〉 6|= p1→ p3.
Nevertheless, even under our hypothesis, modularity may fail to hold. For exam-
ple, let D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 be such that
T = {¬p→ [a]⊥,¬p→ 〈a〉⊤}
Then T ∅ = ∅, and T a = T . Now D |= p, but clearly 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T
∅ ∪ T act(p)〉 6|= p.
How can we know whether a given action theory D is modular? The following
criterion is simpler:
Definition 4.3 (Propositional modularity)
An action theory D is propositionally modular if and only if for every propositional
formula ϕ,
D |= ϕ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T
∅〉 |= ϕ
And that suffices to guarantee modularity:
Theorem 4.1
Let the underlying logic be a fusion, and let D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 be such that T is
partitioned. If D is propositionally modular, then D is modular.
Proof:
See Appendix A.
In the rest of the chapter, we investigate how it can be automatically checked
whether a given action theory D is modular or not, and how to make it modular,
if needed.
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4.3 Deciding Modularity
How can we check whether a given action theory D is modular? Following Theo-
rem 4.1, it is enough to check for propositional modularity.
Definition 4.4 (Implicit static law)
ϕ ∈ Fml is an implicit static law of an action theory D if and only if D |= ϕ and
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,T
∅〉 6|= ϕ.
Let Dtrans = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 formalize a transaction domain such that:
T =
{
¬adult→ ¬obligedPay, [order]obligedPay,
¬adult→ [order]¬adult, 〈order〉⊤
}
Observe that by the fact that Dtrans |= ¬adult → [order]⊥, we have Dtrans |= adult. But
T ∅ 6|=
CPL
adult, hence adult is an example of an implicit static law . Moreover, Dtrans is
also an example of an action theory that is not modular in our sense.
Theorem 4.1 tells us that an action theory is modular if and only if it has no implicit
static law. Hence, checking the existence of such laws provides us a way to decide
modularity of a given action theory. Assuming the theory component T of an action
theory is finite, with Algorithm 4.1 below we can check whether an action theory
has such implicit laws. The idea is as follows: for each pair of laws ϕ1 → 〈a〉⊤ and
ϕ2→ [a]⊥ in T , if ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 is satisfiable and T ∅ 6|=CPL ¬(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2), mark ¬(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) as
an implicit static law.
Algorithm 4.1 Deciding existence of implicit static laws
input: D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉
output: a set of implicit static laws Simp
Simp:= ∅
for all a ∈ act(T ) do
for all ϕ ′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T do
for all {ϕ1→ [a]ψ1, . . . , ϕn→ [a]ψn} ⊆ T a do
if T ∅ ∪ {ϕ ′, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} 6|=CPL ⊥ and T
∅ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} |=CPL ⊥ then
Simp:= Simp ∪ {¬(ϕ
′ ∧ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ϕn)}
Theorem 4.2 (Decidability)
Algorithm 4.1 terminates.
Proof:
Straightforward from finiteness of T .
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Theorem 4.3 (Soundness)
Let Simp be the output of Algorithm 4.1 on input D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉. Then every
ϕ ∈ Simp is an implicit static law of D .
Proof:
Letϕ ∈ Fml be such that ϕ ∈ Simp and D |= ϕ. ϕ is of the form ¬(ϕ
′ ∧ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn),
for some ϕ ′, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, and T
∅ ∪ {ϕ ′ ∧ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn} 6|=CPL ⊥ is the case. Hence,
T ∅ ∪ {¬ϕ} 6|=
CPL
⊥, which means that T ∅ 6|=
CPL
ϕ. Thereforeϕ is an implicit static law.
Remark 4.1 The converse of Theorem 4.3 does not hold: consider the quite simple
action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 such that
T =
{
¬pn, 〈a〉⊤,
pi−1→ [a]pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
Thus, D |= ¬pi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, but running Algorithm 4.1 returns only Simp = {¬pn−1}.
This suggests that it is necessary to iterate the algorithm in order to find all implicit
static laws. We shall do this in the sequel, and now just observe that:
Theorem 4.4
An action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 is modular if and only if Simp = ∅.
Proof:
See Appendix A.
Considering the action theory in Remark 4.1, we see that running Algorithm 4.1
on 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T ∪ {¬pn−1}〉 gives us Simp = {¬pn−2}. This means some of the implicit
static laws may be needed in order to derive others. Hence, Algorithm 4.1 should be
iterated to getD modular. This is achieved with Algorithm 4.2, which iteratively feeds
the set of static laws considered into the if-test of Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.2 Finding all implicit static laws
input: D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉
output: Simp*, the set of all implicit static laws of D
Simp*:= ∅
repeat
Simp:= find imp stat(〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T ∪ Simp*〉) {a call to Algorithm 4.1}
Simp*:= Simp* ∪ Simp
until Simp = ∅
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Theorem 4.5 (Decidability)
Algorithm 4.2 terminates.
Proof:
First, for given a the set of candidates to be an implicit static law is
{¬(ϕ∧
∧
ϕi→[a]ψi∈T^ a
ϕi) : ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T a and T^ a ⊆ T a}
This set is finite.
In each step, either the algorithm ends because Simp = ∅, or at least one of the
candidates is put into Simp (by a call to Algorithm 4.1, which terminates). Such a can-
didate is not going to be put into Simp in future steps, because once added to Simp*, it
will be in the set of laws of all subsequent calls to Algorithm 4.1, falsifying its respec-
tive if-test for such a candidate. Hence the repeat-loop is bounded by the number of
candidates, and therefore Algorithm 4.2 terminates.
Theorem 4.6
Let Simp* be the output of Algorithm 4.2 on input D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉. Then
1. 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T ∪ Simp*〉 is modular.
2. D |=
∧
Simp*.
Proof:
Item 1. is straightforward from the termination of Algorithm 4.2 and Theorem 4.4.
Item 2. follows from the fact that by the if-test in Algorithm 4.1, the only formulas
that are put in Simp* at each execution of the loop are exactly those that are implicit
static laws of the original theory.
Corollary 4.1
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉. For all ϕ ∈ Fml, D |= ϕ if and only if T
∅ ∪ Simp* |=CPL ϕ.
Proof:
For the left-to-right direction, let ϕ ∈ Fml be such that D |= ϕ. Then T |=
PDL
ϕ, and
hence T ∪ Simp* |=PDL ϕ, by monotonicity. By Theorem 4.6-1., 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T ∪ Simp*〉 is
modular, hence T ∅ ∪ Simp* |=CPL ϕ.
The right-to-left direction is straightforward by Theorem 4.6-2.
This establishes that Algorithm 4.2 finds all implicit static laws of an action the-
ory D . Adding such laws to the theory component T of D guarantees, hence, modu-
larity of D .
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4.4 What about the Frame Problem?
As the readermight have already expected, the formalism of PDL alone does not solve
the frame problem [90]. For instance, if Dwts describes our shooting domain (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3), then
Dwts 6|= hasGun→ [load]hasGun.
The reason is that there are some anomalous models in which hasGun is not preserved
after the execution of action load. The model in Figure 2.3 is an example of an anoma-
lous model for such a scenario. Figure 4.1 highlights one of its problematic transitions.
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Figure 4.1: Anomalous model in the Walking Turkey Scenario.
The formula hasGun → [load]hasGun is an example of a frame axiom. Following
the tradition in the reasoning about actions community, we do not want to state such
a kind of axioms in the action theory. In order to satisfy this requirement, given an
action theory D , we need a consequence relation powerful enough to deal with the
frame problem. This means that the deductive power of PDL has to be augmented in
order to ensure that the non-effects of actions follow from the theory. We here opt for
the dependence-based approach presented in [14]. There, meta-logical information,
given in the form of a dependence relation, is added to PDL.
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Definition 4.5 (Dependence relation [14])
A dependence relation is a binary relation ; ⊆ Act× Lit.
The expression a ; ℓ denotes that the execution of action a may make the literal ℓ
true. In our example, we have
; =
{
〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
,
which means that action shootmay make the literals ¬loaded, ¬alive and ¬walking true,
and action tease may make walking true.
Semantically, the dependence-based approach relies on the explanation closure
assumption [102], and its solution to the frame problem consists in a kind of negation
as failure: because 〈load,¬hasGun〉 /∈ ;, we have load 6; ¬hasGun, i.e., ¬hasGun is
never caused by load. Thus, in a context where hasGun is true, after every execution
of load, hasGun still remains true. We also have tease 6; alive and tease 6; ¬alive. The
meaning of all these independences is that the frame axioms hasGun → [load]hasGun,
¬alive→ [tease]¬alive and alive→ [tease]alive hold.
We assume that ; is finite.
A dependence relation ; defines a class of possible worlds models:
Definition 4.6 (; truth conditions)
A PDL-model M = 〈W,R〉 is a ;-model if and only if wheneverwRaw
′ then:
• if a 6; p, then 6|=
M
w
p implies 6|=
M
w′
p; and
• if a 6; ¬p, then |=
M
w
p implies |=
M
w′
p.
Figure 4.2 depicts the dependence-based condition on models.
Given a ;-model M ,Φ and T , |=
M
Φ and |=
M
T are defined as in Definition 2.3.
Definition 4.7 (;-based logical consequence)
A formulaΦ is a ;-based consequence of the set of global axioms T in the class of all
;-models (noted T |=
;
Φ) if and only if for every ;-model M , if |=
M
T , then |=
M
Φ.
Thus, if in our example we replace in Dwts the consequence relation |=; , with its
associated dependence relation above, for |=
PDL
, it holds:
Dwts |= hasGun→ [load]hasGun.
In this way, the dependence-based approach solves the frame problem.
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a
Figure 4.2: Dependence-based condition: preservation of literal ¬p under hypothesis a 6; p.
Henceforth we consider |=
;
as the consequence relation component of our PDL
domain descriptions.
Definition 4.8 (Action theory model)
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be a domain description. A PDL-model M is a model of D if
and only if M is a ;-model and |=
M
T .
All the definitions we have given in this chapter shall then be adapted to fit to-
gether with our new consequence relation. We will develop this issue later on in this
work. Before doing that, in the next two chapters we investigate interesting properties
that justify our choice for the dependence-based approach.
Chapter 5
where we show we can do as simple as others
Recasting Reiter’s Solution
Almost all absurdity of conduct arises from the
imitation of those whom we cannot resemble.
— Samuel Johnson
In this chapter, we propose an encoding of Reiter’s Situation Calculus solution to
the frame problem into the framework of our multimodal logic of actions. In par-
ticular, we show that with the dependence-based solution to the frame problem we
achieve that without quantification, and present the modal counterpart of the regres-
sion technique. This gives us a theorem proving method for a relevant fragment of
our dynamic logic.
5.1 Deterministic PDL with Quantification and Equality
In the reasoning about actions field, most approaches use the Situation Calculus for-
malism [90]. Among those, Reiter’s [99] has turned out to be most fruitful. His basic
formalism is restricted to deterministic actions without static laws. In order to solve
the frame problem, he makes use of so-called Successor State Axioms (SSAs). The
latter enable regression [99], which has interesting computational properties.
The Situation Calculus is a dialect of predicate logic, having situations and actions
as objects, and where actions are viewed as mappings on the set of situations. At first
glance, this is very close to possible worlds semantics for deterministic PDL [49]. But
the precise relation between Reiter’s approach and dynamic logic is not as obvious
as that. One of the reasons why his formalism cannot be translated straightforwardly
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into modal logics of action such as PDL is that the Situation Calculus allows quantify-
ing over actions. Worse, such quantifications are central to Reiter’s approach.
In [24] there has been presented a technique to translate Reiter’s framework into
dynamic logic. In this chapter we present a different approach. We solve the problem
using the dependence-based extension to PDL that we saw in the previous chapter.
Having such a result provides some degree of optimization in doing inference tasks
for some important classes of problems in the area.
In this chapter, we will concentrate only on deterministic PDL, i.e., the logic we
have defined in Chapter 2 restricted to the casewhere eachRa is deterministic: for each
action a and each world w, there is at most one world w ′ such that wRaw
′. Moreover,
we here slightly extend such a logic in order to allow for quantification over actions
and the equality predicate. This will serve as the basis for developing the ideas in this
chapter.
We here will use ~a as a meta-variable ranging over action constants and vari-
ables. Here Φ will also denote complex formulas possibly involving quantification
and equality between actions.
The nonstandard feature of the logic we are going to use here is that we allow
for quantification over actions, and for equality between actions. Hence, in this version of
dynamic logic, we allow for formulas of the form ∀a.Φ, withΦ a complex formula. In
the Yale shooting scenario (YSS) [47], one can e.g. write
∀a.(alive ∧ ¬[a]alive → (a = shoot ∧ hasGun ∧ loaded)).
This is an explanation closure axiom [102] expressing that the only way to make alive
false is by the shoot action under preconditions hasGun and loaded.
We call our version of deterministic PDL with quantification and equality DPDL+.
Once added these features to deterministic PDL, it remains to redefine what its
models are.
Definition 5.1 (DPDL+-model)
A DPDL+-model is a triple M = 〈W,R, I〉 where W and R are as in Definition 2.1,
and I is an interpretation function mapping propositional constants to subsets of W,
and action constants and variables to elements of R.
We will sometimes write w ′ ∈ (I(~a))(w) instead of wI(~a)w ′, and similarly for vari-
ables a.
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Definition 5.2 (Interpretation agreement)
Let I and I ′ be interpretations. I agrees with I ′ except possibly on a if and only if
• I(p) = I ′(p), for every propositional constant p;
• I(~a) = I ′(~a), for every action constant~a; and
• I(a ′) = I ′(a ′), for every action variable a ′ different from a.
For a DPDL+-model M = 〈W,R, I〉, |=
M
w
∀a.Φ if and only if for every I ′ such that I
agrees with I ′ except possibly on a, |=
〈W,R,I ′〉
w
Φ. |=
M
w
[~a]Φ if and only if for every w ′ ∈
(I(~a))(w), |=
M
w′
Φ. |=
M
w
[a]Φ if and only if for every w ′ ∈ (I(a))(w), |=
M
w′
Φ. The other truth
conditions, truth in a model and logical consequence are as defined in Section 2.1.
Actions being deterministic, i.e., (I(~a))(w) is either a singleton or empty, we have
that for every action constant~a and every formulaΦ
|=
DPDL
+ 〈~a〉Φ→ [~a]Φ (5.1)
If all actions are deterministic, then every formula without quantification can be
brought into a normal form where there are neither conjunctions nor disjunctions in
the scope of modal operators. Apart from classical equivalences, this uses the follow-
ing ones from the left to the right:
|=
DPDL
+ [~a](Φ ∧Φ
′)↔ ([~a]Φ∧ [~a]Φ ′) (5.2)
|=
DPDL
+ [~a](Φ ∨Φ
′)↔ ([~a]Φ∨ [~a]Φ ′) (5.3)
In the next section, we introduce the basic hypotheses concerning the knowledge
we have about actions.
5.2 Describing Actions Like Reiter
In describing an action theory, it is more or less explicitly supposed that the following
pieces of information are given. (Some assumptions of complete information are made
about them.)
For each action constant~a, there is a classical formula Poss(~a) describing the action
precondition of ~a, i.e., the condition under which ~a can be executed. For example,
Poss(shoot) = hasGun, and Poss(strangle) = ⊤.
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It is supposed that action preconditions are complete: ~a is executable if and only if
Poss(~a) is true. In terms of dynamic logic, completeness of action preconditions means
that for every~a ∈ Act, we have a global axiom:
Poss(~a)↔ ¬[~a]⊥ (5.4)
For each propositional constant p, there are two finite sets of action constants
causes+(p) and causes−(p), describing, respectively, the positive and negative causes
of p. The set causes+(p) contains the actions in Act which in some circumstances
might cause p to become true, while causes−(p) contains those actions that may
cause p false. For example, causes+(alive) = ∅ (no action makes an agent alive),
causes−(alive) = {shoot, strangle}, and causes−(loaded) = {shoot}.1
It is also supposed that causes+(p) and causes−(p) are small, in the sense that
causes+(p) and causes−(p) are much smaller than Act.
Moreover, we suppose that these two sets are complete: whenever ~a /∈ causes+(p),
then the execution of~a can never make p true. In terms of dynamic logic, causal com-
pletenessmeans that we have a global axiom ¬p→ [~a]¬p in that case. Similarly, for ev-
ery ~a ′ such that ~a ′ /∈ causes−(p) we have a global axiom p→ [~a ′]p. These are frame ax-
ioms. In our example, as strangle 6∈ causes−(loaded), we have loaded → [strangle]loaded.
This corresponds to the explanation closure assumption [102, 103].
For all propositional constant p ∈ Prop and every action constant ~a ∈ causes+(p),
there is a classical formula Cond+(~a, p) describing the positive effect precondition of ac-
tion ~a. As an example, Cond+(toggle,up) = ¬up, and Cond+(load, loaded) = ⊤. Simi-
larly, for every~a ∈ causes−(p), there is a Cond−(~a, p) describing its negative effect precon-
dition. For example, Cond−(strangle, alive) = ⊤, and Cond−(shoot, alive) = loaded.2
It is supposed that effect preconditions are complete: in situations where the for-
mula Cond+(~a, p) does not hold, the execution of ~a can never make p true. Symmetri-
cally, when Cond−(~a, p) does not hold, then the execution of~a can never make p false.
In terms of dynamic logic, to every effect precondition Cond+(a, p), one can asso-
ciate a global axiom Cond+(~a, p) → [~a]p, and to every effect precondition Cond−(a, p),
one can associate a global axiom Cond−(a, p) → [~a]¬p. As an example, we have the
formula loaded→ [shoot]¬alive.
Completeness of effect preconditionsmeans that wemoreover have a global axiom
(¬Cond+(~a, p) ∧ ¬p) → [~a]¬p for every ~a ∈ causes+(p). Symmetrically, for every ~a ′
1In Reiter’s presentation, these functions can be retrieved from his functions γ+ and γ− [100].
2These functions correspond to Reiter’s γ+ and γ− .
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such that ~a ′ ∈ causes−(p), we have a global axiom (¬Cond−(~a ′, p) ∧ p) → [~a ′]p. This
expresses in dynamic logic what Reiter calls the application of Clark completion [18].
For example, we have (¬loaded ∧ alive) → [shoot]alive. In [14], axioms of this form
are called conditional frame axioms. There they are needed to complete the dependence
relation so that we can capture context-dependent effects of actions.
The three pieces of information together with the completeness assumptions guar-
antee that the possible world resulting from the execution of action ~a in a possible
world w is completely determined: for every model M = 〈W,R, I〉 and every world
w ∈ W, if 6|=
M
w
Poss(~a), then (I(~a))(w) = ∅. Else, the truth value of every p in every w ′
accessible from w via I(~a) is as follows. Suppose w.l.o.g. that |=
M
w
p. Then:
• if~a /∈ causes−(p), then |=
M
w′
p;
• if~a ∈ causes−(p) and 6|=
M
w
Cond−(~a, p), then |=
M
w′
p; and
• if~a ∈ causes−(p) and |=
M
w
Cond−(~a, p), then 6|=
M
w′
p.
As all truth values are thus determined, it follows that the set of worlds accessible
via I(~a) is either empty, or it can be considered to be a singleton. This fits with the
assumption that all actions are deterministic.
As we have noted, the action preconditions and effect preconditions appear ex-
plicitly in Reiter’s formalization, while the sets of possible causes causes+(p) and
causes−(p) only appear implicitly there.
Note that in Reiter’s Situation Calculus it is supposed that actions always lead to
some state: even in states where the agent has no gun in his hands, the state resulting
from the execution of shoot exists. The technical reason is that just as every function
in predicate logic, his successor function do(.) is total. This means that the logic of
each action operator [~a] should be KD [16]. We have nevertheless decided to follow
the dynamic logic tradition and suppose that the set of worlds accessible via some
action amight be empty. Therefore the logic of each [~a] is just K.
In fact, inexecutability of the action shoot is expressed in Situation Calculus by stat-
ing Poss(shoot) ↔ hasGun, where Poss(shoot) is a particular propositional constant. In
our formulation, Poss(.) is a function associating a classical formula to every action ~a.
Poss(~a) can be seen as an abbreviation, such as Poss(shoot) = hasGun. Given a domain
description in Reiter’s style, we obtain a description in our style if we
• Define our Poss(~a)-function from Reiter’s preconditions Poss(~a)↔ ϕ; and
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• Replace Reiter’s constants Poss(~a) by our 〈~a〉⊤.
The other way round, our version can be translated to Reiter’s by
• Defining his preconditions Poss(~a)↔ ϕ from our Poss(~a)-function; and
• Recursively replacing [~a]ϕ by Poss(~a)→ [~a]ϕ.
Observe that the latter is nothing but the well-known translation from modal logic K
to KD [93, 94].
All this sounds as if action theories could be described in DPDL+ in a satisfactory
manner, but, in such a framework, we have not solved the frame problem yet: as by
hypothesis causes+(p) and causes−(p) are small, it follows that the size of the set of
frame axioms that we have to state is close to card(Prop) × card(Act). This is usually
considered to be too big, and a central element in the research program of the reason-
ing about actions community was to design mechanisms allowing to infer such frame
axioms without stating them explicitly.
There was a 20-years-long debate about semantics and theorem proving methods
allowing such inferences. Reiter’s proposal seems to have closed the debate at least in
what concerns deterministic actions and no static laws. This is going to be presented
in the sequel.
5.3 Reiter’s Solution to the Frame Problem
Based on a particular class of models, Reiter proposes to incorporate the basic ingre-
dients of action theories that we have presented in the preceding section into what he
calls Successor State Axioms (SSA) [99]. These are special formulas that, given a state
and an action, completely determine the next state.
Reiter requires that all object names in the domain signature are unique and that
models are trees.
Definition 5.3 (Reiter model)
A DPDL+-model M = 〈W,R, I〉 is a Reiter-model if and only if 〈W,
⋃
a∈ActRa〉 is a tree,
and if I(~ai) = I(~aj), then i = j.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the tree-like structure of a Reiter model.
Definition 5.4 (Reiter’s logical consequence)
A formula Φ is a Reiter consequence of the global axioms T in the class of all Reiter-
models (noted T |=
R
Φ) if and only if for every Reiter-model M , if |=
M
T , then |=
M
Φ.
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M : . . .
. . . . . . . . .
a1
a2
an
a1 a2 an a1 a2 an a1 a2 an
Figure 5.1: Structure of a Reiter-model.
Successor State Axioms
Suppose that all the Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.) and Cond−(.) are given,
and that the completeness assumptions are made. We then can associate with that
an action theory D
R
= 〈LDPDL+ , |=R ,TR〉 from which the relevant frame axioms will
follow. According to Reiter’s approach, the component T
R
of the description is made
up of the following axioms:
• for every~a ∈ Act, there is an executability axiom Poss(~a)↔ ¬[~a]⊥; and
• for every p ∈ Prop, if causes+(p) = {a1, . . . , an} and causes
−(p) = {a ′1, . . . , a
′
m},
then there is a Successor State Axiom
∀a.([a]p↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨
(a = a1 ∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p)))))
Note that the Successor State Axiom above is well defined because we have supposed
that causes+(~a) and causes−(~a) are finite.
For the cases where n = 0 or m = 0, conjunction of the elements of an empty set
is identified with ⊤, and disjunction with ⊥. The latter can be illustrated with our
running example, where causes+(alive) = ∅. The Successor State Axiom for alive is:
∀a.([a]alive↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨⊥∨ (alive ∧ ¬(a = shoot ∧ loaded) ∧ ¬(a = strangle ∧⊤))))
We abbreviate reg(a, p) the right hand side of such an equivalence. The Successor
State Axiom for p therefore has the form ∀a.([a]p↔ reg(a, p)).
48 Recasting Reiter’s Solution
Successor State Axioms can be equivalently stated for negative literals as:
∀a.([a]¬p↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨ (a = a ′1 ∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(am, p)) ∨
(¬p ∧ ¬(a = a1 ∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∧ . . .∧ ¬(a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)))))
We abbreviate reg(a,¬p) the right hand side of this equivalence. For example the Suc-
cessor State Axiom for ¬alive is:
∀a.([a]¬alive ↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨ (a = shoot ∧ loaded) ∨ (a = strangle ∧⊤) ∨ (¬alive ∧ ¬⊥)))
Reiter’s original Successor State Axiom [99] is slightly different from ours:
∀a.(Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔
((a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . . ∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . .∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p)))))
Our version can be proved to be equivalent to his:
Theorem 5.1
Let T be the set of global axioms (5.4)–(5.8). Then
T |=
DPDL
+ (∀a.(Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔
((a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p)))))))↔
(∀a.([a]p↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨
(a = a1 ∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p))))))
Proof:
See Appendix B.
In [100], Reiter excluded the precondition Poss(a) from SSAs, and then just writes
∀a.([a]p↔
((a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1 ∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . .∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p))))
Therefore we would have e.g. [shoot]¬alive ↔ (loaded ∨ (¬alive ∧ ¬⊥)), from which
it follows by classical principles that (¬hasGun ∧ alive ∧ [shoot]¬alive) → loaded.
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This means that such SSAs do not take into account inexecutability: this issue must
be managed “by hand” by introducing Poss(shoot) atoms in the right places when
proving consequences of SSAs in their recent version.
Finally, we note that Reiter’s presentation also contains precondition axioms of
the form Poss(~a) ↔ ϕ. This is not needed here because we view Poss(.) as a function
returning a classical formula ϕ, which is directly integrated into our Successor State
Axiom (cf. Section 5.2).
Reiter’s Regression
Successor State Axioms are crucial when it comes to the reasoning aspect of the frame
problem, to which we turn now.
Given a Reiter’s style action theory D
R
, what can be deduced from it? Suppose
that Φ is a complex formula without quantification, action variables, and equality,
such as, for example, hasGun → [load][shoot]¬alive. In order to decide whether D
R
|=
Φ, Reiter proposes to rewrite Φ using the Successor State Axioms from the left to
the right. This is what he calls regression, and it consists in syntactical substitutions
whose iteration reduces a given formula with action symbols into another one with
just propositional constants. The whole procedure is given in Algorithm 5.1.
At each regression step,we have to put formulas in normal form such that there are
neither conjunctions nor disjunctions in the scope of modal operators (using the hy-
pothesis that all actions are deterministic). Hence the innermostmodal operators have
just literals in their scope. For the above example,Φ gets¬hasGun∨ [load][shoot]¬alive.
Algorithm 5.1 Reiter’s regression
input: a DPDL+ formula Φ with no variables, Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.)
and Cond−(.)
output: a classical formula regression(Φ)
whileΦ is not classical do
putΦ in normal form
choose a subformula [a]ℓ
if ℓ = p then
replace [a]p by reg(a, p)
else
replace [a]¬p by reg(a,¬p)
Notice that the action variable a of the Successor State Axiom is instantiated by the
constant denoted by~a.
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In our example, the regression of the subformula [shoot]¬alive is
¬hasGun ∨ (shoot = shoot ∧ loaded)∨
(shoot = strangle ∧⊤) ∨ (¬alive ∧ ¬⊥)
This can be simplified to ¬hasGun ∨ loaded ∨ ¬alive. Hence the result of a one step
regression of Φ is ¬hasGun ∨ [load](¬hasGun ∨ loaded ∨ ¬alive).
Each rewriting step thus eliminates a modal operator, and iterated application re-
sults in a formula without modal operators. If we iterate regression in our example,
we first put the formula
¬hasGun ∨ [load](¬hasGun ∨ loaded ∨ ¬alive)
into normal form, obtaining
¬hasGun ∨ [load]¬hasGun ∨ [load]loaded ∨ [load]¬alive.
The regression of subformula [load]¬hasGun is equivalent to ¬hasGun, that of subfor-
mula [load]loaded to ⊤, and that of [load]¬alive to ¬alive. We therefore obtain
¬hasGun ∨ ¬hasGun ∨⊤∨ ¬alive,
which is valid in classical propositional logic. This means that the original formula
hasGun→ [load][shoot]¬alive is entailed by D
R
.
As regression is proved to be sound [100, Theorem 4.5.2], checking validity of the
original formula amounts to checking satisfiability of the regressed one in the initial
state of the world:
Theorem 5.2 ([100])
Let D
R
be a Reiter style domain description, and Φ be a formula without variables.
Then D
R
|= Φ↔ regression(Φ).
Corollary 5.1
D
R
|= Φ if and only if |=
CPL
regression(Φ).
In the rest of this chapter, we explore whether regression can be performed in a
simpler framework, in particular without quantifying over actions.
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5.4 Solving the Frame Problem without Quantification
The venue of Reiter’s Situation Calculus-based solution has raised the natural ques-
tion of at what extent it could be possible to do the same in dynamic logic. Given
the expressivity limitations of the latter w.r.t. first-order logic (originally it did not al-
low for quantification over actions), many researchers [119, 120] have turned to other
ways of facing the problems in the area. There has been others [23], however, who
have tried on the first steps in that direction.
We here give DPDL+ up and consider just deterministic PDL and possible exten-
sions of it in order to encode Reiter’s solution to the frame problem.
De Giacomo and Lenzerini’s Encoding into PDL
De Giacomo and Lenzerini [23] have expressed Reiter’s solution in a slightly modified
version of PDL that avoids quantification over actions. For the sake of presentation,
here we simplify their account a bit. Basically, their approach can be said to have the
following ingredients (α denotes a complex action, i.e., an action built up on atomic
actions and PDL classical action composition operators):
• nondeterministic choice α ∪ α ′;
• converse α−;
• a particular nondeterministic atomic action any, thought of as the nondetermin-
istic composition of all atomic actions of Act: any = a1 ∪ a2 ∪ . . . ∪ an; and
• complement ¬α w.r.t. any, where α = a1 ∪ . . . ∪ am, for some a1, . . . , am ∈ Act.
Moreover, it is supposed that the past is deterministic, as expressed by the logical
axiom ¬[any−]¬Φ→ [any−]Φ.
Considering our running example, its formalization in De Giacomo and Lenz-
erini’s framework would be:
[any](¬alive → 〈any−〉¬alive ∨ 〈shoot−〉loaded ∨ 〈strangle−〉⊤)
[any](alive → 〈any−〉alive)
Just as for PDL, reasoning in De Giacomo and Lenzerini’s logical framework is
EXPTIME-complete [23]. While their encoding certainly preserves the spirit of Re-
iter’s Successor State Axioms, they did not give the counterpart of Reiter’s regression,
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and hence did not investigate whether reasoning for syntactically restricted theories is
“cheaper” than EXPTIME. In what follows, we show how this can be simulated with-
out quantification in the dependence-based framework we introduced in Chapter 4.
Regression in PDL plus Dependence
We start by observing that stating a ; p in the dependence-based framework is just
another way of writing down that a ∈ causes+(p), and a ; ¬p that a ∈ causes−(p).
Suppose all the ingredients Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.), Cond−(.) are
given, and let us make the completeness assumptions as introduced in Section 5.2.
We construct a dependence relation and a set of global axioms T as follows:
• for each p ∈ Prop: for every a ∈ causes+(p), we put a ; p; and for every a ′ ∈
causes−(p), we put a ′ ; ¬p;
• for every a ∈ Act, add the executability axiom Poss(a)↔ ¬[a]⊥ to T
• for every p ∈ Prop and every a ∈ causes+(p), add two effect axioms to T :
Cond+(a, p)→ [a]p (5.5)
(¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ [a]¬p (5.6)
• for every p ∈ Prop and every a ′ ∈ causes−(p), add two effect axioms to T :
Cond−(a ′, p)→ [a ′]¬p (5.7)
(¬Cond−(a ′, p) ∧ p)→ [a ′]p (5.8)
Note that these axioms do not resemble Successor StateAxioms. They nevertheless
validate the same regression principle as in Reiter’s framework, as it will be shown in
the sequel.
A point that bears noting is that our representation indeed counts as a solution to
the frame problem: the sets; and T are both “small” (in the sense that we can expect
they are much smaller than card(Prop)× card(Act)), and contain no frame axioms.
Now we turn to an important result:
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Theorem 5.3
Let the underlying logic be deterministic PDL, ; be a dependence relation obtained
from sets causes+(.) and causes−(.), and let T be the set of global axioms (5.4)–(5.8).
Then
(1) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ p, if a 6; p and a 6; ¬p;
(2) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)), if a 6; p and a ; ¬p;
(3) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ p, if a ; p and a 6; ¬p; and
(4) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a)∨Cond+(a, p)∨ (p∧¬Cond−(a, p)), if a ; p and a ; ¬p.
Proof:
See Appendix B.
Based on this result, with Algorithm 5.2 we give a regression method for deter-
ministic PDL with a dependence relation. (Let us consider Cond(a, ℓ) = Cond+(a, p), if
ℓ = p, and Cond(a, ℓ) = Cond−(a, p), if ℓ = ¬p.)
Algorithm 5.2 Regression with dependence
input: a PDL formula Φ, Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.) and Cond−(.)
output: a classical formula regression(Φ)
whileΦ is not classical do
putΦ in normal form
choose some subformula [a]ℓ
case a 6; ℓ and a 6; ¬ℓ
replace [a]ℓ by ¬Poss(a) ∨ ℓ
case a 6; ℓ and a ; ¬ℓ
replace [a]ℓ by ¬Poss(a) ∨ (ℓ∧ ¬Cond(a,¬ℓ))
case a ; ℓ and a 6; ¬ℓ
replace [a]ℓ by ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond(a, ℓ) ∨ ℓ
case a ; ℓ and a ; ¬ℓ
replace [a]ℓ by ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond(a, ℓ) ∨ (ℓ∧ ¬Cond(a,¬ℓ))
Suppose Φ is a complex formula without quantification and equality, such as
hasGun → [load][shoot]¬alive. Then, running Algorithm 5.2 on Φ, the regression of
[shoot]¬alive is ¬hasGun ∨ loaded ∨ ¬alive. Hence the result of this regression step is
hasGun → [load](¬hasGun ∨ loaded ∨ ¬alive). Putting this into normal form using ax-
iom (5.3), we obtain the formula hasGun→ ([load]¬hasGun∨ [load]loaded∨ [load]¬alive).
The regression of [load]¬hasGun is ¬hasGun, that of [load]loaded is ⊤, and that of
[load]¬alive is ¬alive. We therefore obtain hasGun → (¬hasGun ∨ ⊤∨ ¬alive), which is
valid in classical propositional logic.
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Theorem 5.4 (Decidability, soundness and completeness)
Let T and ; be obtained from Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.) and Cond−(.),
and let Φ be a complex formula. Then, Algorithm 5.2 terminates returning a classical
formula ϕ and T |=
;
Φ↔ ϕ.
Proof:
Let Φ be an input formula. Termination is straightforward, as each step of the al-
gorithm eliminates exactly one modal operator. Soundness and completeness are
also immediate: after putting formula Φ in normal form, it will be made of conjunc-
tions/disjunctions of modal subformulas. In this case, the equivalence betweenΦ and
ϕ follows from the ones given in Theorem 5.3 together with the rule of substitution of
equivalences (which is valid in PDL).
For our running example, hasGun → [load][shoot]¬alive is a consequence of the
theory T with the dependence relation ; because its regression is classically valid.
Hence, modulo equality, we obtain the same result as for Reiter’s regression in our
example. This generalizes: a close look at both algorithms shows that if both our T
with; and Reiter’s domain description are obtained from the same Poss(.), causes+(.),
causes−(.), Cond+(.), Cond−(.), then the results are logically equivalent.
It follows thus that whenever Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.), Cond−(.) are
given, and the completeness assumptions can be made, then Reiter’s formulation in
terms of Successor State Axioms and ours in terms of effect axioms and dependence
do the same job in their respective logical basis:
Corollary 5.2
Let the sets Poss(.), causes+(.), causes−(.), Cond+(.), Cond−(.) be given. Let D
R
=
〈LDPDL+ , |=R ,TR〉 be a Reiter theory obtained from them as described in Section 5.3,
and let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be obtained from them as described above. Let Φ be a
complex formula without quantification and equality. Then D
R
|= Φ if and only if
D |= Φ.
Proof:
Straightforward.
5.5 What about the Ramification Problem?
Reiter’s solution supposes that domain descriptions only contain executability and
effect laws. Thus it does not allow for static laws such as walking → alive. Such laws
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augment the effects of the shoot action: shooting not only has the (direct) effect ¬alive,
but also the (indirect) effect ¬walking (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Indirect effect of shooting: the turkey stops walking.
Because an action can have toomany indirect effects, stating all of them in the form
of effect laws may be unfeasible and make the domain description unmanageable.
The problem of being able to derive all indirect effects of an action without explicitly
stating them as axioms is known as the ramification problem [32]. Basically, this one
states that we should not relate actions with their indirect effects (in the base logic).
In the example above, instead of stating the law loaded → [shoot]¬walking in the
theory, we should rather be able to conclude that ramification just from the base ef-
fect laws for shoot and the static law walking → alive. Nevertheless, as extensively
addressed in the literature, static laws alone are not enough to express a notion of
causation and thus cannot cope to avoid the derivation of indirect effects not prop-
erly caused by the action under consideration. For example, from [tease]walking and
walking → alive in our scenario, we conclude that alive is always true after execution
of action tease, which intuitively may not be the case if alive initially does not hold:
teasing a dead turkey does not resurrect it.
This means that the only indirect effects that follow from an action theory should
be those that are really relevant.
In the recent literature on reasoning about actions, the concept of causality has
been studied as a means of overcoming the inadequacy of static laws in tackling the
ramification problem. In this sense, many types of causal notions have been pro-
posed so that causality is then considered in different ways: strong [78, 83, 119, 64] or
weak [112, 14] causality (if we always force or only permit something to be caused); as a
predicate [78], a relation [112, 14] or a modality [84, 45, 43, 35]; and primitive (built in the
logic) [78, 43, 119] or derived (with the aid of some meta-logical information) [112, 14].
56 Recasting Reiter’s Solution
The dependence-based solution to the frame problem we have chosen is an ex-
ample of a meta-logical causal notion expressed as a relation. With it we avoid the
problem of stating indirect effects in the base logic without unintuitive results. In our
example, by stating the dependence shoot ; ¬walking we get shoot’s indirect effect,
and because tease 6; alive, we do not get alive as indirect effect of tease.
Basically, all the extant approaches in the literature perform well in describing
dynamic domains where ramifications have to be dealt with. Nevertheless, things
get more complicated when actions with both indeterminate and indirect effects are
involved. This is what we are going to address in the following chapter.
Chapter 6
where we show what others cannot do
Causality and
Indeterminate Indirect Effects
In the sharp formulation of the law of causality – ‘if we know
the present exactly, we can calculate the future’ – it is not the
conclusion that is wrong, but the premise.
—Heisenberg
In this chapter, we investigate the behavior of the main existing causal approaches
to reasoning about actions that are called fluent-indexed frameworks. In particular,
we analyze how they perform in dealing with domains that have actions with both
nondeterministic and indirect effects. For this, we present an example of such a sce-
nario, give a requirement concerning the interpretation of indeterminate indirect ef-
fects and study it through the chapter.
6.1 The Mailboxes Scenario
Many approaches consider that it is a change in some property that produces (causes)
change of some other property. We call them fluent-indexed approaches, for they relate
pairs of literals or formulas.
We argue here that fluent-indexed approaches are not enough for dealing with the
ramification problem in domains involving actions with both nondeterministic and
indirect effects. We do this by showing an example of this class of action domain that
will lead us through a systematic analysis of such approaches.
We present here the Mailboxes Scenario, which was originally defined in [15].
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In essence, it combines Reiter’s famous “dropping a coin on a chessboard” exam-
ple with Sandewall’s argument against causality-based solutions to the ramification
problem [101].
In such a scenario, we reason about the status of a particular e-mail message and
two mailboxes (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: The Mailboxes Scenario.
The domain is as follows: suppose mbox1 means “the message is in mailbox 1”,
and mbox2 “the message is in mailbox 2”. We represent the fact that the e-mail is
saved in mbox1 or in mbox2 or in both by the literal saved. Hence the static law for this
example is
saved ↔ (mbox1∨ mbox2)
in formalisms that are not situation-indexed, and
Holds(saved, s)↔ (Holds(mbox1, s) ∨ Holds(mbox2, s))
in situation-indexed formalisms such as the Situation Calculus. (As usual, we assume
that all free variables denoting situations are universally quantified.)
Consider the actions save1 and save2, whose direct effects are to save an e-mail
message in mbox1 and in mbox2, respectively. Suppose we also have a nondetermin-
istic save action, whose direct effect is saved, i.e., saving the e-mail in one of the two
mailboxes or in both. Hence save has the indirect effect mbox1 ∨ mbox2. This is also
an indeterminate effect. Note that, in particular, after executing save, it is also possible
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to have mbox1 ∧ mbox2. This is just as in Reiter’s “dropping a coin on a chessboard”
example, where drop has the possible effect black ∧ white.1
In order to correctly reason about a nondeterministic action, we have to be able
of properly treating its set of indeterminate effects. This means that we should not
systematically interpret effects described with the inclusive disjunction ‘∨’ as the ex-
clusive one ‘⊕’. For example, in the Mailboxes Scenario, the effect of save should not
be equivalent to mbox1 ⊕ mbox2. The motivation for such a requirement has been
originally suggested by Reiter.
As we will see along this chapter, the Mailboxes Scenario is problematic for all
the existing approaches allowing for the representation of actions with both indirect
and indeterminate effects. In what follows, we discuss the approaches of Lin [78, 79],
McCain and Turner [83, 84], Thielscher [112, 113] and Zhang and Foo [119]. Indeed, it
can be shown that, in all these frameworks, either we have to state a frame axiom, or
to relate an action (in the base logic) with some of its ramifications, or, in order not to
violate our requirement about the interpretation of disjunctions, the action save1 has
the indirect indeterminate effect of changing mbox2, which is clearly counterintuitive.
6.2 Minimization of Causality
We here examine the behavior of Lin’s causal approach [78, 79] in formalizing the
Mailboxes Scenario.
Roughly speaking, Lin proposes to add a new predicate Caused(.) to the Situation
Calculus. Caused(p, v, s) reads as “atom p is caused to have truth value v in situa-
tion s”. Such a predicate is used to describe the appropriate causal relationships be-
tween fluents. In order to solve the frame problem, instances of Caused(.) shall be
minimized via circumscription [86, 87, 76].
In addition, the following axioms are assumed:
Caused(p, true, s)→ Holds(p, s) (6.1)
Caused(p, false, s)→ ¬Holds(p, s) (6.2)
1It is possible as well to rephrase our example in terms of Reiter’s: we can regard action save as drop,
which means putting a pin on a white, a black, or both squares (the pin lying on the region between two
squares). save1 (resp. save2) can be seen as analogous to drop1 (resp. drop2), which means putting the pin
in a black (resp. white) square.
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which state that something that is caused in a situation smust hold in such a situation,
as well as something that is caused to cease is no longer valid in that situation.
In what follows, we describe the Mailboxes Scenario using this formalism. Fol-
lowing the definitions in the original work, the effect axioms for this scenario are:
Poss(save1, s)→ Caused(mbox1, true, do(save1, s)) (6.3)
Poss(save2, s)→ Caused(mbox2, true, do(save2, s)) (6.4)
Poss(save, s)→ Caused(saved, true, do(save, s)) (6.5)
Then, according to Lin’s method, we have to supplement the static law saved ↔
(mbox1 ∨ mbox2) in the following way: as save1 (resp. save2) has effect mbox1 (resp.
mbox2) and mbox1 (resp. mbox2) being true causes the truth of saved, then we must
causally relate mbox1 (resp. mbox2) and saved. This is done stating the formulas:
Caused(mbox1, true, s)→ Caused(saved, true, s) (6.6)
Caused(mbox2, true, s)→ Caused(saved, true, s) (6.7)
Thus, the way domain constraints and effect axioms are stated defines a fluent-
indexed strong causal notion: an atom being causally related with another, whenever
it becomes true, the other is forced to become true.
The other way round, as an execution of save has the direct effect saved and a
change in saved means a change in mbox1 and/or in mbox2, we are obliged to causally
relate saved with both mbox1 and mbox2. This is done stating the formula:
Caused(saved, true, s)→ Caused(mbox1, true, s) ∨ Caused(mbox2, true, s) (6.8)
Stating just these laws, according to the circumscription-based minimization pro-
cess defined in [79], we would get an exclusive interpretation of the disjunction
in (6.8), i.e., savewould have the indirect effect mbox1⊕mbox2. So, in order to capture
the possibility of save saving the e-mail in both mailboxes, in Lin’s approach we have
also to state the constraints:2
Caused(saved, true, s)→ Caused(mbox1, true, s) ∨ Caused(mbox1, false, s) (6.9)
Caused(saved, true, s)→ Caused(mbox2, true, s) ∨ Caused(mbox2, false, s) (6.10)
2It is worth noting that both consequents of (6.9) and (6.10) are not tautologies (cf. [78]).
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Thus, we have the following:
Proposition 6.1
Formulas (6.3)–(6.10) entail
Poss(save1, s)→ Caused(mbox2, true, do(save1, s))∨
Caused(mbox2, false, do(save1, s))
Proof:
Suppose that Poss(save1, s) is the case. Then, from Formula (6.3) we obtain
Caused(mbox1, true, s ′), where s ′ stands for do(save1, s). From this and Formula (6.6),
we get Caused(saved, true, s ′). Thus, constraint (6.9) gives us Caused(mbox1, true, s ′) ∨
Caused(mbox1, false, s ′). Nevertheless, even with the minimization policy defined
in [79], it is still possible to derive another extension: from Caused(saved, true, s ′) and
constraint (6.10) we conclude Caused(mbox2, true, s ′) ∨ Caused(mbox2, false, s ′).
So, we get that an execution of save1 can produce the indirect effect of changing
mbox2. But we do not want such an indirect effect, for save1would be nondeterminis-
tic. A possible solution for this could be to state
(Poss(save1, s) ∧ ¬Holds(mbox2, s))→ Caused(mbox2, false, do(save1, s))
from which we derive
(Poss(save1, s) ∧ ¬Holds(mbox2, s))→ ¬Holds(mbox2, do(save1, s))
but this is a frame axiom.
Another tentative of tackling the problem is stating
Poss(save1, s)→ Caused(mbox2, false, do(save1, s))
but, this is unintuitive, for in a situation where we already had saved, with the e-mail
in mbox2, saving again with save1would make a change in mbox2.
6.3 Causal Laws Approach
In this section, we formalize the Mailboxes Scenario using the base formalism pro-
posed by McCain and Turner [83]. Their approach considers that background knowl-
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edge about causation should be given in the form of causal laws, which are stated as
sentences in a modal, conditional logic with the aid of a causal modal operator⇒.
A causal law of the form ϕ ⇒ ψ, where ϕ and ψ are classical formulas, is read as
“ϕ causes ψ”, or “the truth of ϕ determines the truth of ψ”. In our terms, this is thus
a fluent-indexed causal approach.
Let Laws be the set of all causal laws concerning a given domain. A set of formu-
las T is closed under Laws if and only if whenever ϕ ⇒ ψ is in Laws and ϕ ∈ T ,
then ψ ∈ T . T ⊢
Laws
ϕ means that formula ϕ belongs to the smallest set of formulas
containing T that is closed w.r.t. propositional logic and also closed under Laws.
In the formalization that follows, a set of literals Facts denotes a knowledge base
(alias state), and Eff a set of direct effects.
With the causal laws approach, the representation of the Mailboxes Scenario is as
follows:
Laws =
{
saved⇒ (mbox1∨ mbox2),
(mbox1∨ mbox2)⇒ saved
}
The causal law saved⇒ (mbox1∨mbox2) is needed because the truth of fluent saved
causes the truth of formula mbox1∨ mbox2. Analogously, (mbox1∨ mbox2)⇒ saved is
necessary because mbox1 ∨ mbox2 being true causes saved also to be true. (Instead of
(mbox1 ∨ mbox2) ⇒ saved one could have as well the causal laws mbox1 ⇒ saved and
mbox2⇒ saved, whose justifications are straightforward. On the other hand, we could
not replace saved⇒ (mbox1∨mbox2) by saved⇒ mbox1 and saved⇒ mbox2, for in this
case save would always cause mbox1∧ mbox2.)
Completing the domain description, we have a set of initial observations:
Facts0 = {¬mbox1,¬mbox2,¬saved}
and we suppose that saved has been produced as a direct effect:
Eff = {saved}
From this representation and according to McCain and Turner’s approach defined
in [83], after save action we get an exclusive interpretation of the disjunction mbox1 ∨
mbox2. This is shown in the following proposition:
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Proposition 6.2
Let Facts0 = {¬mbox1,¬mbox2,¬saved} and Eff = {saved}. Then the only possible
successor states are: {
{mbox1,¬mbox2, saved},
{¬mbox1,mbox2, saved}
}
Proof:
Following the definitions in [83], for any knowledge base Facts, any direct effects Eff,
and any set Laws of causal laws, the set of possible next states after performing an
action is the set of interpretations Facts ′ such that:
Facts ′ = {ℓ : ℓ ∈ Lit, (Facts ∩ Facts ′) ∪ Eff ⊢
Laws
ℓ}
where ⊢
Laws
is derivability w.r.t. the causal laws defined in Laws.
For the possible next state Facts1 = {mbox1,¬mbox2, saved}, we have Facts0 ∩
Facts1 = {¬mbox2} and {¬mbox2}∪ {saved} ⊢Laws mbox1, and this is a possible next state.
For the state Facts2 = {¬mbox1,mbox2, saved}, we have Facts0∩ Facts2 = {¬mbox1} and
{¬mbox1} ∪ {saved} ⊢
Laws
mbox2, and this is a possible next state, too. The interpreta-
tion Facts3 = {¬mbox1,¬mbox2, saved} is not a possible next state as clearly Facts3 is
not closed under Laws. Now, considering the state Facts4 = {mbox1,mbox2, saved}, we
have Facts0∩ Facts4 = ∅ and neither ∅ ∪ {saved} 6⊢Laws mbox1 nor ∅∪ {saved} 6⊢Laws mbox2,
so Facts4 is not closed under Laws. Thus, the only possible states after performing the
save action are Facts1 and Facts2, and from this the result follows.
3
In order to avoid exclusive interpretation of disjunctions, we have to relax inertia
by increasing Lawswith the following causal laws
(saved ∧ mbox1)⇒ mbox1
(saved ∧ mbox2)⇒ mbox2
However, with this apparent solution we get that an execution of save1 could make
a change in mbox2: the interpretation {mbox1,mbox2, saved} is a possible next state of
Facts0w.r.t. Eff = {mbox1}.
In [84] an improved version of the causal laws approach is given. Basically, the
difference is that actions are made explicit and each action, fluent and formula has an
associated time point. For example, save12 means that the action of saving the e-mail
3The reader is invited to verify that with the causal laws mbox1 ⇒ saved and mbox2 ⇒ saved instead
of (mbox1 ∨ mbox2) ⇒ saved one obtains the same result.
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in mailbox 1 is executed at time point 2, and havingmbox13means that at time point 3,
the e-mail is saved in mailbox 1 (independently of the action that has been executed
to achieve that).
Besides considering time, the following standard schemas are also assumed (remem-
bering, a stands for action names, p for atom (fluent) names, and ϕ for a formula):
at⇒ at (6.11)
¬at⇒ ¬at (6.12)
p0⇒ p0 (6.13)
¬p0⇒ ¬p0 (6.14)
ϕt∧ϕt+1⇒ ϕt+1 (6.15)
Schema (6.11) (resp. (6.12)) states that the occurrence (resp. non-occurrence) of
action a at time t is caused whenever a occurs (resp. does not occur) at t. The
Schemas (6.13) and (6.14) establish that the initial observations are caused from the
beginning. Schema (6.15) formalizes the common sense law of inertia, representing
the fact that whenever a set of fluents holds at two successive time points, their truth
at the second time point is taken to be caused simply by virtue of its persistence.
Using this variant of the causal laws approach, we formalize the Mailboxes Sce-
nario in the following way (Laws, Facts0 and Eff are as above, except that they are
time-indexed):
Laws =


save1t∧ ¬mbox1t⇒ mbox1t+1,
save2t∧ ¬mbox2t⇒ mbox2t+1,
savet⇒ savedt+1,
savedt⇒ (mbox1t∨ mbox2t),
(mbox1t∨ mbox2t)⇒ savedt


Facts0 = {¬mbox10,¬mbox20,¬saved0}
Again, with such a representation, our requirement about the interpretation of the
disjunction is violated: we get an exclusive interpretation of the nondeterminism of
the save action. As before, if we relax inertia by means of some extra causal laws, we
will also get that save1may cause a change in mbox2.
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6.4 Postprocessing Approach
In this section, we examine the postprocessing generation of ramifications proposed
by Thielscher [112, 113]. The basic idea of this approach consists in admitting states
not satisfying the domain constraints, which are seen as “intermediate states”. “Sta-
ble” states are obtained after successive applications of the so called causal relations.
A causal relation ℓ1 causes ℓ2 if ϕ, where ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ Lit and ϕ ∈ Fml, is the way a fluent
indexed causal notion is defined in this approach.
In what follows, an action law is a triple 〈C, a, E〉, where a is an action, and C and
E are sets of literals containing, respectively, the action preconditions and effects, and
such that atm(C) = atm(E) (C and E have the same atoms). An influence relation is
a relation between atoms that is used to automatically generate the causal relations.
Saying that a pair (p1, p2), where p1, p2 ∈ Prop, is in the influence relation means that
a change in the truth value of p1 may cause a change in the truth value of p2.
A state of the world (not necessarily satisfying the domain constraints) is a pair
of sets of literals (Facts,Eff), where Facts denotes a knowledge base and Eff a set of
direct effects. An action law 〈C, a, E〉 is applicable to a state (Facts,Eff) if and only
if C ⊆ Facts. Performing an action a in a state of affairs Facts corresponds to ap-
plying its associated action law 〈C, a, E〉 to the pair (Facts,Eff), giving us a new pair
(Facts ′,Eff ′), where Facts ′ = (Facts \ C) ∪ E and Eff ′ = Eff ∪ E.
A causal relation ℓ1 causes ℓ2 if ϕ is applicable to a state (Facts,Eff) if and only if
Facts |=
CPL
ϕ ∧ ¬ℓ2 ∧ ℓ1 and ℓ1 ∈ Eff. The state resulting from applying such a causal
relation is (Facts ′,Eff ′), where Facts ′ = (Facts\{¬ℓ2})∪{ℓ2} and Eff
′ = (Eff\{¬ℓ2})∪{ℓ2}.
For the Mailboxes Scenario, we define the following action laws:
〈{¬mbox1}, save1, {mbox1}〉 (6.16)
〈{¬mbox2}, save2, {mbox2}〉 (6.17)
〈{¬saved}, save, {saved}〉 (6.18)
Action law (6.16) expresses that “in a state where mbox1 is false, after executing
save1, mbox1will be true”. For action laws (6.17) and (6.18), the reading is analogous.
The set of static laws is the singleton {saved↔ (mbox1∨ mbox2)}.
According to Thielscher’s approach, as for this example a change in mbox1 (resp.
mbox2) may cause a change in saved and vice-versa, we have to define the influence
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relation for this scenario as follows:{
(mbox1, saved), (mbox2, saved),
(saved,mbox1), (saved,mbox2)
}
From this influence information and Algorithm 1 given in [112], we obtain the
following set of causal relations:


saved causes mbox1 if ¬mbox2,
saved causes mbox2 if ¬mbox1,
¬mbox1 causes ¬saved if ¬mbox2,
¬mbox2 causes ¬saved if ¬mbox1,
mbox1 causes saved if ⊤,
¬saved causes ¬mbox1 if ⊤,
mbox2 causes saved if ⊤,
¬saved causes ¬mbox2 if ⊤


Thus, with this domain description, we get the following:
Proposition 6.3
Let ({¬mbox1,¬mbox2,¬saved}, ∅) be an initial state. Then the only possible succes-
sor states after executing save action are ({mbox1,¬mbox2, saved}, {saved,mbox1}) and
({¬mbox1,mbox2, saved}, {saved,mbox2}).
Proof:
Let ({¬mbox1,¬mbox2,¬saved}, ∅) be the initial state. Then, applying the action
law (6.18) to it, we get the resulting (intermediate) state
({¬mbox1,¬mbox2, saved}, {saved}) (6.19)
As (6.19) is inconsistent w.r.t. the static law saved ↔ (mbox1 ∨ mbox2), we apply the
causal relation saved causes mbox1 if ¬mbox2 to (6.19) and obtain
({mbox1,¬mbox2, saved}, {saved,mbox1})
which is a successor state [112]. In this state, no other causal relation can be applied.
Looking at (6.19) again, we apply the causal relation saved causes mbox2 if ¬mbox1,
and obtain
({¬mbox1,mbox2, saved}, {saved,mbox2})
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which is a successor state, too. Again, in such a state, no other causal relation is
applicable. The same observation holds now for (6.19).
Therefore, there are only two successor states.
Then, we get that with Thielscher’s approach, action save gives an exclusive inter-
pretation of the conjunction in its indirect effects.
6.5 Modal Causality
We now formalize theMailboxes Scenario using the base logic EPDL, proposed by Foo
and Zhang [119, 35]. Essentially, such a logic is an extension of PDL that allows for
modalities of the form [ϕ], with ϕ ∈ Fml, for specifying the indirect effects of actions.
Given ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, the causal statement [ϕ]ψ means that formula ψ is caused when-
ever ϕ is the case. The semantical counterpart of such an extension is that models are
of the form 〈W,R〉, whereW is as defined in Chapter 2, and R : Act ∪ Fml −→ 2W×W is
a function mapping action constants a to accessibility relations Ra ⊆W×W, and clas-
sical formulas ϕ to accessibility relations Rϕ ⊆W×W. Moreover, every EPDL-model
M = 〈W,R〉must satisfy that for all w ∈W and every ϕ ∈ Fml, if |=
M
w
ϕ, thenwRϕw.
Therefore in EPDL we are able to write formulas like [mbox1]saved, which states
that in all possible worlds in which mbox1 is true, saved is caused to be true. The
complete domain description for the Mailboxes Scenario in EPDL is given bellow:
T =


[saved](mbox1∨ mbox2), [mbox1∨ mbox2]saved,
〈save〉⊤, 〈save1〉⊤, 〈save2〉⊤,
[save]saved, [save1]mbox1, [save2]mbox2


In Foo and Zhang’s approach, static laws are implicitly derived from the causal
statements. Then, for the theory above, we have T |=
EPDL
saved ↔ (mbox1 ∨ mbox2)
without explicitly stating it.
Proposition 6.4
T |=
EPDL
(¬mbox1∧ ¬mbox2)→ [save1](mbox1∨ mbox2).
Proof:
1. ¬mbox1→ [save1]mbox1, from global axioms T and classical logic
2. ¬mbox2→ [save1]mbox1, from global axioms T and classical logic
3. [mbox1∨ mbox2]saved, from global axioms T
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4. (mbox1∨ mbox2)→ saved, from 3. and EPDL
5. ¬mbox2→ [save1]saved, from 2., 4. and classical logic
6. [saved](mbox1∨ mbox2), from global axioms T
7. saved → (mbox1∨ mbox2), from 6. and EPDL
8. ¬mbox2→ [save1](mbox1∨ mbox2), from 5. and 7.
9. (¬mbox1∧ ¬mbox2)→ [save1](mbox1∧ (mbox1∨ mbox2)), from 1. and 8.
10. (¬mbox1∧ ¬mbox2)→ [save1](mbox1∨ mbox2), from 9. and classical logic
This happens because no specific solution to the frame problem is associated to
EPDL, and then, without considering the frame axiom ¬mbox2 → [save1]¬mbox2, we
still get the above unintuitive result. As a way of avoiding to state frame axioms in the
domain description, Foo and Zhang [120] suggest to generate them “on the fly”, i.e.,
by the time queries are made. This could be achieved based on an interpolation result
stating that the only frame axioms needed are those mentioning actions and atoms
occurring in the vocabulary of the query. With this, according to the authors, it would
be enough to use some method for automatically generating frame axioms from the
effect laws, like, e.g. Pednault’s [95].
The advantage of such an approach to the frame problem is the fact that no infor-
mation about persistence has to be stated in the action theory. The inconvenience is
that frame axioms are still needed and must be computed during the reasoning pro-
cess. This constitutes an overhead that is neatly worse than that produced by checking
the literal preservation condition of the dependence-based approach (cf. Section 4.4).
6.6 The Mailboxes Scenario with Dependences
So far we have seen the difficulties that arise when we try to formalize actions with
both indeterminate and indirect effects in fluent-indexed causal approaches.
The problem with all these formalisms is that in our scenario there is an atom
(saved) that can be caused in two different ways (directly with save or indirectly with
save1 or save2) and that can or cannot cause nondeterministic ramifications depending
on the way it was generated. With fluent-indexed approaches we cannot record this
subtlety and this is the main reason they all fail in formalizing this example. So, with
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all this discussion, we have seen that with the approaches presented in [78, 79, 83, 84,
112, 119, 35] either we get an exclusive interpretation of the nondeterminism, or we
have to state frame axioms in the action theory.
Here we present the formalization of the Mailboxes Scenario in the dependence-
based approach, which is action-indexed. The corresponding action theory for that is
Dmail = 〈LPDL, |=; ,T 〉, where
T =


saved↔ (mbox1∨ mbox2),
[save]saved, [save1]mbox1, [save2]mbox2,
〈save〉⊤, 〈save1〉⊤, 〈save2〉⊤


;=


〈save1,mbox1〉, 〈save2,mbox2〉,
〈save1, saved〉, 〈save2, saved〉,
〈save, saved〉, 〈save,mbox1〉, 〈save,mbox2〉


Then, we have Dmail |= [save](mbox1∨ mbox2), as intended.
This supports our thesis and others’ [102, 101, 14] according to which causality
must be action indexed, and also justifies our choice for the dependence-based solu-
tion to the frame problem. It is important to observe, however, that with it we do
not entirely solve the ramification problem: while indirect effects such as [save1]saved
can be deduced with |=
;
without explicitly stating that in the set of laws for save1, we
nevertheless still have to state indirect dependences such as save1 ; saved. However,
according to Reiter’s view:
“what counts as a solution to the frame problem . . . is a systematic proce-
dure for generating, from the effect laws, . . . a parsimonious representa-
tion for [all] the frame axioms” [100].
The framework of ; complies with that as the dependence relation can be semi-
automatically generated from the set of static and effect laws [13]. Moreover, as it has
been shown in this chapter and argued in [15, 55], our approach is in line with the
state of the art because none of the existing solutions to the frame and the ramification
problems can handle domains with both indeterminate and indirect effects.
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Chapter 7
where we open our toolbox
Refining Modularity and
Computing Implicit Laws
So act that your principle of action might
safely be made a law for the whole world.
— Immanuel Kant
In this chapter, we make a step further into the concept of modularity. Besides
considering a solution to the frame and ramification problems integrated in the base
formalism, we develop a more fine grained analysis of modular theories. We achieve
that by investigating some possible arrangements of modules and establishing a set
of postulates that characterize modularity. Moreover, we also define algorithms to
identify the troubled part of a given theory.
7.1 Defining Modules
Remembering our central hypothesis, what we argue for is that the different types
of laws defined in Section 2.2 should be neatly separated in modules. Besides that,
following the ideas in Chapter 4, we want such laws to interfere only in one sense:
static laws together with action laws for a may have consequences that do not follow
from the action laws for a alone (e.g. ramifications). The other way round, action laws
should not allow to infer new static laws, action laws for a should not allow to infer
action laws for a ′, etc. This means that our logical modules should be designed in
such a way that they are as specialized and as little dependent on others as possible.
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Our first claim is that the distinction made between the types of laws commonly
used in reasoning about actions is not just a matter of syntactical sugar. By identifying
such a distinction and treating different formulas in different ways, we tacitly assume
that they constitute the basic entities in the theory of a domain description. It is not
difficult to see why: to determine the set of possible states, static laws must be dealt
with in a careful manner; in plan generation tasks, executabilities play an important
role; for prediction and regression, the effect laws take their turn; etc.
To simplify the presentation, in this chapter we investigate how this can be accom-
plished when just one action is considered. A generalization of the results we obtain
here is addressed in Chapter 8.
Given that, our first proposal here is to separate laws of different types into dif-
ferent pieces of a theory. Henceforth, the set of all static laws of a domain will be
denoted by S ⊆ Fml. For a ∈ Act, the set of effect laws for a is denoted by Ea; the set
of all executability laws for a will be denoted by X a; and all inexecutability laws for a
is denoted by Ia.
Definition 7.1 (Action theory for a)
An action theory for a is a tuple Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉, where T = S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia.
In our running scenario example, an action theory for tease would comprise
S = {walking→ alive}, E tease = {[tease]walking},
X tease = {〈tease〉⊤}, I tease = {¬alive→ [tease]⊥},
and a dependence ;= {〈tease,walking〉}.
With these basic entities, we address now modularization of action theories. In
what follows, given an action theory Da, we propose and analyze some possible ar-
rangements of the sets S , Ea, X a and Ia into what we call module prototypes (cf.
Section 3.1). The purpose here is to argue backwards from analyzing what modules in
reasoning about actions should be to a definition of modularity that better fits it. As
we cannot cope with local completeness (cf. Section 3.3), what we do in the sequel is
to relax such a principle and allow modules to have some degree of interaction. This
will give us a “coupling-friendly” modularity [57].
Looking at the set S alone, we see that static laws do not mention actions at all,
and then, in our context, they do not contain modal operators. This means that for in-
ferences concerning only static laws, we need neither all expressiveness of PDL nor its
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consequence relation. This suggests that static laws should constitute a module pro-
totype in classical propositional logic. Let 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 be such a sub-description,
where LCPL is the language of the classical propositional logic, and |=CPL is the classical
entailment relation.
Regarding the solution to the frame and ramification problems, it could be rea-
sonable to define a module prototype only for frame axioms. This would give us
〈LPDL, |=
;
, ∅〉. Nevertheless, a solution to the frame problem is global to the theory,
in the sense that its solution is necessary to most reasoning tasks. Moreover, deduc-
tion of frame axioms is mainly important in interacting with effect laws, and not for
just deriving some frame axioms sporadically. Because of this we consider having a
module like that would not really help modularity.
With a similar reasoning, we can expect to have a module prototype built on the
effect laws Ea and |=
PDL
: 〈LPDL, |=PDL , E
a〉, i.e., a sub-description for deriving effect laws.
Unfortunately, in the presence of the frame and ramification problems, this is not
enough: in all inferences about effect laws, information about frame axioms and in-
direct effects (ruled by a causal notion) must be taken into account. This means that
〈LPDL, |=PDL , E
a〉would not be good as a module for reasoning about actions.
By applying the same analysis as in the above paragraphs, we can see that
〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,X a〉 and 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,Ia〉 are not good as modules either. Even if, a pri-
ori, we do not need frame axioms to infer executabilities, the absence of static laws is
too restrictive. For the case of inexecutabilities, as long as they can be seen as a special
type of effect laws, frame axioms are important, or, as we are going to see in the se-
quel, because of some overlaps between Ea and Ia, we should at least guarantee that
all inexecutabilities entailed by the theory are in Ia (and thus S is mandatory).
Because static laws describe the laws of the universe being represented (and that
must be respected in every reasoning), it is reasonable to consider them as part of
every module.1 One of the reasons for that is the situation illustrated above: with-
out S , it is not possible to derive indirect effects with 〈LPDL, |=PDL , E
a〉. The same can
be said about the solution to the frame problem: it should be present at least when ef-
fects are under concern. Moreover, there are trivial effect laws that are entailed by Ia:
ϕ → [a]⊥ entails ϕ → [a]ψ for any ψ ∈ Fml.2 In this case, we may also need inex-
1We could also see them as global data with a special status, similarly as done in [64]. For the sake
of presentation, we prefer to keep static laws in the same level as action laws, i.e., seeing them just as
formulas of a theory, so that the difference is just what they are for. Of course, in real implementations
there should be no redundant replications of the set S .
2If we were to argue against the principle of explosion (cf. Section 3.3), this could be a reason.
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ecutabilities to guarantee the module’s completeness. So a module prototype better
than 〈LPDL, |=PDL , E
a〉 would rather be 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉. With it, all effects, non-
effects and ramifications of actions should be derived.
As long as action laws other than elements of X a are not necessarily needed to
infer executabilities, we can expect 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X
a〉 to be a module prototype
for deriving executability laws. Similarly, and despite the fact that Ea plays a role in
the deduction of inexecutabilities, we shall define 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,S ∪ Ia〉 as a module
prototype for inexecutability laws.
So, now we have four module prototypes: one for inferring in classical logic,
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉; one for doing prediction and explanation in PDL with a solution to
the frame and ramification problems, 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉; a module prototype for
inferring executability laws 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X
a〉; and one for the deduction of inexe-
cutabilities, 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I
a〉. Such sub-descriptions are minimal in the sense that
each one contains theminimum necessary potential interaction inside their data to the
realization of inferences in its domain of application. For instance, as argued above,
weakening 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 may have as consequence that some laws will no
longer be inferable in the module.
With that, we define our version of local completeness that gives us modularity:
Definition 7.2 (a-modularity)
Let Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be an action theory for a such that T = S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia. Da is
a-modular if and only if
1. Da |= ϕ implies 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ϕ
2. Da |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X a〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
3. Da |= ϕ→ [a]⊥ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥
4. Da |= ϕ→ [a]ψ implies 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ
The main difference between our definition of local completeness and those of
Garson and Cuenca Grau et al. (cf. Section 3.3) is that we do not require modules to
be disjoint modulo logical consequences. In other words, we allow for a formula of a
given type to be inferred from different modules.
Just having module prototypes defined in our way is not enough to have a-
modularity. This is what we address in the sequel.
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7.2 More Fine Grained Postulates
A first step toward modularity has been the proposed division of our entities into
modules. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 3, in order to accomplish our goal, we
have to diminish interaction among such modules, rendering them the least interwo-
ven we can.
Restricted to the case of one action, in the rest of this chapter we will state and
investigate postulates that guarantee modularity, and give a method to satisfy them.
Although we here use the syntax of PDL, all we shall say applies as well to first-order
formalisms, in particular to the Situation Calculus. All postulates we are going to
present can be stated as well for other frameworks, in particular for action languages
such as A, AR [39, 65, 44] and others, and for Situation Calculus based approaches.
In [57] we have given a Situation Calculus version of our analysis.
Let Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be such that T = S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia.
PC (Logical consistency): Da 6|= ⊥
The theory of a given action should be logically consistent.
PS (No implicit static laws): if Da |= ϕ, then 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ϕ
If a classical formula can be inferred from the action theory, then it should be inferable
from the set of static laws alone.
PI (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if Da |= ϕ→ [a]⊥, then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥
If an inexecutability law for a given action a can be inferred from its domain descrip-
tion, then it should be inferable in PDL from the static laws and the set of inexecutabil-
ity laws for a alone.
PX (No implicit executability laws):
if Da |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, then 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,S ∪ X a〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
If an executability law for a can be inferred from its action theory, then it should al-
ready “be” in X a, in the sense that it should also be inferable in PDL from the set of
static and executability laws for a alone.
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Postulate PC is obvious, for we are interested in consistent theories. Moreover, it
can be shown that PX is a consequence of PS (see Corollary 8.2).
Thus, while PC is obvious and PX can be ensured by PS, things are less obvious
for Postulates PS and PI: it turns out that, for all approaches in the literature, they
are easily violated by action theories that allow to express the four kinds of laws.
We therefore study each of these postulates in the subsequent sections by means of
examples, give algorithms to decide whether they are satisfied, and discuss about
what to do in the case the answer is “no”.
7.3 No Implicit Static Laws
While executability laws increase expressive power, they might conflict with inexe-
cutability laws. Consider, for example, Dteasewts = 〈LPDL, |=; ,S ∪ E
tease ∪ X tease ∪ I tease〉,
where
S = {walking→ alive}, E tease = {[tease]walking},
X tease = {〈tease〉⊤}, I tease = {¬alive→ [tease]⊥}
and the dependence relation is given by ;= {〈tease,walking〉}.
From this description, we have the unintuitive inference X tease,I tease |=
PDL
alive: the
turkey is immortal (Figure 7.1)! This is an implicit static law (cf. Section 4.3) because
alive does not follow from S alone: Dteasewts violates Postulate PS.
¬l, w
a, h
¬l, ¬w
a, h
¬l, w
a, ¬h
l, w
a, ¬h
¬l, ¬w
a, ¬h
l, ¬w
a, ¬h
l, ¬w
a, h
l, w
a, h
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
Figure 7.1: A ;-model for the theory in Dtease: the turkey is immortal.
Implicit static laws are not a drawback of our underlying logical formalism. They
also appear in Situation Calculus-based approaches and in causal laws theories. To
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witness3, suppose in Lin’s framework we have
Holds(p1, s)→ Caused(p2, true, s) (7.1)
and
Caused(p2, false, s) (7.2)
Then from (7.2) and Axiom (6.2), we get
¬Holds(p2, s) (7.3)
From (7.2) and the contrapositive of Axiom (6.1) it follows
¬Caused(p2, true, s) (7.4)
Finally, from (7.1) and (7.4) we get
¬Holds(p1, s)
which is an implicit static law.
To see how implicit static laws show up in McCain and Turner’s causal laws ap-
proach (cf. Section 6.3), let Laws contain the causal law ϕ ⇒ ψ and T = {¬ψ}. Then
¬ϕ is an implicit static law in such a description.
How can we find out whether an action theory for a satisfies Postulate PS? Before
that, we need a definition.
Definition 7.3 (Big model)
LetDa = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be such that T = S ∪Ea ∪X a ∪Ia. Then M = 〈W,R〉 is the big
(alias maximal/standard) model for Da if and only if:
• M is a ;-model;
• W = valuations(S ) (all valuations of S ); and
• Ra = {(w,w
′) : for all ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ Ea ∪ Ia, if |=M
w
ϕ, then |=
M
w′
ψ}.
For an example, consider an action theory whose components are given by
S = ∅, Ea = {p1→ [a]¬p2}, X a = {〈a〉⊤},
3The examples are from [104].
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Ia = {p2→ [a]⊥}, and ;= {〈a,¬p1〉, 〈a,¬p2〉}
Figure 7.2 depicts one of its models and its associated big model.
M :
p1,¬p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
Mbig :
p1,¬p2
¬p1,¬p2
p1, p2 ¬p1, p2
a
a
a
Figure 7.2: A model of Da and the big model Mbig of Da.
Big models contain all valuations consistent with S . Clearly, for a big model M
we have |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia. Because M extends the set of possible worlds, it is only X a
which might not be true in M .
Theorem 7.1
Let Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be such that T = S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia. Da satisfies Postulate PS if
and only if the big model for Da is a model of Da.
Proof:
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be the big model of Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉.
(⇒): As M is a big model of Da, we have |=M S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia. It remains to show that
|=
M
X a. Let ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a, and let w ∈ W be such that |=Mw ϕi. Therefore, for
all ϕj ∈ Fml such that S , E
a,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕj → [a]⊥, we must have 6|=Mw ϕj, because
S , Ea,X a,Ia |=
;
¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj), and as D
a satisfies Postulate PS, S |=
CPL
¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj), and
hence |=
M
¬(ϕi ∧ϕj). Then, by the construction of M , there is some w
′ ∈ W such that
|=
M
w′
ψ, for all ϕ → [a]ψ such that S , Ea,Ia |=
;
ϕ → [a]ψ and |=M
w
ϕ, and wRaw
′. Hence,
|=
M
w
ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤, and thus M is a model of Da.
(⇐): SupposeDa does not satisfy Postulate PS. Then there must be ϕ ∈ Fml such that
Da |= ϕ and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ, i.e., S , E
a,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ and S 6|=
CPL
ϕ. Hence there
is a valuation val of S that falsifies ϕ. As val ∈ W (because M contains all possible
valuations of S ), M is not a model of Da.
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In the rest of this section, we will characterize when a domain description admits
a big model.
We shall give an algorithm to find a finite characterization of all4 implicit static
laws of a given action theory Da. The idea follows that of Algorithm 4.1 with the
improvement of taking into account dependence information: for each executability
law ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ in the theory, construct from Ea, Ia and ; a set of inexecutabilities
{ϕ1 → [a]⊥, . . . , ϕn → [a]⊥} that potentially conflict with ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. For each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, if ϕ∧ ϕi is satisfiable w.r.t. S , mark ¬(ϕ ∧ϕi) as an implicit static law. In
the same way as done in Algorithm 4.2, incrementally repeat this procedure (adding
all the implicit ¬(ϕ∧ϕi) to S ) until no more implicit static law is obtained.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, consider the action theory for
tease above. For the action tease, we have the executability 〈tease〉⊤. Now, from E tease,
I tease and ;, we try to build an inexecutability for tease. We take [tease]walking and
compute then all indirect effects of tease w.r.t. S . From walking → alive, we get that
alive is an indirect effect of tease, giving us [tease]alive. But 〈tease, alive〉 /∈ ;, which
means the frame axiom ¬alive → [tease]¬alive holds. Together with [tease]alive, this
gives us the inexecutability ¬alive → [tease]⊥. As S ∪ {⊤,¬alive} is satisfiable (⊤ is
the antecedent of the executability 〈tease〉⊤), we get ¬alive → ⊥, i.e., the implicit static
law alive. For this example, no other inexecutability for tease can be derived, so the
computation stops.
Before presenting the pseudo-code of the algorithm, we need some definitions.
Definition 7.4 (Implicate)
Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ be a clause. χ is an implicate of ϕ if and only if ϕ |=
CPL
χ.
In our running example, walking ∨ alive and ¬walking ∨ alive are implicates of the
set of formulas {walking→ alive,walking}.
Definition 7.5 (Prime implicate)
Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ be a clause. χ is a prime implicate of ϕ if and only if
• χ is an implicate of ϕ, and
• for every implicate χ ′ of ϕ, χ ′ |=
CPL
χ implies χ |=
CPL
χ ′.
The set of all prime implicates of a formula ϕ is denoted PI(ϕ).
4Actually, what the algorithm does is to find an interpolant of all implicit static laws of the theory.
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For example, the set of prime implicates of p1 is just {p1}, and that of p1∧(¬p1∨p2)∧
(¬p1∨ p3∨ p4) is {p1, p2, p3∨ p4}. In our shooting domain, alive is a prime implicate of
{walking→ alive,walking}. For more on prime implicates and their properties, see [82].
Definition 7.6 (Function NewCons(.))
Let ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. ThenNewCons(ψ,ϕ) = PI(ϕ∧ψ) \ PI(ϕ).
The functionNewCons(ψ,ϕ) computes the new consequences of ψw.r.t.ϕ: the set of
strongest clauses that follow from ϕ∧ψ, but do not follow fromϕ alone (cf. e.g. [61]).
It is computed by subtracting the prime implicates of ϕ from those of ϕ ∧ ψ. For
example, NewCons((¬p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p3 ∨ p4), p1) = {p2, p3 ∨ p4}. And for our
scenario, NewCons(walking,walking→ alive) = {alive,walking}.
The algorithm below improves both Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 by integrating a so-
lution to the frame problem (via the dependence relation ;). For convenience, we
define Ca = Ea ∪ Ia as the set of all formulas expressing the direct consequences of an
action a, whether they are consistent or not.
Algorithm 7.1 Finding all implicit static laws induced by a
input: Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉
output: Simp*, the set of all implicit static laws of D
a
Simp*:= ∅
Ca:= Ea ∪ Ia
repeat
Simp:= ∅
for all ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a do
for all C^a ⊆ Ca such that C^a 6= ∅ do
ϕC^a:=
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ C^a}
ψC^a:=
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ C^a}
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) do
if S ∪ Simp* ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a ,¬χ} 6|=CPL ⊥ and ∀ℓi ∈ χ, a 6; ℓi then
Simp:= Simp ∪ {¬(ϕ∧ϕC^a ∧ ¬χ)}
Simp*:= Simp* ∪ Simp
until Simp = ∅
In each step of the algorithm, S ∪Simp* is the updated set of static laws (the original
ones fed with the implicit laws caught up to that point). At the end, Simp* collects all
the implicit static laws.
The following result establishes decidability of the method:
Theorem 7.2 (Decidability)
Algorithm 7.1 terminates.
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Proof:
Let Ca = Ea ∪ Ia. First, the set of candidates to be an implicit static law that might be
due to a and that are examined in the repeat-loop is
{¬(ϕ∧ϕC^a ∧ ¬χ) : C^
a ⊆ Ca, ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S )}
As Ea, Ia and X a are finite, this set is finite.
In each step, either the algorithm stops because Simp = ∅, or at least one of the
candidates is put into Simp in the outermost for-loop. (This one terminates, because
X a, Ca and NewCons(.) are finite.) Such a candidate is not going to be put into Simp
in future steps, because once added to S ∪ Simp*, it will be in the set of laws S ∪ Simp*
of all subsequent executions of the outermost for-loop, falsifying its respective if-test
for such a candidate. Hence the repeat-loop is bounded by the number of candidates,
and therefore Algorithm 7.1 terminates.
While terminating, our algorithm comes with considerable computational costs:
first, the number of formulas ϕC^a and ψC^a is exponential in the size of C
a, and second,
the computation of NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) might result in exponential growth. While we
might expect Ca to be reasonably small in practice (because Ea and Ia are in general
small), the size of NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) is more difficult to control.
Example 7.1
For Dteasewts , Algorithm 7.1 returns Simp* = {alive}.
The following theorem establishes soundness and completeness of our method:
Theorem 7.3
Let Simp* be the output of Algorithm 7.1 on input D
a = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉.
Then Da satisfies Postulate PS if and only if Simp* = ∅.
Proof:
See Appendix C.
Corollary 7.1
Let Simp* be the output of Algorithm 7.1 on input D
a = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉.
Then
1. 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Simp* ∪ E
a ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 satisfies PS.
2. Da |=
∧
Simp*.
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Proof:
Item 1. is straightforward from the termination of Algorithm 7.1 and Theorem 7.3.
Item 2. follows from the fact that by the if-test in Algorithm 7.1, the only formulas
that are put in Simp* at each execution of the repeat-loop are exactly those that are
implicit static laws of the current theory, and therefore of the original theory, too.
Corollary 7.2
For all ϕ ∈ Fml, Da |= ϕ if and only if 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S ∪ Simp*〉 |= ϕ.
Proof:
For the left-to-right direction, let ϕ ∈ Fml be such that Da |= ϕ, i.e., S , Ea,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ,
and hence S ∪ Simp*, E
a,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ, by monotonicity. By Corollary 7.1-1., we have
that 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Simp* ∪ E
a ∪X a ∪ Ia〉 has no implicit static law. From this it follows
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S ∪ Simp*〉 |= ϕ.
The right-to-left direction is straightforward by Corollary 7.1-2.
What shall we do once we have discovered an implicit static law?
The presence of implicit static laws may indicate too strong executability laws: in
Example 7.1, we wrongly assumed that tease is always executable. Thus one way of
“repairing” our theory would be to consider the weaker executability alive→ 〈tease〉⊤
instead of 〈tease〉⊤ in X tease.
On the other hand, implicit static laws may also indicate that the inexecutability
laws are too strong:
Example 7.2
Consider Dshootwts such that S = ∅, E
shoot = {loaded → [shoot]¬alive}, X shoot = {hasGun →
〈shoot〉⊤} and Ishoot = {[shoot]⊥}, with ;= {〈shoot,¬alive〉, 〈shoot,¬walking〉. For this
action theory, Algorithm 7.1 returns Simp* = {¬hasGun}.
In Example 7.2, we discovered that the agent never has a gun. The problem here
can be overcome by weakening [shoot]⊥ in Ishoot with ¬hasGun→ [shoot]⊥.5
We can go further on in this reasoning and also argue that the problem may
be due to a too strong set of effect laws, or even to too strong frame axioms (i.e.,
a too weak dependence relation). To witness, for Example 7.1, if we take off the
inexecutability ¬alive → [tease]⊥ and replace the law [tease]walking by the weaker
alive → [tease]walking, the resulting action theory would satisfy Postulate PS. In the
5Regarding Examples 7.1 and 7.2, one might argue that in practice such silly errors will never be
made. Nevertheless, the examples here given are quite simplistic, and for applications of real interest,
whose complexity will be much higher, we simply cannot rely on the designer’s knowledge about all
side effects the stated formulas can have.
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same way, stating the (unintuitive) dependence tease ; alive (which means the frame
axiom ¬alive → [tease]¬alive is no longer valid) guarantees satisfaction of PS. (Note,
however, that this solution becomes intuitive when alive is replaced by awake.)
To finish, implicit static laws of course may also indicate that the static laws them-
selves are too weak:
Example 7.3
Suppose a computer representation of the line of integers, in which we can be at a
strictly positive number, positive, or at a negative one or zero, ¬positive. Let maxInt
and minInt, respectively, be the largest and the smallest representable integer number.
Action goLeft is the action of moving to the biggest integer strictly smaller than the
one at which we are. Consider the action theory D
goLeft
Z
for this scenario such that (ati
means we are at number i):
S = {ati→ positive : 0 < i ≤ maxInt} ∪ {ati→ ¬positive : minInt ≤ i ≤ 0}
EgoLeft = {atminInt → [goLeft]underflow} ∪ {ati→ [goLeft]ati−1 : i > minInt},
X goLeft = {〈goLeft〉⊤}, IgoLeft = ∅
with the dependence relation (minInt ≤ i < maxInt):
; =
{
〈goLeft, ati〉, 〈goLeft, positive〉,
〈goLeft,¬positive〉, 〈goLeft,underflow〉
}
Applying Algorithm 7.1 to this action theory would give us the implicit static law
¬(at1∧ at2), i.e., we cannot be at numbers 1 and 2 at the same time.
To summarize, in order to satisfy Postulate PS, an action theory should contain
a complete set of static laws or, alternatively, should not contain too strong action
laws (executability, inexecutability or effect laws). We will come back to this point in
Chapter 9, where we address action theory change.
Remark 7.1 S ∪ Simp* in general is not intuitive.
Whereas in the latter example the implicit static laws should be added to S , in the
others the implicit static laws are unintuitive and due to an (in)executability law that
is too strong and should be weakened. Of course, how intuitive the modified action
theory will be depends mainly on the knowledge engineer’s choice.
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7.4 No Implicit Inexecutability Laws
Let Dteasewts be such that S = {walking→ alive}, E tease = {[tease]walking}, X tease = I tease = ∅,
and ;= {〈tease,walking〉}. Dteasewts in this way satisfies Postulate PS. Now we observe
that from [tease]walking it follows with S that [tease]alive, i.e., in every situation, after
teasing the turkey, it is alive: Dteasewts |= [tease]alive. Now as tease 6; alive, the status of
alive is not modified by tease, and we have Dteasewts |= ¬alive → [tease]¬alive. From the
above, it follows
Dteasewts |= ¬alive → [tease]⊥,
i.e., an inexecutability law stating that a dead turkey cannot be teased. But
S ,I tease 6|=
PDL
¬alive→ [tease]⊥,
and then
〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I
tease〉 6|= ¬alive→ [tease]⊥
which means that Postulate PI is violated. Here the formula ¬alive → [tease]⊥ is an
example of what we call an implicit inexecutability law.
In the literature, such laws are also known as implicit qualifications [42], and it has
been often supposed, in a more or less tacit way, that it is a positive feature of frame-
works to leave them implicit and provide mechanisms for inferring them [78, 79, 113].
The other way round, one might argue as well that implicit qualifications indicate that
the domain has not been described in an adequate manner: the form of inexecutabil-
ity laws is simpler than that of effect laws, and it might be reasonably expected that
it is easier to exhaustively describe them.6 Thus, all inexecutabilities of a given action
should be explicitly stated, and this is what Postulate PI says.
How can we check whether PI is violated? We can conceive an algorithm to find
implicit inexecutability laws of a given action a. The basic idea is as follows: for every
combination of effect laws of the form (ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn)→ [a](ψ1∧ . . .∧ψn), with each
ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea, if ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn is consistent w.r.t. to S , ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn inconsistent
w.r.t. S , and S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn)→ [a]⊥, then output (ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn)→ [a]⊥ as
an implicit inexecutability law. Our algorithm basically does this, and moreover takes
into account dependence information.
6Note that this concerns the necessary conditions for executability, and thus it is not related to the
qualification problem [85], which basically says that it is difficult to state all the sufficient conditions for
executability of an action.
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For an example of the execution of the algorithm, take Dteasewts as above. From E
tease
we get ⊤ → [tease]walking, whose antecedent is consistent with S . As |=
;
¬alive →
[tease]¬alive and S ∪ {walking} |=
CPL
alive, and because S ,I tease 6|=
PDL
(⊤ ∧ ¬alive) →
[tease]⊥, we caught an implicit inexecutability. As there is no other combination of
effect laws for tease, we end the simulation here.
Algorithm 7.2 below shows the pseudo-code for that (the reason X a is not used in
the computation will be made clear in the sequel).
Algorithm 7.2 Finding implicit inexecutability laws for a
input: Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉
output: Iaimp , the set of implicit inexecutability laws for a
Iaimp:= ∅
for all E^a ⊆ Ea do
ϕE^a:=
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ E^a}
ψE^a:=
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ E^a}
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) do
if ∀ℓi ∈ χ, a 6; ℓi and S ,I
a 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥ then
Iaimp:= I
a
imp ∪ {(ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥}
Theorem 7.4 (Decidability)
Algorithm 7.2 terminates.
Proof:
Straightforward, as we have assumed S , Ea, X a, Ia and ; finite, and NewCons(.) is
finite (because S and ψE^a are finite).
Example 7.4
ConsiderDteasewts as given above. Then Algorithm 7.2 returns I
tease
imp = {¬alive → [tease]⊥}.
Nevertheless, applying Algorithm 7.2 is not enough to guarantee Postulate PI, as
illustrated by the following example:
Example 7.5 (Incompleteness of Algorithm 7.2 without PS)
Let Da be such that S = ∅, Ea = {p1 → [a]p2}, X a = {〈a〉⊤}, Ia = {p2 → [a]⊥}, and
;= ∅. Then we have Da |= p1→ [a]⊥, but after running Algorithm 7.2 on Da we have
〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I
a ∪ Iaimp〉 6|= p1→ [a]⊥.
Example 7.5 shows that the presence of implicit static laws (induced by executabil-
ities) implies the existence of implicit inexecutabilities that are not caught by Algo-
86 Refining Modularity and Computing Implicit Laws
rithm 7.2. One possibility of getting rid of this is by considering the weaker version of
Postulate PI:
PI’ (No implicit inexecutability laws – weak version):
if Da |= ϕ→ [a]⊥ and Da 6|= ¬ϕ, then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥
If a non-trivial inexecutability law for a given action a can be inferred from its respec-
tive theory, then it should be inferable in PDL from the static and inexecutability laws
for it alone.
With an adaptation of Algorithm 7.2 to support a test for satisfiability of an in-
executability’s antecedent, we could guarantee completeness with respect to Postu-
late PI’. However, such a test has the same complexity as checking whether Postu-
late PS is satisfied. That is the reason we keep abide on PI and require Da to satisfy
Postulate PS prior to running Algorithm 7.2. This gives us the following result:
Theorem 7.5
Let Iaimp be the output of Algorithm 7.2 on input D
a = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉. If
Da satisfies Postulate PS, then Da satisfies Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
Proof:
See Appendix C.
With Algorithm 7.2, not only do we decide whether Postulate PI is satisfied, but
we also get information on how to “repair” the action theory. The set of implicit inex-
ecutabilities so obtained provides logical andmeta-logical information concerning the
correction that must be carried out: in the first case, elements of Iaimp can be added to
Ia; in the second one, Iaimp helps in properly changing E
a or ;. For instance, to correct
the action theory of our example, the knowledge engineer would have the following
options:
1. Add the qualification ¬alive→ [tease]⊥ to I tease; or
2. Add the (unintuitive) dependence 〈tease, alive〉 to ;; or
3. Weaken the effect law [tease]walking to alive→ [tease]walking in E tease.
It is easy to see that whatever she opts for, the resulting action theory for tease will
satisfy Postulate PI (while still satisfying PS).
§7.4 No Implicit Inexecutability Laws 87
Example 7.6 (Drinking coffee [57])
Suppose a situation in which we reason about the effects of drinking a cup of coffee,
given by the action theory Ddrinkcoffee such that:
S = ∅, Edrink =
{
sugar→ [drink]happy,
salt→ [drink]¬happy
}
,
X drink = Idrink = ∅
and the dependence relation is
;= {〈drink, happy〉, 〈drink,¬happy〉}
Observe that Ddrinkcoffee satisfies PS. Then, running Algorithm 7.2 on this action theory
will give us Idrinkimp = {(sugar ∧ salt)→ [drink]⊥}.
Remark 7.2 Ia ∪ Iaimp is not always intuitive.
Whereas in Example 7.4 we have got an inexecutability that could be safely added
to I tease, in Example 7.6 we got an inexecutability that is unintuitive (just the presence
of sugar and salt in the coffee precludes drinking it). In that case, revision of other
parts of the theory should be considered in order to make it intuitive. Anyway, the
problem pointed out in the depicted scenario just illustrates that intuition is beyond
syntax. The scope of this work relies on the syntactical level. Only the knowledge
engineer can judge about how intuitive a formula is.
In the next chapter, we revisit our postulates in order to strengthen them to the
case where more than one action is under concern, and thus get results that can be
applied to whole action theories.
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Chapter 8
where our method becomes a Swiss Army knife
Generalizing
Modularity and Exploiting It
All generalizations are dangerous, even this one.
—Alexandre Dumas
In this chapter, we generalize Postulates PC, PS and PI to action theories as a
whole, i.e., considering all actions of a domain, and prove some results that follow
from that. We also investigate whether our set of postulates can be augmented in
order to get a more refined notion of modularity. We close the chapter showing the
benefits we get from domain descriptions that are modular in our sense.
8.1 Postulates for Multiple Action Theories
Go as far as you can see, and when you get there, you will see farther
—Anonymous
We have seen the importance satisfaction of Postulates PC, PS and PImay have in
describing the action theory of a particular action a. However, in applications of real
interest, more than one action is involved, and thus a natural question that could be
raised is “can we have similar meta-theoretical results for multiple action theories?”
Given a dynamic domain, we define E =
⋃
a∈ActE
a, X =
⋃
a∈ActX
a, and I =
⋃
a∈Act I
a. All these sets are finite, because Act is finite and each of the Ea, X a, Ia is
finite. We here redefine action theories.
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As I told earlier, I never repeat anything.
Definition 8.1 (Action theory)
An action theory is a tuple D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉, where T = S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I .
Given that, a generalization of Postulate PC for whole action theories is quite easy
and has no need for justification:
PC* (Logical consistency): D 6|= ⊥
The whole action theory should be logically consistent.
Generalizing Postulate PSwill give us the following:
PS* (No implicit static laws): if D |= ϕ, then 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ϕ
If a classical formula can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it should be
inferable from the set of static laws alone. We have the following results:
Theorem 8.1
D satisfies Postulate PS* if and only if Da satisfies Postulate PS for all a ∈ Act.
Proof:
(⇒): Straightforward: Suppose that for some a ∈ Act Da does not satisfy PS. Then
there is ϕ ∈ Fml such that Da |= ϕ and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ, i.e., S , E
a,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ
and S 6|= ϕ. Of course S , E ,X ,I |=
;
ϕ, by monotonicity, and then D |= ϕ, but still
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ. Hence D does not satisfy PS*.
(⇐): Suppose D does not satisfy PS*. Then there is ϕ ∈ Fml such that D |= ϕ and
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ, i.e., S , E ,X ,I |=; ϕ and S 6|= ϕ. ϕ is equivalent to ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧
ϕn, with ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fml and such that there is at least one ϕi such that S 6|= ϕi
(otherwise S |= ϕ). Because the logic is independently axiomatized, there must be
some a ∈ Act such that S , Ea,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕi. From this and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕi it
follows that Da does not satisfy PS.
Corollary 8.1
D satisfies Postulate PS* if and only if the big model for D is a model of D .
Proof:
The proof follows from Theorems 7.1 and 8.1.
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Theorem 8.2
If D satisfies PS*, then D satisfies PC* if and only if Da satisfies PC for all a ∈ Act.
Proof:
Let D satisfy PS*.
(⇒): Suppose that Da does not satisfy PC, for some a ∈ Act. Because D satisfies PS*,
Da satisfies Postulate PS (Theorem 8.1), and then 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ⊥. From this it
follows that D |= ⊥ (by monotonicity) and then D does not satisfy Postulate PC*.
(⇐): SupposeD does not satisfy PC*. Then D |= ⊥. BecauseD satisfies Postulate PS*,
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ⊥. Since Act 6= ∅, there is some a ∈ Act such that D
a |= ⊥.
A more general form of Postulate PI can also be stated:
PI* (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if D |= ϕ→ [a]⊥, then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥
If an inexecutability law can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it should
be inferable in PDL from the static and inexecutability laws alone.
Note that having that Da satisfies PI for all a ∈ Act is not enough to D satisfy PI*
if there are implicit static laws. To witness, let S = Ea1 = ∅, X a1 = {〈a1〉⊤}, and
Ia1 = {ϕ→ [a1]⊥}. Let also Ea2 = X a2 = Ia2 = ∅, and let ;= ∅. Observe that both Da1
and Da2 satisfy PI, but D |= ϕ→ [a2]⊥ and 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I〉 6|= ϕ→ [a2]⊥.
Nevertheless, under PS* the result follows:
Theorem 8.3
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfy Postulate PS*. D satisfies Postulate PI* if
and only if Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 satisfies Postulate PI for all a ∈ Act.
Proof:
See Appendix D.
In the next section wemake a step toward an attempt of amending our modularity
criteria by investigating possible extensions of our set of postulates.
8.2 Can We Ask for More?
Can we augment our set of postulates to take into account other modules of action
theories, or even other meta-theoretical issues in reasoning about actions? That is the
topic we discuss in what follows.
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Postulates about Action Effects
It seems to be in line with our postulates to require action theories not to allow for the
deduction of new effect laws: if an effect law can be inferred from an action theory
(and no inexecutability for the same action in the same context can be derived), then
it should be inferable from the set of static and effect laws alone. This means that we
should have:
PE (No implicit effect laws):
if D |= ϕ→ [a]ψ and D 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥, then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ
But consider the action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 such that:
S = ∅, E =
{
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive,
(¬loaded ∧ alive)→ [shoot]alive
}
X = {hasGun→ 〈shoot〉⊤}, I = {¬hasGun→ [shoot]⊥},
;= {〈shoot,¬alive〉}
Such a domain description satisfies Postulates PS* and PI*, but does not satisfy PE.
Indeed:
D |= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded→ [shoot]¬alive
and
D 6|= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded→ [shoot]⊥,
but
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E〉 6|= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded → [shoot]¬alive
So, Postulate PEwould not help us to deliver the goods.
Another possibility of improving our modularity criteria could be:
P⊥ (No unattainable effects):
if ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ E , then D 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥
This expresses that if we have explicitly stated an effect law for a in some context,
then there should be no inexecutability law for the same action in the same context.
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It is straightforward to design an algorithm which checks whether this postulate is
satisfied. We do not investigate this further here, but just observe that the slightly
stronger version below leads to unintuitive consequences:
P⊥’ (No unattainable effects – strong version):
if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ, then D 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥
Indeed, for the above action theory we have
E |=
;
(¬hasGun ∧ loaded)→ [shoot]¬alive,
but
D |= (¬hasGun ∧ loaded)→ [shoot]⊥.
This is certainly too strong. Our example also illustrates that it is sometimes natural
to have some “redundancies” or “overlaps” between E and I . Indeed, as we have
pointed out, inexecutability laws are a particular kind of effect laws, and the distinc-
tion here made is conventional. The decision of considering them as strictly different
entities or not depends mainly on the context. At a representational level, in the most
part of this work, we preferred to keep them separated, while in Algorithm 7.1 we
have mixed them together in order to compute all the consequences of an action (cf.
Chapters 4 and 9).
In what followswe address the problem of completing the set of executability laws
of an action theory.
Maximizing Executability
As we have seen, implicit static laws only show up when there are executability laws.
So, a question that naturally raises is “which executability laws can be consistently
added to a given action theory?”
A hypothesis usually made in the literature is that of maximization of executabili-
ties: in the absence of a proof that an action is inexecutable in a given context, assume
its executability for that context. Such a hypothesis is formally captured by the fol-
lowing postulate:
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PX+ (Maximal executability laws):
if D 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥, then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
Such a postulate expresses that if in context ϕ no inexecutability for a can be inferred,
then the respective executability should follow in PDL from the executability and
static laws.
Postulate PX+ generally holds in nonmonotonic frameworks, and can be enforced
in monotonic approaches such as ours by maximizing X . We nevertheless would like
to point out that maximizing executability is not always intuitive. Towitness, suppose
we know that if we have the ignition key, the tank is full, . . ., and the battery tension
is beyond 10V, then the car (necessarily) will start. Suppose we also know that if the
tension is below 8V, then the car will not start. What should we conclude in situations
where we know that the tension is 9V? Maximizing executabilities makes us infer that
it will start, but such reasoning is not what we want if we would like to be sure that
all possible executions lead to the goal (cf. Section 1.1).
We do not investigate this further here, and in the rest of the chapter we emphasize
the main results that we obtain when our modularity principle is satisfied.
8.3 The Role of Modularity in Reasoning
We start by generalizing the definition of modularity for multiple action theories.
Oh, de´ja` vu!
—Neo, in Matrix
Definition 8.2 (Modularity)
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,T 〉 be an action theory such that T = S ∪ E ∪X ∪ I . D ismodular
if and only if
1. D |= ϕ implies 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 |= ϕ
2. D |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
3. D |= ϕ→ [a]⊥ implies 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥
4. D |= ϕ→ [a]ψ implies 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ I〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ
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In what follows, we see how modularity can be reduced to our base postulates.
Theorem 8.4
If D satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ⊥ if and only if 〈LCPL, |=
CPL
,S〉 |= ⊥.
This theorem says that if there are no implicit static laws, then consistency of an action
theory can be checked by just checking consistency of S . An immediate consequence
is that consistency of a new learned information ϕ w.r.t. the whole description can be
checked by just checking consistency of S ∪ {ϕ}.
Progress isn’t made by early risers. It’s made by lazy
men trying to find easier ways to do something.
— Robert Heinlein
Theorem 8.5
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → [a]ψ if and
only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ.
Proof:
See Appendix D.
This means that under PS*we have modularity inside E , too: when deducing the
effects of a, we need not consider the action laws for other actions.
Versions of Theorem 8.5 for executability and inexecutability can be stated as well:
Theorem 8.6
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ if and
only if 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X
a〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
Proof:
See Appendix D.
Corollary 8.2
Postulate PX is a consequence of PS.
Proof:
Straightforward.
Hence, Item 2 in Definition 8.2 is subsumed by Item 1. With this and Theorem 8.5
above we get that modularity of action theories in reasoning about actions amounts
to having neither implicit static laws nor implicit inexecutability laws in the theory.
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Theorem 8.7
If D is modular, then D |= ϕ→ [a]⊥ if and only if 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof:
(⇒): If D |= ϕ → [a]⊥, then S , E ,X ,I |=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥, and from PS* and Theorem 8.5
we have S , Ea,Ia |=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥. From this and PI* we get S ,Ia |=
PDL
ϕ → [a]⊥, from
what the result follows.
(⇐): Suppose D 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥, i.e., S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there is a ;-
model M such that |=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and 6|=
M
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then, given a, we have
|=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia, and then |=
M
S ∧ Ia. Moreover, by definition, M is a PDL-model.
Hence S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, and then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥.
In Theorems 8.6 and 8.7, modularity guarantees that no dependence is needed to
derive, respectively, executabilities and inexecutabilities.
Remark 8.1 There exist action theories D not satisfying Postulate PS* such that both
D |= ϕ→ [a]ψ and 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ→ [a]ψ.
As an example, for Dwts such that
S = {walking→ alive}, E = { [tease]walking,
loaded → [shoot]¬alive,
}
,
X = {〈tease〉⊤}, I = {¬alive → [tease]⊥}
and
;=
{
〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
we have that
D |= ¬alive→ [shoot]alive,
but
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E shoot ∪ Ishoot〉 6|= ¬alive → [shoot]alive.
Let Ea1,...,an =
⋃
1≤i≤nE
ai , X a1,...,an =
⋃
1≤i≤nX
ai , and Ia1,...,an =
⋃
1≤i≤nI
ai . Un-
der Postulate PS*, deduction of an effect of a sequence of actions a1; . . . ; an (prediction)
needs neither the effect and inexecutability laws for actions other than a1, . . . , an, nor
the executability laws of the domain:
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Theorem 8.8
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪X ∪I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]ψ if
and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an 〉 |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]ψ.
Proof:
See Appendix D
The same result holds for testing inexecutability of a sequence of actions:
Corollary 8.3
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]⊥
if and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an〉 |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]⊥.
Proof:
Straightforward, as a special case of Theorem 8.8.
The next theorem shows that our notion of modularity is also fruitful in plan vali-
dation:
Theorem 8.9
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ
if and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ X a1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ.
Proof:
See Appendix D.
And as a consequence, we also optimize testing executability of a plan:
Corollary 8.4
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉⊤
if and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ X a1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; an〉⊤.
Proof:
Straightforward, as a special case of Theorem 8.9.
Theorems 8.8 and 8.9 together with Corollaries 8.3 and 8.4 suggest that we can
simulate modularization by sub-domains [77]: If 〈{a1, . . . , an},Prop
′〉 is a sub-domain
for some Prop ′ ⊆ Prop, then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪Ea1,...,an ∪X a1,...,an ∪Ia1,...,an〉 corresponds
to the module for 〈{a1, . . . , an},Prop
′〉 in Lifschitz and Ren’s sense (cf. Section 10.2).
In the following chapter, we investigate the role modularity plays when the do-
main description has to be changed.
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Chapter 9
where we cut, crop and paste with our Swiss Army knife
Towards Action Theory Change
Education consists mainly in what we have unlearned.
—Mark Twain
We here address the problem of changing action theories and define a general
method based on contraction of formulas. We present the semantics of our theory
change and define syntactical operators for contracting a domain description. We
establish soundness and completeness of the operators w.r.t. the semantics for de-
scriptions that satisfy our principle of modularity. We also investigate an example of
changing non-modular domain descriptions.
9.1 Motivation
Suppose a situation where an agent has always believed that if the light switch is up,
then there is light in the room. Suppose now that someday she observes that even
if the switch is in the upper position, the light is off. In such a case, the agent must
change her beliefs about the relation between the propositions “the switch is up” and
“the light is on”. This example is an instance of the problem of changing propositional
belief bases and is largely addressed in the literature about belief revision [37] and
belief update [67].
Next, let our agent believe that whenever the switch is down, after toggling it,
there is light in the room. This means that if the light is off, in every state of the world
that follows the execution of toggling the switch, the room is lit up. Then, during a
blackout, the agent toggles the switch and surprisingly the room is still dark.
Imagine now that the agent never worried about the relation between toggling
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the switch and the material it is made of, in the sense that she ever believed that just
toggling the switch does not break it. Nevertheless, in a stressful day, she toggles the
switch and then observes that she had broken it.
Completing the wayside cross our agent experiments in discovering the world’s
behavior, suppose she ever believed it is always possible to toggle the switch, pro-
vided some conditions like being close enough to it, having a free hand, that the switch
is not broken, etc, are satisfied. Then, in a beautiful April fool’s day, she discovers that
someone has glued the switch and consequently it is no longer possible to toggle it.
The last three examples illustrate situations where changing the beliefs about the
behavior of the action of toggling the switch is mandatory. In the first one, toggling
the switch, once believed to be deterministic, has now to be seen as nondeterministic,
or, alternatively, to have a different outcome in a specific context (e.g. if the power
station is overloaded). In the second example, toggling the switch is known to have
side-effects (ramifications) one was not aware of. In the last example, the executability
of the action under concern is questioned in the light of new information showing a
context that was not known to preclude its execution.
Such cases of theory change are very important when one deals with logical de-
scriptions of dynamic domains: it may always happen that one discovers that an ac-
tion actually has a behavior that is different from that one has always believed it had.
Up to now, theory change has been studied mainly for knowledge bases in classi-
cal logics, both in terms of revision and update. Only in a few recent works it has been
considered in modal logics, viz. in epistemic logic [48], and in action languages [31].
Recently, some works [106, 62] have investigated revision of beliefs about facts of the
world. In our examples, this would concern e.g. the current status of the switch: the
agent believes it is up, but is wrong about this and might subsequently be forced to
revise her beliefs about the current state of affairs. Such revision operations do not
modify the agent’s beliefs about action laws. In opposition to that, here we are inter-
ested exactly in such modifications. Our aim in this chapter is to make a step toward
that issue and propose a framework that deals with contraction of action theories.
9.2 Models of Contraction
When a domain description has to be changed, the basic operation is that of contrac-
tion. (In belief-base update [116, 67] it has also been called erasure.) In this section, we
define its semantics.
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For the sake of presentation, as in Chapter 4 we here consider inexecutability laws
as special cases of effect laws (those whose effect is⊥). It can be seen that doing things
this way does no harm to the theoretical results we have obtained so far.
In general, we might contract by any formula Φ. Here we focus on contraction
by one of the three kinds of laws. We therefore suppose that Φ is either ϕ, where ϕ
is classical, or ϕ → [a]ψ, or ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. The contraction of a model M = 〈W,R〉 by
Φ results in a set of models each of which is a minimal modification of M that is no
longer a model of Φ.
For the case of contracting static laws, we resort to existing approaches in order to
change the set of static laws. In the following, we consider any belief change operator
such as Forbus’ update method [36], or the possible models approach [116, 117], or
WSS [53] or MPMA [27].
Contraction by ϕ corresponds to adding new possible worlds to W. Let ⊖ be a
contraction operator for classical logic.
Definition 9.1 (Semantics of classical contraction)
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a PDL-model and ϕ a classical formula. The set of mod-
els resulting from contracting M by ϕ is the singleton M −ϕ = {〈W
′,R〉} such that
W ′ = W⊖ valuations(ϕ).
For example, consider the model M in Figure 9.1 (note that |=
M
p1 → p2) and
suppose that we want to contract M by the static law p1→ p2. The result is depicted
by M ′ in Figure 9.1, with M ′ ∈ M −p1→p2 .
M :
p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
M ′ :
p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
Figure 9.1: Contraction of a model by a static law.
Observe that the accessibility relation R should, a priori, change as well. Figure 9.2
shows twomodels resulting from contractingM in Figure 9.1 by the static law p1→ p2
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in which R has been changed so that we have arrows leaving the world just added.
M ′1 :
p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
a
M ′2 :
p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
a
a
Figure 9.2: Contraction of a static law: adding leaving arrows to the new world.
The reason for changing R is that otherwise contracting a classical formula may
conflict with X . For instance, if ¬ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X and we contract by ϕ, the result
may make X untrue. However, given the amount of information we have at hand,
we think that whatever we do with R (adding or removing edges), we will always be
able to find a counter-example to the intuitiveness of the operation, since it is domain
dependent. For instance, adding edges for a deterministic action may render it non-
deterministic. Deciding on what changes to carry out on R when contracting static
laws depends on the user’s intuition, and unfortunately this information cannot be
generalized and established once for all. We here opt for a priori doing nothing with
R and postponing correction of executability laws.
Action theories being defined in terms of effect and executability laws, changing
an action theory will mainly involve changing one of these two sets of laws. Let us
consider now both these cases.
Suppose the knowledge engineer acquires new information regarding the effect of
action a. Then it means that the law under consideration is probably too strong, i.e.,
the expected effect may not occur and thus the law has to be weakened. Consider e.g.
¬up → [toggle]light, and suppose it has to be weakened to the more specific (¬up ∧
¬blackout) → [toggle]light.1 In order to carry out such a weakening, first the designer
has to contract the set of effect laws and second to expand the resulting set with the
weakened law.
1The other possibility of weakening the law, i.e., replacing it by ¬up → [toggle](light ∨ ¬light) looks
silly. We were not able to find examples where changing the consequent could give a more intuitive
result. In this sense, we prefer to always weaken a given law by strengthening its antecedent.
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Contraction byϕ→ [a]ψ amounts to adding some “counter-example” arrows from
ϕ-worlds to ¬ψ-worlds.
Definition 9.2 (Semantics of effect contraction)
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a PDL-model and ϕ → [a]ψ an effect law. The models resulting
from contracting M by ϕ→ [a]ψ is M −
ϕ→[a]ψ = {〈W,R ∪ R ′a〉 : R ′a ⊆ {(w,w ′) : |=Mw ϕ}}.
Figure 9.3 depicts the three resulting models of contracting ¬p2 → [a]p2 in the
model M of Figure 9.1.
M ′1 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
a
M ′2 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
a
M ′3 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
a
a
a
Figure 9.3: Contraction of model M in Figure 9.1 by an effect law.
Suppose now the knowledge engineer learns new information about the exe-
cutability of a. This usually occurs when there are executability laws that are too
strong, i.e., the condition in the theory guaranteeing the executability of a is too weak
and has to be made more restrictive. Let e.g. 〈toggle〉⊤ be the law to be contracted,
and suppose it has to be weakened to the more specific ¬broken → 〈toggle〉⊤. To im-
plement such a weakening, the designer has to first contract the set of executability
laws and then to expand the resulting set with the weakened law.
Contraction by ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ corresponds to removing some arrows leaving worlds
where ϕ holds. Removing such arrows has as consequence that a is no longer always
executable in context ϕ.
Definition 9.3 (Semantics of executability contraction)
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a PDL-model and ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ an executability law. The set of
models resulting from contracting M by ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ is M −
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ = {〈W,R \ R ′a〉 : R ′a ⊆
{(w,w ′) : wRaw
′ and |=
M
w
ϕ}}.
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Figure 9.4 illustrates contraction of model M in Figure 9.1 by the executability
p1→ 〈a〉⊤. (Observe that, in this example, p1→ [a]⊥ has not become true inM −p
1
→〈a〉⊤,
but it is not hard to imagine examples where an inexecutability becomes valid when
contracting an executability law.)
M ′1 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
M ′2 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
M ′3 : p1, p2
¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
Figure 9.4: Contraction of model M in Figure 9.1 by an executability law.
In the next section, we make a step toward syntactical operators that reflect the
semantic foundations for contraction.
9.3 Contracting an Action Theory
Having established the semantics of action theory contraction, we can turn to its syn-
tactical counterpart.
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 be an action theory and Φ a PDL-formula. By D−Φ
we denote the action theory resulting from the contraction of D by Φ.
Contracting a theory by a static law ϕ amounts to using any existing contraction
operator for classical logic. Let ⊖ be such an operator. Moreover, we also need to
guarantee that ϕ will not continue to follow from E , X and ;, i.e., in the case ϕ is
an implicit static law (cf. Sections 7.3 and 9.4). We define contraction of a domain
description by a static law as follows:
Definition 9.4 (Contraction of a static law)
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉. D−ϕ = 〈LPDL, |=; ,S
− ∪ E ∪ X−〉, where S− = S ⊖ ϕ
and X− = (X \ X a) ∪ {(ϕi ∧ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a}.
For example, contracting the law up → light in our running scenario, besides
changing S , would give us X− = {(¬up ∨ light) → 〈toggle〉⊤}, so that the old exe-
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cutabilities are still satisfied in the new possible state {up,¬light} that is intended to be
added at the semantical level.
To contract a theory by ϕ→ [a]ψ, for every effect law in D , we must ensure that a
still has effect ψ whenever ϕ does not hold, and change ; so that a may have ¬ψ as
outcome. This is enough to guarantee that the law has been contracted. The operator
below formalizes this:
Definition 9.5 (Contraction of an effect law)
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉. D−
ϕ→[a]ψ = 〈LPDL, |=; ′ ,S ∪ E− ∪ X 〉, where E− =
(E \ Ea) ∪ {(ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)→ [a]ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea}, and ; ′= ; ∪({a}× Lit).
If Dlight denotes our running example such that
S = {up→ light}, E = { ¬up→ [toggle]up,
up→ [toggle]¬up
}
,
X = {〈toggle〉⊤}, ; =
{
〈toggle, light〉, 〈toggle,¬light〉,
〈toggle,up〉, 〈toggle,¬up〉
}
then contracting the law blackout→ [toggle]light from Dlight would give us
E− =
{
(¬up ∧ ¬blackout)→ [toggle]up,
(up ∧ ¬blackout)→ [toggle]¬up
}
,
;
′ =


〈toggle, light〉, 〈toggle,¬light〉,
〈toggle,up〉, 〈toggle,¬up〉,
〈toggle, blackout〉, 〈toggle,¬blackout〉


Finally, we consider the case of contracting an action theory by an executability
law ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤. For every executability in D , we ensure that action a is executable only
in contexts where ¬ϕ is the case. The following operator does the job.
Definition 9.6 (Contraction of an executability law)
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉. D−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ = 〈LPDL, |=; ,S ∪ E ∪ X−〉, where X− =
(X \ X a) ∪ {(ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a}.
For instance, contracting the executability glued → 〈toggle〉⊤ from Dlight would
give us X− = {¬glued→ 〈toggle〉⊤}.
Now we establish that our operators are correct w.r.t. the semantics. Our first
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theorem establishes that the semantical contraction of the models ofD byΦ produces
models of the contracted theory D−Φ.
Theorem 9.1
Let Φ be a formula that has the form of one of the three laws. For all models M ′, if
M ′ ∈ M −Φ for some M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
D , then |=
M ′
D−Φ.
Proof:
See Appendix E.
It remains to prove that the other way round, the models of D−Φ result from
the semantical contraction of models of D by Φ. This does not hold in general, as
shown by the following example: suppose there is only one atom p and one ac-
tion a, and consider the action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 such that S = ∅,
E = {p → [a]⊥}, X = {〈a〉⊤}, and ;= ∅. The only model of that action theory is
M = 〈{{¬p}}, {({¬p}, {¬p})}〉 in Figure 9.5. By definition, M −p→〈a〉⊤ = {M }. On the other
hand, D−
p→〈a〉⊤ is such that S = ; = ∅, E = {p → [a]⊥}, and X = {¬p → 〈a〉⊤}. The
contracted theory has twomodels: M and M ′ = 〈{{p}, {¬p}}, ({¬p}, {¬p})〉 in Figure 9.5.
While ¬p is valid in the contraction of the models of D , it is not valid in the models of
D−p→〈a〉⊤.
M :
¬p
a
M ′ :
¬p p
a
Figure 9.5: Incompleteness of contraction.
Fortunately, we can establish a result for those action theories that are modular.
The proof requires three lemmas. The first one says that for a modular theory we can
restrict our attention to its big models.
Lemma 9.1
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 be modular. Then D |= Φ if and only if |=
M
Φ for every
model M = 〈W,R〉 of D such thatW = valuations(S ).
Proof:
(⇒): Because D is modular, D satisfies Postulate PS*. By Corollary 8.2, for every
M = 〈W,R〉 such that W = valuations(S ), |=
M
D . From the hypothesis D |= Φ, it
follows |=
M
Φ.
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(⇐): Suppose D 6|= Φ. Then there is a model M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=M D and 6|=M Φ.
We can augment M to a big model M ′ = 〈valuations(S ),R〉. Because D is modular,
by Corollary 8.2, it follows |=
M ′
D . Clearly 6|=
M ′
Φ.
Note that the lemma does not hold for non-modular theories (because the set
{〈W,R〉 : W = valuations(S )} is empty then).
The second lemma says that modularity is preserved under contraction.
Lemma 9.2
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 be modular, and let Φ be a formula of the form of one
of the three laws. Then D−Φ is modular.
Proof:
See Appendix E.
The third one establishes the required link between the contraction operators and
contraction of big models.
Lemma 9.3
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 be modular, let Φ be a formula of the form of one of
the three laws, and D−Φ = 〈LPDL, |=; ′ ,S
′ ∪ E ′ ∪ X ′〉. If M ′ = 〈valuations(S ′),R ′〉 is a
model of D−Φ, then there is a model M of D such that M
′ ∈ M −Φ.
Proof:
Let M ′ = 〈valuations(S ′),R ′〉 be such that |=
M ′
D−Φ. We analyze each case.
Let Φ be ϕ, for some propositional ϕ ∈ Fml. Because D is modular, Lemma 9.1
gives us that there is a model M = 〈valuations(S ),R〉 such that |=
M
D . Clearly, M ′ ∈
M −ϕ , from soundness of ⊖.
Suppose now Φ has the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. D being modular,
Lemma 9.1 gives us that M = 〈valuations(S ),R〉 is such that |=
M
D . Because, when
contracting effect laws, S ′ = S , it suffices to choose R and R ′′a such that R
′ = R ∪ R ′′a ,
for some R ′′a ⊆ {(w,w
′) : |=
M
w
ϕ}, and then M ′ ∈ M −
ϕ→[a]ψ.
Now let Φ have the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml. From D modular and
Lemma 9.1, there is M = 〈valuations(S ),R〉 such that |=
M
D . When contracting exe-
cutabilities, S ′ = S , hence taking the right R and R ′′a such that R
′ = R \ R ′′a , for some
Ra" ⊆ {(w,w
′) : wRaw
′ and |=
M
w
ϕ}, we get M ′ ∈ M −
ϕ→〈a〉⊤.
Putting the three above lemmas together we get:
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Theorem 9.2
LetD = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪E ∪X 〉 be modular, letΦ be a formula of the form of one of the
three laws, and D−Φ = 〈LPDL, |=; ′ ,S
′ ∪ E ′ ∪ X ′〉. For all models M ′, if |=
M ′
D−Φ, then
M ′ ∈ M −Φ, for some M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
D .
Proof:
From the hypothesis that D is modular and Lemma 9.2, D−Φ is modular. Then, M
′ =
〈valuations(S ′),R ′〉 is such that |=
M ′
D−Φ, by Lemma 9.1. From this and Lemma 9.3, the
result follows.
Our two theorems together establish correctness of the operators:
Corollary 9.1
LetD = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪E ∪X 〉 be modular, letΦ be a formula of the form of one of the
three laws, and D−Φ = 〈LPDL, |=; ′ ,S
′ ∪ E ′ ∪ X ′〉. Then D−Φ |= Ψ if and only if for every
model M ′ such that M ′ ∈ M −Φ for some M such that |=
M
D , |=
M ′
Ψ.
Proof:
(⇒): Let M ′ be such that |=M ′D−Φ. By Theorem 9.2, M ′ ∈ M −Φ for some M such that
|=
M
D . From the hypothesisD−Φ |= Ψ, we have |=
M ′
Ψ.
(⇐): Suppose that D−Φ 6|= Ψ. Then there is a model M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=MD−Φ and
6|=
M
Ψ. Because D is modular, by Lemma 9.2, D−Φ is modular, too. By Lemma 9.1, M
can be augmented to a big model M ′ = 〈valuations(S ′),R〉 such that |=
M ′
D−Φ. Clearly,
we have 6|=
M ′
Ψ.
We also give a sufficient condition for the success of a contraction.
Theorem 9.3
Let Φ be an effect or an executability law such that S 6|=
PDL
Φ. If D is modular, then
D−Φ 6|= Φ.
Proof:
Suppose D−Φ |= Φ. From the fact that D is modular, Corollary 9.1 gives us that |=
M ′
Φ
for all M ′ ∈ M −Φ, for some M such that |=
M
D .
Let Φ be of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. If |=M ′ϕ → [a]ψ for every M ′ ∈
M
−
ϕ→[a]ψ, then even for M ′′ = 〈W,R ∪ R ′a〉 such that R ′a = {(w,w ′) : |=Mw ϕ}, we have
|=
M ′′
ϕ → [a]ψ. By our semantics, this is the case only if W = valuations(ψ), in which
case S |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]ψ.
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Let now Φ have the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml. If |=M ′ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ for every
M ′ ∈ M −
ϕ→〈a〉⊤, then even for M ′′ = 〈W, ∅〉 ∈ M −ϕ→〈a〉⊤, we have |=M ′′ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. But
this is true only if W = valuations(¬ϕ), in which case S |=
PDL
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
What is the status of the AGM-postulates for contraction in our framework? First,
contraction of static laws satisfies all the postulates, as soon as the underlying classical
contraction operator⊖ satisfies all of them.
In the general case, however, our constructions do not satisfy the central postulate
of preservation D−Φ = D if D 6|= Φ. Indeed, suppose we have a language with only
one atom p, and a model M with two worldsw = {p} andw ′ = {¬p} such that wRaw
′,
w ′Raw, andw
′Raw
′ (Figure 9.6). Then |=
M
p→ [a]¬p and 6|=M [a]¬p, i.e., M is a model of
the effect law p→ [a]¬p, but not of [a]¬p. Now the contraction M −
[a]¬p yields the model
M ′ such that Ra = W ×W. Then 6|=
M ′
p → [a]¬p, i.e., the effect law p → [a]¬p is not
preserved. Our contraction operation thus behaves rather like an update operation.
M :
p ¬p
a
a
a
Figure 9.6: Counter-example to preservation.
Now let us focus on the other postulates. Since our operator has a behavior which
is close to the update postulate, we focus on the following basic erasure postulates
introduced in [66].
KM1 Cn(D−Φ) ⊆ Cn(D)
Postulate KM1 does not always hold because it is possible to make the formula ϕ →
[a]⊥ valid in the resulting theory by removing elements of Ra (cf. Definition 9.3).
KM2Φ /∈ Cn(D−Φ)
Under the condition that D is modular, Postulate KM2 is satisfied (cf. Theorem 9.3).
KM3 If Cn(D1) = Cn(D2) and |=PDL Φ1↔ Φ2, then Cn(D1−Φ2 ) = Cn(D2−Φ1 ).
Theorem 9.4
If D1 and D2 are modular and the propositional contraction operator ⊖ satisfies Pos-
tulate KM3, then Postulate KM3 is satisfied for every PDL-formulas Φ1,Φ2.
110 Towards Action Theory Change
Proof:
The proof follows straightforwardly from our results: since Cn(D1) = Cn(D2) and
|=
PDL
Φ1 ↔ Φ2, they have, pairwise, the same models. Hence, given M such that
|=
M
D1 and |=
M
D2, M
−
Φ1
and M −Φ2 have the same semantical operations. Because D1
and D2 are modular, Corollary 9.1 guarantees we get the same syntactical results.
Moreover, as the classical contraction operation ⊖ satisfies Postulate KM3, it follows
that Cn(D1
−
Φ2
) = Cn(D2
−
Φ1
).
9.4 Contracting Implicit Static Laws
There can bemany reasonswhy a theory should be changed. Following the discussion
in Chapter 7, here we focus on the case where it has some classical consequenceϕ the
designer is not aware of.
Ifϕ is taken as intuitive, then, normally, no change has to be done at all, unless we
want to keep abide on the modularity principle and thus make ϕ explicit by adding it
to S . In the scenario example of Section 9.3, if the knowledge engineer’s universe has
immortal turkeys, then she would add the static law alive to S .
The other way round, if ϕ is not intuitive, as long as ϕ is entailed by D , the goal is
to avoid such an entailment, i.e., what we want isD−ϕ 6|= ϕ. In the mentioned scenario,
the knowledge engineer considers that having immortal turkeys is not reasonable and
thus decides to change the domain description.
This means that action theories that are not modular need to be changed, too.
Such a changing process is driven by the problematic part of the theory detected by
Algorithm 7.1.
It seems that in general implicit static laws are not intuitive. Therefore their con-
traction is more likely to happen than their addition.2 In the example above, the ac-
tion theory has to be contracted by alive.3 In order to contract the action theory, the
designer has several choices:
• Contract the set S . (In this case, such an operation is not enough, since alive is a
consequence of the rest of the theory.)
2In all the examples in which we have found implicit static laws that are intuitive they are so evident
that the only explanation for not having them explicitly stated is that they have been forgotten by the
theory’s designer (cf. Section 7.3).
3Here the change operation is a revision-based operation rather than an update-based operation since
we mainly “fix” the theory.
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• Weaken the effect law [tease]walking to alive → [tease]walking, since the original
effect law is too strong. This means that in a first stage the designer has to con-
tract the theory and in a second one expand the effect laws with the weaker law.
The designer will usually choose this option if she focuses on the effect precon-
ditions of actions.
• Weaken the executability law 〈tease〉⊤ by rephrasing it as alive → 〈tease〉⊤: first
the executability is contracted and then the weaker one is added to the resulting
set of executability laws. The designer will choose this option if she focuses on
preconditions for action execution.
The analysis of this example shows that the choice of what change has to be car-
ried out is up to the knowledge engineer. Such a task can get more complicated
when ramifications are involved. To witness, suppose our scenario has been for-
malized as follows: S = {walking → alive}, E = {[shoot]¬alive}, X = {〈shoot〉⊤}, and
;= {〈shoot,¬alive〉}. From the corresponding action theory, we can derive the inexe-
cutability walking → [shoot]⊥ and thus the implicit static law ¬walking. In this case,
we have to change the theory by contracting the frame axiom walking→ [shoot]walking
(which amounts to adding the missing indirect dependence shoot ; ¬walking).
For an account of how elaboration tolerant our theory change method is, we refer
the reader to the next chapter, where we also discuss about related work on modular-
ity and update of domain descriptions.
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Chapter 10
where we have a small talk with our neighbors
Discussion and Related Work
I am a part of all that I have seen.
—Alfred Lord Tennyson
In this chapter, we analyze whether our modularity paradigm is in line with the
requirements that logical modules are expected to satisfy, and also address existing
work in the literature about the meta-theory of actions. We then investigate the prin-
ciple of elaboration tolerance in our theory change framework and discuss about other
techniques for changing a domain description.
10.1 HowModular our Modules Are
Here we comment on the properties logical modules should have by assessing how
our notion of modularity behaves with respect to them. The following criteria were
compiled by Fodor [34] and Garson [38]. They also correspond to most of the design
principles commonly found in software engineering.
Domain specificity: A module is domain specific if it is designed to draw conclusions
over a limited domain of expertise [38]. Since with our modules we can reason in a set
of laws concerning only the actions and fluents describing a sub-domain, regardless
of the rest of the description, we can say that our modules are domain specific.
Accuracy: A module is accurate if it proves all sentences in its domain of application.
Our modules are accurate for by satisfying the principle of modularity they can prove
any formula in their respective domain that also follows from the whole theory.
Auto-sufficiency: A module should contain all the data it needs to solve problems in
its domain, so that the only input it needs is the question to be answered [38]. This
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also relates to accuracy and modularity. Clearly, by guaranteeing that there are no
implicit laws, our modules possess all the data they need for answering a query.
Performance: Inferences in themodule should be faster than in the whole description.
First, because the module may use an inference relation less complex than the global
one (e.g., our module of static laws uses the classical consequence relation |=
CPL
). Sec-
ond, the number of formulas of a module is supposed to be significantly smaller than
that of the whole description, then even if algorithms with exponential complexity are
used, the size of the problem is small enough to ensure practical response times [38].
With the results of Section 8.3, we achieve such an improvement in performance.
Encapsulation: We achieve encapsulation if modules do not need to access global in-
formation concerning the problem to be solved. As we have seen along this work,
static laws are (by definition) laws of the world and (by definition) they must be ac-
cessed by all modules. Here we got rid of this by putting them inside each module.
The price to pay is the replication of the same set of static laws in all modules.
Independence: Modules should be independent in the sense that further modifica-
tions (elaborations) of the description are carried out with as little disruption as possi-
ble. This means that additions or removals of modules should not affect the behavior
of the rest of the system. This relates to the principle of elaboration tolerance [88, 89]
in reasoning about actions. Despite some attempts of quantifying such an indepen-
dence [3], that remains an open issue of research. Regarding our modules, we can
easily see that they depend one upon the others: first, as already expected, because
of the static laws. Second, because changing laws of one type is very likely to affect
laws of other types, too (e.g. if we replace hasGun → 〈shoot〉⊤ in our example by just
〈shoot〉⊤, there would be a new static law, viz. hasGun). Third, since changing a mod-
ule may add implicit laws into the theory, modularity may have to be checked again.
Fortunately, with the results of Section 8.3, we can guarantee independence of action
laws for actions a1, . . . , an from action laws that mention actions other than a1, . . . , an,
under the condition that the added module is also itself modular [54].
10.2 Other Modularity and Consistency Notions
AMeta-theory of the Situation Calculus
Pirri and Reiter have investigated the meta-theory of the Situation Calculus [96]. In a
spirit similar to ours, they use executability laws and effect laws. Contrarily to us,
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their executability laws are equivalences and are thus at the same time inexecutability
laws. As they restrict themselves to domains without ramifications, there are no static
laws, i.e., S = ∅. For this setting, they give a syntactical condition on effect laws
guaranteeing that they do not interact with the executability laws in the sense that
they do not entail implicit static laws. Basically, the condition says that when there
are effect laws ϕ1 → [a]ψ and ϕ2 → [a]¬ψ, then ϕ1 and ϕ2 are inconsistent (which
essentially amounts to having in their theories a kind of “implicit static law schema”
of the form ¬(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)).
This then allows them to show that such theories are always consistent. More-
over, they thus simplify the entailment problem for this calculus, and show for several
problems such as consistency or regression that only some of the modules of an action
theory are necessary.
In the object-oriented Situation Calculus [2, 4], executabilities are as in [96] and the
same condition on effect laws is assumed, which syntactically precludes the existence
of implicit static laws. The frame problem is solved using Reiter’s solution [100] and
then is also restricted to domains without static laws. Ramifications are dealt with
by compiling them away a` la Reiter and Lin [80] based on the method given in [91],
which takes into account only some restricted state constraints.
In spite of using many of the object-oriented paradigm tools and techniques, no
mention is made to the concepts of cohesion and coupling [98], which are closely re-
lated tomodularity [57]. In the approach presented in [2], even if modules are individ-
ually highly cohesive, they are not necessarily lowly coupled, due to the dependence
between objects in the reasoning phase. We do not investigate this further here, but
conjecture that this could be done there by, during the reasoning process defined for
that approach, avoiding passing to a module a formula of a type different from those
it contains (cf. Chapter 3).
The present work generalizes and extends Pirri and Reiter’s result to the case
where S 6= ∅ and both these works where the syntactical restriction on effect laws
is not made. It also constitutes a better approach for domains with ramifications as
we do not impose any restriction on the domain constraints we can deal with.
Moreover, by guaranteeing satisfaction of modularity, our domain descriptions
can be decomposed according to the ideas in [2]. We illustrate this with the example
from Section 3.2:
D1 = 〈L1, |=CPL , 〈{walking1→ alive1}, {walking1, alive1}〉〉
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D2 = 〈L2, |=PDL , 〈
{
alive2→ 〈tease2〉⊤,
hasGun2→ 〈shoot2〉⊤
}
, {alive2}〉〉
D3 = 〈L3, |=
;
, 〈


¬loaded3→ [load3]loaded3,
loaded3→ [shoot3]¬alive3,
[tease3]walking3

 , {walking3, alive3}〉〉
D4 = 〈L4, |=PDL , 〈
{
¬hasGun4→ [shoot4]⊥,
¬alive4→ [tease4]⊥
}
, {alive4}〉〉
(For this example, we assume we have detected all implicit laws of the description in
Section 3.2 with Algorithm 7.1 and then contracted the theory by the unintuitive static
law alive.)
Hence with our approach we have the advantage of a more expressive power, as
we can reason about inexecutabilities, and a better modularity in the sense that we
do not combine formulas that are conceptually different (viz. executabilities and inex-
ecutabilities). Moreover, by guaranteeing nonexistence of implicit laws, many of the
results presented in the referred work, e.g., conditional independence (cf. Section 3.2),
transfer to ours.
Consistency in the Presence of Ramifications
Zhang et al. [118] have also proposed an assessment of what a good action theory
should look like. They develop the ideas in the framework of EPDL [119], an extended
version of PDL which allows for propositions as modalities to represent a causal con-
nection between literals (cf. Section 6.5). We do not present the details of that, but
concentrate on the main meta-theoretical results.
Zhang et al. propose a normal form for describing action theories,1 and investigate
three levels of consistency. Roughly speaking, a set of laws T is uniformly consistent if
it is globally consistent (i.e., T 6|=
EPDL
⊥); a formula Φ is T -consistent if T 6|=
EPDL
¬Φ,
for T a uniformly consistent theory; T is universally consistent if (in our terms) every
logically possible world is accessible.
Furthermore, two assumptions are made to preclude the existence of implicit qual-
ifications. Satisfaction of such assumptions means the theory under consideration is
1But not as expressive as one might think: For instance, in modeling the nondeterministic action of
dropping a coin on a chessboard, we are not able to state [drop](black ∨ white). Instead, we should write
something like [dropblack]black, [dropwhite]white, [dropblack,white]black and [dropblack,white]white, where dropblack is
the action of dropping the coin on a black square (analogously for the others) and drop = dropblack ∪
dropwhite ∪ dropblack,white, with “∪” the nondeterministic composition of actions.
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safe, i.e., it is uniformly consistent. Such a normal form justifies the two assumptions
made and on which their notion of good theories relies.
Given this, they propose algorithms to test the different versions of consistency for
a theory T that is in normal form. This test essentially amounts to checking whether
T is safe, i.e., whether T |=
EPDL
〈a〉⊤, for every action a. Success of this check should
mean that the theory under analysis satisfies the consistency requirements.
Although they are concerned with the same kind of problems that have been dis-
cussed in this work, they take an overall view of the subject, in the sense that all prob-
lems are dealt with together. This means that in their approach no special attention
(in our sense) is given to the different components of the theory, and then every time
something is wrong with it this is taken as a global problem inherent to the theory as
a whole. Whereas such a “systemic” view of action theories is not necessarily a draw-
back (we have just seen the strong interaction that exists between the different sets
of laws composing an action theory), being modular in our sense allows us to better
identify the “problematic” laws and take care of them. Moreover, the advantage of al-
lowing to find the set of laws which must be modified in order to achieve the desired
consistency is made evident by the algorithms we have proposed (while their results
only allow to decide whether a given theory satisfies some consistency requirement).
Consistency and Executability
Lang et al. [72] address consistency of action theories in a version of the causal laws
approach [83], focusing on the computational aspects.
To solve the frame problem, they suppose an abstract notion of completion. Given
a theory T a containing logical information about a’s direct effects as well as the in-
direct effects that may follow (expressed in the form of causal laws), the completion
of T a, roughly speaking, is the original theory T a amended of some axioms stating
the persistence of all non-affected (directly nor indirectly) literals. (Note that such
a notion of completion is close to the underlying semantics of the dependence rela-
tion used throughout the present work, which essentially amounts to the explanation
closure assumption [102].)
Their EXECUTABILITY problem is to check whether action a is executable in all
possible initial states (Zhang et al.’s safety property). This amounts to testing whether
every possible state w has a successor w ′ reachable by a such that w and w ′ both
satisfy the completion of T a. For the Walking Turkey Scenario, the formalization of
action tease with causal laws is given by:
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T tease =
{
⊤
tease⇒ walking,
¬alive⇒ ¬walking
}
where the first formula is a conditional effect law for tease, and the latter a causal
law in McCain and Turner’s sense (cf. Section 6.3). We will not dive in the technical
details, and just note that the executability check will return “no” for this example as
tease cannot be executed in a state satisfying ¬alive.
In the mentioned work, the authors are more concerned with the complexity anal-
ysis of the problem of doing such a consistency test and no algorithm for performing it
is given, however. In spite of the fact their motivation is the same as ours, again what
is presented is a kind of “yes-no tool” which can help in doing a meta-theoretical
analysis of a given action theory, and many of the comments concerning Zhang et al.’s
approach could be repeated here.
Another criticism that could be made about both these approaches concerns the
assumption of full executability they rely on. We find it too strong to require all actions
to be always executable (cf. Section 8.2), and to reject as bad an action theory admitting
situationswhere some action cannot be executed at all. As an example, consider a very
simple action theoryD = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪X ∪I〉, where S = {walking→ alive}, E =
{[tease]walking}, X = {〈tease〉⊤}, I = ∅, and ;= {〈tease,walking〉}. Observe that, with
our approach, it suffices to derive the implicit inexecutability law ¬alive → [tease]⊥,
change I , and the system will properly run in situations where ¬alive is the case.
On the other hand, if we consider the equivalent representation of such an action
theory in the approach of Lang et al., after computing the completion of T tease, if we
test its executability, we will get the answer “no”, the reason being that tease is not
executable in the possible state where ¬alive holds. Such an answer is correct, but note
that with only this as guideline we have no idea about where a possible modification
in the action theory should be carried out in order to achieve full executability for
tease. The same observation holds for Zhang et al.’s proposal.
Just to see how things can be even worse, let D ′ be the same action theory as
above, but with X = {alive → 〈tease〉⊤}, obtained by the correction of D above with
the algorithms we proposed. Observe that D ′ satisfies all our postulates. It is not
hard to see, however, that the representation of such an action theory in the above
frameworks, when checked by their respective consistency tests, is still considered to
have a problem.
This problem arises because Lang et al.’s proposal do not allow for executability
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laws, thus one cannot make the distinction between X = {〈tease〉⊤}, X = {alive →
〈tease〉⊤} and X = ∅. By their turn, Zhang et al.’s allows for specifying executabilities,
however their consistency definitions do not distinguish the cases alive → 〈tease〉⊤
and 〈tease〉⊤.
Modular Action Languages
Lifschitz and Ren [77] propose an action description language derived from C+ [45] in
which action theories can also be decomposed in modules. Contrarily to our setting,
in theirs a module is not a set of formulas for given action a, but rather a description
of a subsystem of the theory, i.e., each module describes a set of interrelated fluents
and actions (cf. Section 3.2). As an example, a module describing Lin’s suitcase sce-
nario [78] should contain all causal laws in the sense of C+ that are relevant to the sce-
nario. Actions or fluents having nothing to do, neither directly nor indirectly, with the
suitcase should be described in different modules. This feature makes such a decom-
position somewhat domain-dependent, while here we have proposed a type-oriented
modularization of the formulas, which does not depend on the domain.
In the referred work, modules can be defined in order to specialize other modules.
This is done by making the newmodule to inherit and then specialize other modules’
components. This is an important feature when elaborations are involved. In the suit-
case example, adding a new action relevant to the suitcase description can be achieved
by defining a new module inheriting all properties of the old one and containing the
causal laws needed for the new action. Such ideas are interesting from the stand-
point of software and knowledge engineering: reusability is an intrinsic property of
the framework, and easy scalability promotes elaboration tolerance.
Consistency of a given theory and how to prevent (independent or inherited) con-
flicts between modules however is not addressed.
Other Logics
A concept similar to that of implicit static laws was firstly addressed, as far as we are
concerned, in the realm of regulation consistency with deontic logic [17]. Indeed, the
notions of regulation consistency given in the mentionedwork and that of modularity
presented in [58] and used here can be proved to be equivalent. The main difference
between the mentioned work and the approach in [58] relies on the fact that in [17]
some syntactical restrictions on the formulas have to be made in order to make the
algorithm that is proposed to work.
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In [22] an algorithm is proposed to, given a monolithic description of a web ontol-
ogy in description logic [7], find a good modularization according to criteria similar
to Garson’s. As we have seen, those are stronger than our notion of modularity in
the sense that a given formula should be derivable only from a single module (cf.
Section 3.3). This means that applying the method in [22] to reasoning about actions
would preclude the natural overlapping between modules, that is inherent in reason-
ing about actions theories. Moreover, modules defined in that way are sub-domain
oriented andmay have any type of formula, what can still difficult themodule’smain-
tainability.
A different approach of the work we presented here can be found in [57], where
modularity of action theories is assessed from a software engineering perspective in
the Situation Calculus.
Based on the results we have seen in Chapter 4, in [59] we have defined a modu-
larity approach for description logic [7]. Such a notion of modularity we present there
is related to uniform interpolation for TBoxes [41]. Let concepts(T ) denote the concept
names and roles(T ) the role names occurring in a TBox T . Given T and a signature
S ⊆ concepts(T ) ∪ roles(T ), a TBox T S over (concepts(T ) ∪ roles(T )) \ S is a uniform
interpolant of T outside S if and only if:
• T |= T S;
• T S |= C ⊑ D for every C ⊑ D that has no occurrences of symbols from S.
(Here, |= denotes the entailment for description logics.) It is not difficult to see that
a partition {T ∅} ∪ {T Ri : Ri ∈ roles(T )} is modular if and only if every T
Ri is a
uniform interpolant of T outside roles(T ) \ {Ri}. In [111] there are complexity results
for computing uniform interpolants in ALC.
Still in the realm of description logics, in [41] a notion of conservative extension is
defined that is similar to our modularity. There, T1∪T2 is a conservative extension of T1
if and only if for all concepts C,D built from concepts(T1) ∪ roles(T1), T1 ∪ T2 |= C ⊑ D
implies T1 |= C ⊑ D.
Given our Theorem 4.1, we can show that checking for modularity can be reduced
to checking for conservative extensions of T ∅. Indeed, supposing that the signature
of T ∅ is the set of all concept names, we have that T is modular if and only if for every
role Ri, T
Ri ∪ T ∅ is a conservative extension of T ∅.
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10.3 How Elaboration Tolerant We Are
The principle of elaboration tolerance has been proposed by McCarthy [88]. Roughly,
it states that the effort required to add new information to a given representation (new
laws or entities) should be proportional to the complexity of the information being
added, i.e., it should not require the complete reconstruction of the old theory [105].
Since then, many formalisms claim, in a more or less tacit way, to satisfy such a
principle. Nevertheless, for all this time there has been a lack of good formal criteria
allowing for the evaluation of theory change difficulty and, consequently, compar-
isons between different frameworks are carried out in a subjective way.
The proposal by Amir [3] made the first steps in formally answering what diffi-
culty of changing a theory means by formalizing one aspect of elaboration tolerance.
The basic idea is as follows: let D0 be the original domain description and let D1 and
D2 be two equivalent (and different) descriptions such that each one results from D0
by the application of some sequence of operations (additions and/or deletions of for-
mulas). The resulting theory whose transformation from D0 has the shortest length
(number of operations) is taken as the most elaboration tolerant.
Nevertheless, in the referred work only addition/deletion of axioms is considered,
i.e., changes in the logical language or contraction of consequences of the theory not
explicitly stated in the original set of axioms are not taken into account. This means
that even the formal setting given in [3] is not enough to evaluate the difficulty of
theory change in a broad sense. Hence the community still needs formal criteria that
allow for the comparison between more complex changes carried out by frameworks
like ours, for example.
Of course, how elaboration tolerant a given update/revision method is strongly
depends on its underlying formalism for reasoning about actions, i.e., its logical back-
ground, the solution to the frame problem it implements, the hypotheses it relies on,
etc. In what follows, we discuss how the dependence-based approach here used be-
haves when expansion is considered. Most of the comments concerning consequences
of expansion can also be stated for contraction. We do that with respect to some of the
qualitative criteria given in [89]. In all that follows, we suppose that the resulting
theory is consistent.
Adding effect laws: In the dependence-based framework, adding the new effect law
ϕ→ [a]ψ to the theory demands a change in the dependence relation ;, and hence it
means changing the consequence relation in D . In that case, the maximum number of
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statements added to ; is card({ℓ : ℓ ∈ χ, for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψ,S )}) (dependences
for all indirect effects have to be stated, too). This is due to the explanation closure
nature of the reasoning behind dependence (for more details, see [14]). Because of
this, according to Shanahan [105], explanation closure approaches are not elaboration
tolerant when dealing with the ramification problem. In order to achieve that, the
framework should have a mechanism behaving like circumscription that automati-
cally deals with ramifications. This raises the question: “if we had an automatic (or
even semi-automatic) procedure to do the job of generating the indirect dependences,
could we say the framework is elaboration tolerant?”. We think we can answer pos-
itively to such a question, since we can semi-automatically generate the dependence
relation from a set of effect laws with the method in [13].
Adding executability laws: Such a task demands only a change in the set X of exe-
cutabilities, possibly introducing implicit static laws as a side effect.
Adding static laws: Besides expanding the set S , adding new (indirect) dependences
may be required, changing the consequence relation component of the domain de-
scription (see above).
Adding frame axioms: If the frame axiom ¬ℓ → [a]¬ℓ has to be valid in the resulting
theory, expunging the dependence a ; ℓ should do the job, which in our case means
a change in the consequence relation.
Adding a new action name: Without loss of generality we can assume the action in
question was already in the language. In that case, we expect just to add effect or
executability laws for it. For the former, at most card(Lit) dependences will be added
to ;. (We point out nevertheless that the requirement made in [89] that the addition
of an action irrelevant for a given plan in the old theory should not preclude it in the
resulting theory is too strong. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine a new action forcing
an implicit static law from which an inexecutability for some action in the plan can be
derived. The same holds for the item below.)
Adding a new fluent name: In the same way, we can suppose the fluent was already
in the language. Such a task amounts thus to one or more of the above expansions.
There will be at most 2× card(Act) new elements added to ;.
Because of forcing formulas to be explicitly stated in their respective modules (and
thus possibly making them inferable from two or more different modules at once), in-
tuitively modularity could be seen to diminish elaboration tolerance. For instance,
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when contracting a classical formula ϕ from a non-modular theory, it seems reason-
able to expect not to change the set of static laws S , while the theory being modular
surely forces changing such a module. However it is not difficult to conceive non-
modular theories in which contraction of a formula ϕ may demand a change in S as
well. To witness, let S = {ϕ1 → ϕ2} in an action theory from whose dynamic part
we (implicitly) infer ¬ϕ2. Then, contracting ¬ϕ1 keeping ¬ϕ2 would necessarily ask
for a change in S . We point out nevertheless that, in both cases (modular and non-
modular), the extra work in changing othermodules stays in themechanical level, i.e.,
in the machinery that carries out the theory modification, and does not augment in a
significant way the amount of work the knowledge engineer is expected to do.
10.4 Other Update Methods
Following [73, 75], Eiter et al. [31] have investigated update of action domain descrip-
tions. They define a version of action theory update in an action language and give
complexity results showing how hard such a task can be.
Update of action descriptions in their sense is always relative to some condi-
tions (interpreted as knowledge possibly obtained from earlier observations and that
should be kept). This characterizes a constraint-based update. In the example they
give, change must be carried out preserving the assumption that pushing the button
of the remote control is always executable. Actually, the method is more subtle, as
new effect laws are added constrained by the addition of viz. an executability law for
the new action under concern. In the example, the constraint (executability of push)
was not in the original action description and must figure in the updated theory.
They describe domains of actions in a fragment of the action language C [40]. How-
ever they do not specify which fragment, so it is not clear whether the claimed advan-
tages C has over A really transfer to their framework. At one hand, their approach
deals with indirect effects, but they do not talk about updating a theory by a law with
a nondeterministic action.
Eiter et al. consider a theory T as comprising twomain components: Tu, the part of
the theory that must remain unchanged, and Tm, the part concerning the statements
that are allowed to change. The crucial information to the associated solution to the
frame problem is always in Tu.
Given a theory T = Tu ∪ Tm, ((Tu ∪ Tm),T
′, C) is the problem of updating T by
T ′ ⊆ S ∪ E warranting the result satisfies all constraints in C ⊆ S ∪ X .
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Even though they do not explicitly state postulates for their kind of theory up-
date, they establish conditions for the update operator to be successful. Basically, they
claim for consistency of the resulting theory; maintenance of the new knowledge and
the invariable part of the description; satisfaction of the constraints in C; and also
minimal change.
In some examples that they develop, the illustrated “partial solution” does not
satisfy C due to the existence of implicit laws (cf. their Example 1, where there is an
implicit inexecutability law). To achieve a solution, while keeping C, some other laws
must be dropped (in the example, the agent gives up a static law).2
Just to see the link between update by subsumed laws and addition of implicit
static laws, we note that their Proposition 1 is the same as our Corollary 7.1: every
implicit static law in our sense is trivially a subsumed law in Eiter et al.’s sense.
With their method, we can also contract by a static and an effect law. Contraction
of executabilities are not explicitly addressed, and weakening (replacing a law by a
weaker one) is left as future work.
2This does not mean however that the updated theory will necessarily contain no implicit law.
Chapter 11
where we finish to start
Conclusion
Not every end is a goal. The end of a melody is not its
goal; however, if the melody has not reached its end,
it would also not have reached its goal. A parable.
—Nietzsche
Our contribution is twofold: general, as we presented postulates that apply to all
reasoning about actions formalisms; and specific, as we proposed algorithms for a
dependence-based solution to the frame problem.
We have identified and made a critique of the main approaches of logical mod-
ularity for domain descriptions, pointing out their characteristics and showing why
they do not completely assess modularity in the sense descriptions in reasoning about
actions need.
We have argued that modularity as commonly used in programming or defined
in works on formal logic are not appropriate in reasoning about actions. In the first
case because of expressivity restrictions. In the second because modularity of logical
theories are usually too strong and shows to be of no much aid if the theory is a
description of a scenario in reasoning about actions
We have analyzed the principle of modularity for logics in general defined by
Garson. Such a notion of modularity as defined in [38] and adopted in [22] can be
reduced to the concepts of cohesion and coupling [108, 98] in software engineering.
In [57] we have seen the difficulty of requiring a domain description in reasoning
about actions to satisfy these two principles.
The main motivation in the original work by Garson is the intractability of consis-
tency check in classical first-order logic. That is the reason he moves to relevant logic
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in order to get rid of the principle of explosion and hence get a formal substratum in
which descriptions fit better with his notion of local completeness.
The principle of explosion is not a reason on its own to abandon classical logic.
We agree with Cuenca Grau and colleagues [22] when they say that we can turn our
attention to consistent theories and give an account of modularity even in the presence
of the principle of explosion. Since our aim is to point out whether a theory is good
or not, if it is inconsistent, then it simply cannot be good. Moreover, we focus on how
to refine modularity, not on how to force modularity to hold for inconsistent theories.
We have shown that, despite the principle of explosion, and with some amendments,
we can have a good account of modularity for theories in reasoning about actions.
We have defined here our concept of modularity of an action theory and pointed
out some of the problems that arise if it is not satisfied. In particular we have ar-
gued that the non-dynamic part of action theories could influence but should not be
influenced by the dynamic one.1
We have put forward some postulates, and in particular tried to demonstrate that
when there are implicit static and inexecutability laws then one has slipped up in
designing the action theory in question. As shown, a possible solution comes into its
own with Algorithms 7.1 and 7.2, which can give us some guidelines in correcting an
action theory if needed. By means of examples, we have seen that there are several
alternatives of correction, and choosing the right module to be modified as well as
providing the intuitive information that must be supplied is a task that is up to the
knowledge engineer.
Given the difficulty of exhaustively enumerating all the preconditions under
which a given action is executable (and also those under which such an action can-
not be executed), it is reasonable to expect that there is always going to be some ex-
ecutability precondition ϕ1 and some inexecutability precondition ϕ2 that together
lead to a contradiction, forcing, thus, an implicit static law ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2). This is the
reason we propose to state some information about both executabilities and inexe-
cutabilities, and then run the algorithms in order to improve the description.
It could be argued that unintuitive consequences in action theories are mainly due
to badly written axioms and not to the lack of modularity. True enough, but what we
have presented here is the case that making a domain description modular gives us
1It might be objected that it is only by doing experiments that one learns the static laws that govern
the universe. But note that this involves learning, whereas here – as always done in the reasoning about
actions field – the static laws are known once forever, and do not evolve.
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a tool to detect at least some of such problems and correct it. (But note that we do
not claim to correct badly written axioms automatically and once for all). Besides this,
having separate entities in the ontology and controlling their interaction help us to
localize where the problems are, which can be crucial for real world applications.
In this work we have illustrated by some examples what we can do in order to
make a theory intuitive. This involves theory modification. We have presented a gen-
eral method for changing a domain description given a formula we want to contract.
We have defined a semantics for theory contraction and also presented its syntac-
tical counterpart through contraction operators. Soundness and completeness of such
operators with respect to the semantics have been established (Corollary 9.1).
We have also shown that modularity is a sufficient condition for contraction to be
successful (Theorem 9.3). This gives further evidence that the notion of modularity is
fruitful.
Modularity is not necessarily a property of the underlying logical formalism. It is
rather a property of descriptionswritten in such a formalism. The choice of which log-
ical background to use in formalizing a domain may more or less ease the satisfaction
of modularity.
In this work we used a weak version of PDL, but our notions and results can be
applied to other frameworks as well. It is worth noting however that for first-order
based frameworks the consistency checks of Algorithms 7.1 and 7.2 are undecidable.
We can get rid of this by assuming thatD is finite and that there is no function symbol
in the language. In this way, the result of NewCons(.) is finite and the algorithms
terminate.
The dependence-based framework we have used here is a simple yet powerful
account to the frame and ramification problems, within which Reiter’s regression
technique can be applied [26]. We have shown that regression does not necessarily
build on Successor State Axioms as in Reiter’s original theory, which involves quan-
tification. Moreover, the dependence-based framework has the advantage of having a
decision procedure in terms of tableau systems [12, 11] (while the Situation Calculus
contains second-order axioms and is a priori not even semi-decidable).
We have also presented an example of a scenario having actions with both indeter-
minate and indirect effects, which leads to counterintuitive results when formalized
in fluent-indexed approaches. The analysis we have carried out supports the thesis
that causality should be action-indexed.
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The problem with such a causal notion is that one must in some way relate ac-
tions and their indirect effects. Nevertheless, the present work is a step toward a
solution to the problem of indirect dependences: indeed, if the indirect dependence
shoot ; ¬walking is not in;, then after running Algorithm 7.2 we get an implicit inex-
ecutability (loaded∧walking)→ [shoot]⊥, i.e., shoot cannot be executed if loaded∧walking
holds. Such an unintuitive inexecutability is not in I and thus indicates the missing
indirect dependence. The general case is nevertheless more complex, and it seems
that such indirect dependences cannot be computed automatically in the case of inde-
terminate effects.
A topic for further investigations could be considering the notion of coherence de-
fined in [71] as a guideline for “repairing” a given theory. Roughly, given an action
theoryD and an unintuitive implicit static lawϕ, the formulas in T that are most likely
to be revised are exactly those whose utility, in Kwok et al.’s sense, for deriving ϕ are
the highest.
Our postulates do not take into account causality statements linking propositions
such as in [78, 83], nor the qualification problem. This could be a topic for further
investigation.
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Appendix A
Long Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let the underlying logic be a fusion, and let D = 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,T 〉 be such that T is parti-
tioned. If D is propositionally modular, then D is modular.
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 be propositionally modular. Suppose that for some Φ
〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T
∅ ∪ T act(Φ)〉 6|= Φ, i.e., T ∅ ∪ T act(Φ) 6|=
PDL
Φ. Hence there is a PDL-model
M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
T act(Φ)∧T ∅, and 6|=
M
Φ. This means that there is somew ∈W
such that 6|=
M
w
Φ. We prove that D 6|= Φ by constructing from M a model M ′ such that
|=
M ′
T and 6|=
M ′
w
Φ.
First, as our logic is an extension of classical propositional logic and it is compact,
propositional modularity implies that for every propositional valuation val ⊆ 2Lit
which is a model of T ∅, there is a possible worlds model Mval = 〈Wval,Rval〉 such that
|=
Mval T , and val ∈ Wval, i.e., for every propositional valuation of T
∅, there is a model
of T containing that valuation.
Second, taking the disjoint union of all these models, we obtain a model M ′ =
〈W ′,R ′〉 such that |=
M ′
T , and for every propositional valuation val ⊆ 2Lit of T ∅, there
is a possible world w ′ ∈W ′ such that w ′ = val.
Now, we can use M ′ to adjust those accessibility relations Ra of M whose a does
not appear in Φ, in a way such that the resulting model satisfies the rest of the theory
T \ T act(Φ). Let M ′′ = 〈W ′′,R ′′〉 be such that
• W ′′ = {uv : u ∈W, v ∈W
′, and u = v};
• if a ∈ act(Φ), then uvR
′′
a u
′
v′ if and only if uRau
′;
• if a 6∈ act(Φ), then uvR
′′
a u
′
v′ if and only if vRav
′; and
• uv = u = v.
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We have W ′′ 6= ∅ because |=
M
T ∅. M ′′ is a model of the underlying logic because the
latter is a fusion. Then, for the sublanguage constructed from act(Φ), it can be proved
by structural induction that for every formulaΦ ′ of the sublanguage and every u ∈W
and v ∈ W ′, |=
M
u
Φ ′ if and only if |=
M ′′
uv
Φ ′. The same can be proved for the sublanguage
constructed from Act \ act(Φ). As, by hypothesis, T is partitioned, T ∅ and each T a are
in at least one of these sublanguages, thus we have proved that |=
M ′′
T , and 6|=
M ′′
wv
Φ for
every v. Hence D 6|= Φ.
Proof of Theorem 4.4
An action theory D = 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,T 〉 is modular if and only if Simp = ∅.
(⇒): Suppose Simp = ∅. Therefore, for all subsets {ϕ1 → [a]ψ1, . . . , ϕn→ [a]ψn} of T a
and all ϕ ′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T a, we have that
if T ∅ ∪ {ϕ ′, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} 6|=CPL ⊥, then T
∅ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} 6|=CPL ⊥. (A.1)
By Theorem 4.1, it suffices to prove that D is propositionally modular. Therefore,
suppose T ∅ 6|=
CPL
ϕ for some propositional ϕ. Let W be the set of all propositional
valuations satisfying T ∅ that falsify ϕ. As T ∅ 6|=
CPL
ϕ, T ∅ ∪ {¬ϕ} is satisfiable, henceW
must be nonempty. For every w ∈W let
Eaϕ(w) = {ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ T a and w satisfies ϕi}
X aϕ(w) = {ϕi : ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and w satisfies ϕi}
We define Ra such that wRaw
′ if and only if
• X aϕ(w) 6= ∅; and
• w ′ satisfies ψi for every ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ T a such that ϕi ∈ Eaϕ(w).
We then obtain a model M = 〈W,R〉. We have that |=
M
T ∅, by the definition of W.
Moreover, for everyw ∈W and everyϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ T a, if |=Mw ϕi, then, by the definition
of Ra, |=
M
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈ W such that wRaw
′. We also have that for every w ∈ W and
every ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T a, if |=Mw ϕi, then from (A.1) and the definition of Ra, there exists
at least one w ′ such that wRaw
′.
Hence, |=
M
T . Clearly 6|=
M
ϕ, by the definition of W. Thus we have T 6|=
PDL
ϕ, and
then D 6|= ϕ.
(⇐): Straightforward, by the soundness result (Theorem 4.3).
Appendix B
Long Proofs of Chapter 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let T be the set of global axioms (5.4)–(5.8). Then
T |=
DPDL
+ (∀a.(Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔
((a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p)))))))↔
(∀a.([a]p↔
(¬Poss(a) ∨
(a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . . ∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p)) ∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p))))))
Let ϕ denote the formula
(a = a1∧ Cond
+(a1, p)) ∨ . . .∨ (a = an∧ Cond
+(an, p))∨
(p ∧ ¬(a = a ′1∧ Cond
−(a ′1, p)) ∧ . . .∧ ¬(a = a
′
m∧ Cond
−(a ′m, p)))
(→): We are going to show that
T |=
DPDL
+ (∀a.(Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔ ϕ)))→ (∀a.([a]p↔ (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ)))
1. Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔ ϕ), from hypothesis
2. Poss(a)→ ([a]p→ ϕ), from 1. by classical logic
3. (Poss(a) ∧ [a]p)→ ϕ, from 2. by classical logic
4. ([a]p ∧ Poss(a))→ ϕ, from 3. by classical logic
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5. [a]p→ (Poss(a)→ ϕ), from 4. by classical logic
6. Poss(a)↔ ¬[a]⊥, from global axiom (5.4)
7. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]⊥, from 6. and classical logic
8. [a](⊥→ p), RN on ⊥→ p
9. [a]⊥→ [a]p, from K on 8. and modus ponens
10. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]p, from 7. and 9. by classical logic
11. Poss(a)→ (ϕ→ [a]p), from 1. by classical logic
12. (¬Poss(a) ∧ϕ)→ [a]p, from 10. by classical logic
13. ¬Poss(a)→ (ϕ→ [a]p), from 12. by classical logic
14. (Poss(a) ∨ ¬Poss(a))→ (ϕ→ [a]p), from 11. and 13. by classical logic
15. ⊤→ (ϕ→ [a]p), from 14. by classical logic
16. ϕ→ [a]p, from 15. by classical logic
17. (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ)→ [a]p, from 10. and 16. by classical logic
18. (Poss(a)→ ϕ)→ [a]p, from 17. by classical logic
19. [a]p↔ (Poss(a)→ ϕ), from 5. and 18. by classical logic
20. [a]p↔ (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ), from 19. by classical logic
(←): We now prove that
T |=
DPDL
+ (∀a.([a]p↔ (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ)))→ (∀a.(Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔ ϕ)))
1. [a]p↔ (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ), from hypothesis
2. (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ)→ [a]p, from 1. by classical logic
3. (Poss(a)→ ϕ)→ [a]p, from 2. by classical logic
4. Poss(a)→ (ϕ→ [a]p), from 3. by classical logic
5. [a]p→ (¬Poss(a) ∨ϕ), from 1. by classical logic
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6. [a]p→ (Poss(a)→ ϕ), from 5. by classical logic
7. ([a]p ∧ Poss(a))→ ϕ, from 6. by classical logic
8. Poss(a)→ ([a]p→ ϕ), from 7. by classical logic
9. Poss(a)→ ([a]p↔ ϕ), from 4. and 8. by classical logic
Proof of Theorem 5.3
Let the underlying logic be deterministic PDL, ; be a dependence relation obtained from sets
causes+(.) and causes−(.), and let T be the set of global axioms (5.4)–(5.8). Then
(1) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ p, if a 6; p and a 6; ¬p;
(2) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)), if a 6; p and a ; ¬p;
(3) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ p, if a ; p and a 6; ¬p; and
(4) T |=
;
[a]p↔ ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)), if a ; p and a ; ¬p.
Proving (1):
(→): We are about to prove ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a).
1. ¬p→ [a]¬p, from the hypothesis a 6; p
2. ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 1. by classical logic
3. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a](p ∧ ¬p), by K and classical logic
4. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 3. and classical logic
5. ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 2. and 4. by classical logic
6. [a]⊥→ ¬Poss(a), from global axiom (5.4)
7. ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a), from 5. and 6. by classical logic
(←): We now prove ¬Poss(a) ∨ p→ [a]p.
1. p→ [a]p, from the hypothesis a 6; ¬p
2. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]⊥, from global axiom (5.4)
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3. [a](⊥→ p), RN on ⊥→ p
4. [a]⊥→ [a]p, from K on 3. and modus ponens
5. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]p, from 2. and 4. by classical logic
6. ¬Poss(a) ∨ p→ [a]p, from 1. and 5. by classical logic
Proving (2):
(→): Let’s show ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a) and ([a]p ∧ Cond−(a, p))→ ¬Poss(a).
1. ¬p→ [a]¬p, from the hypothesis a 6; p
2. ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 1. by classical logic
3. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a](p ∧ ¬p), by K and classical logic
4. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 3. and classical logic
5. [a]⊥→ ¬Poss(a), from global axiom (5.4)
6. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ ¬Poss(a), from 4. and 5. by classical logic
7. ([a]p ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a), from 2. and 6. by classical logic
8. Cond−(a, p)→ [a]¬p, by global axiom (5.7)
9. ([a]p ∧ Cond−(a, p))→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 8. by classical logic
10. ([a]p ∧ Cond−(a, p))→ [a]⊥, from 9. and 4. by classical logic
11. ([a]p ∧ Cond−(a, p)→ ¬Poss(a), from 10. and 5. by classical logic
(←): We are going to prove ¬Poss(a) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p.
1. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]⊥, from global axiom (5.4)
2. [a](⊥→ p), RN on ⊥→ p
3. [a]⊥→ [a]p, from K on 2. and modus ponens
4. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]p, from 1. and 3. by classical logic
5. (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p, from global axiom (5.8)
6. ¬Poss(a) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p, from 4. and 5. by classical logic
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Proving (3):
(→): We will prove ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a).
1. (¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ [a]¬p, by global axiom (5.6)
2. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 1. by classical logic
3. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a](p ∧ ¬p), by K and classical logic
4. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 3. and classical logic
5. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 2. and 4. by classical logic
6. [a]⊥→ ¬Poss(a), from global axiom (5.4)
7. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ ¬Poss(a), from 5. and 6. by classical logic
(←): We are about to prove ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ p→ [a]p
1. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]⊥, from global axiom (5.4)
2. [a](⊥→ p), RN on ⊥→ p
3. [a]⊥→ [a]p, from K on 2. and modus ponens
4. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]p, from 1. and 3. by classical logic
5. p→ [a]p, by hypothesis a 6; ¬p
6. Cond+(a, p)→ [a]p, from global axiom (5.5)
7. ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ p→ [a]p, from 4., 5. and 6. by classical logic
Proving (4):
(→): We prove ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬(p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)))→ ¬Poss(a)
1. (¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ [a]¬p, from global axiom (5.6)
2. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬p)→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 1. by classical logic
3. Cond−(a, p)→ [a]¬p, by global axiom (5.7)
4. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ Cond−(a, p)) → ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ [a]¬p), from 3. by
classical logic
5. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ [a]¬p)→ ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), by classical logic
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6. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ Cond−(a, p)) → ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p), from 4. and 5. by classical
logic
7. [a]p∧¬Cond+(a, p)∧¬p∨ [a]p∧¬Cond+(a, p)∧Cond−(a, p)→ [a]p∧ [a]¬p, from 2.
and 4. by classical logic
8. ([a]p∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬(p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)))→ ([a]p∧ [a]¬p), from 7. by classical
logic
9. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a](p ∧ ¬p), by K and classical logic
10. ([a]p ∧ [a]¬p)→ [a]⊥, from 9. and classical logic
11. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬(p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p)))→ [a]⊥, from 8. and 10. by classical
logic
12. [a]⊥→ ¬Poss(a), from global axiom (5.4)
13. ([a]p ∧ ¬Cond+(a, p) ∧ ¬(p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))) → ¬Poss(a), from 11. and 12. by
classical logic
(←): We will prove ¬Poss(a) ∨ Cond+(a, p) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p
1. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]⊥, from global axiom (5.4)
2. [a](⊥→ p), RN on ⊥→ p
3. [a]⊥→ [a]p, from K on 2. and modus ponens
4. ¬Poss(a)→ [a]p, from 1. and 3. by classical logic
5. Cond+(a, p)→ [a]p, from global axiom (5.5)
6. (p ∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p, by global axiom (5.8)
7. ¬Poss(a) ∨Cond+(a, p) ∨ (p∧ ¬Cond−(a, p))→ [a]p, from 4., 5. and 6. by classical
logic
Appendix C
Long Proofs of Chapter 7
We recall that |=
CPL
is logical consequence in classical propositional logic, and PI(T ∅)
is the set of prime implicates of the set T ∅ of classical formulas.
Before giving the proof of the theorems, we recall some properties of prime im-
plicates [81, 82] and of the function NewCons(.) [61] (see Section 7.3). Let ϕ ∈ Fml,
T ∅ ⊆ Fml finite (identified with the conjunction of its formulas), and χ be a clause.
Then
1. |=
CPL
ϕ↔ ∧PI(ϕ) [82, Corollary 3.2].
2. PI(T ∅) ∪NewCons(ϕ,T ∅) = PI(T ∅ ∧ϕ) (by definition of NewCons(.)).
3. |=
CPL
(T ∅ ∧ϕ)↔ (T ∅ ∧ NewCons(ϕ,T ∅)) (from 1 and 2)
4. If PI(ϕ) |=
CPL
χ, then there is χ ′ ∈ PI(ϕ) such that χ ′ |=
CPL
χ [82, Proposition 3.4].
Proof of Theorem 7.3
Let Simp* be the output of Algorithm 7.1 on input D
a = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉. Then
Da satisfies Postulate PS if and only if Simp* = ∅.
LetDa = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪X a ∪Ia〉 be an action theory for a, and let ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈
X a, Ca = Ea ∪ Ia, and C^a ⊆ Ca. We define:
ϕC^a =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ C^a}
ψC^a =
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ C^a}
Moreover, let indepa = {¬ℓ : a 6; ℓ}.
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Lemma C.1
Let indep ′a ⊆ indepa. S ∪ {ψC^a} ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ if and only if S ∪ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪
indep ′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof:
S ∪ {ψC^a} ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥
if and only if
PI(S ∪ {ψC^a}) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ (by Property 1)
if and only if
PI(S ) ∪NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ (by Property 2)
if and only if
S ∪NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ (by Property 1).
Lemma C.2
Let indep ′a ⊆ indepa. If S ∪ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥, then there exists χ ∈
NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) such that S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof:
S ∪NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥
if and only if
PI(S ) ∪NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ (by Property 1)
if and only if
PI(S ∪ {ψC^a}) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ (by Property 2)
if and only if
PI(S ∪ {ψC^a}) |=CPL ¬
∧
{¬ℓi : ¬ℓi ∈ indep
′
a}
if and only if
PI(S ∪ {ψC^a}) |=CPL
∨
{ℓi : ¬ℓi ∈ indep
′
a}
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if and only if there exists χ ∈ PI(S ∪ {ψC^a}) such that
χ |=
CPL
∨
{ℓi : ¬ℓi ∈ indep
′
a} (by Property 4)
if and only if
{χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥
if and only if
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥.
Lemma C.3
Let indep ′a ⊆ indepa. If we have both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ and S ∪
NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥, then there exists χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) such that
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof:
By Lemma C.2 and classical logic.
Lemma C.4
Let indep ′a ⊆ indepa. If we have both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ and S ∪
NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥, then there exists χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) such that
both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof:
Trivially, by Lemma C.3.
Lemma C.5
Let indep ′a ⊆ indepa. If χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) is such that S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥
and S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥, then both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ⊥.
Proof:
Let S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ and χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) be such that S ∪ {χ} ∪
indep ′a |=CPL ⊥.
If χ = ⊥, the result is trivial. Otherwise, we have the following cases:
• If atm(χ) 6⊂ atm(indep ′a), then the premise is false (and the lemma trivially holds).
• If atm(χ) = atm(indep ′a), the lemma holds.
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• Let atm(χ) ⊂ atm(indep ′a). Then, from
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ (the hypothesis)
it follows
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥.
From
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥ (hypothesis)
and because
S ∪ indep ′a 6|=CPL ⊥,
it follows
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ⊥.
Lemma C.6
If χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) is such that both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a}∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ⊥, then S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a ,¬χ} 6|=CPL ⊥ and for all
ℓi ∈ χ, a 6; ℓi.
Proof:
From
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
we conclude
S ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥.
From this and the hypothesis
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ⊥,
it follows
S ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ¬χ.
If S |=
CPL
¬χ, then S ∪ {ψC^a} |=CPL ¬χ, and because χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ), we have
χ |=
CPL
¬χ, a contradiction. Hence S ∪ {χ} 6|=
CPL
⊥.
Suppose now that there is a literal ℓ ∈ χ such that ¬ℓ /∈ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi}.
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Then, the propositional valuation in which χℓ←true satisfies
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi},
and then
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥.
Hence there cannot be such a literal, and then for all ℓi ∈ χ, a 6; ℓi.
Now, from a 6; ℓi for all ℓi ∈ χ, we have |=CPL
∧
{¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} ↔ ¬χ.
From this and the hypothesis
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a } ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
it follows S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a ,¬χ} 6|=CPL ⊥.
Proof of Theorem 7.3
We are about to prove that Da satisfies Postulate PS if and only if Simp* = ∅.
(⇒): Suppose Simp* 6= ∅. Then at the first step of the algorithm there has been
some ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and some C^a ⊆ Ca such that for some χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ),
Da |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕC^a ∧ ¬χ) and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕC^a ∧ ¬χ). Hence D
a does not
satisfy Postulate PS.
(⇐): Suppose that Simp* = ∅. Therefore for all ϕ ′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and for all subsets
C^a ⊆ Ca, we have that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ), if S ∪ {ϕ
′, ϕC^a ,¬χ} 6|=CPL ⊥,
then there exists ℓi ∈ χ such that a ; ℓi
(C.1)
From (C.1) and Lemma C.6, we get
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ), if S ∪ {ϕ,ϕC^a }∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥,
then S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
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From this and Lemma C.5, it follows that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψC^a ,S ), if S ∪ {ϕ
′, ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥,
then S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a 6|=CPL ⊥
This and Lemma C.4 gives us
if S ∪ {ϕ ′, ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥, then S ∪NewCons(ψC^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥
From this and Lemma C.1, it follows that for all indep ′a ⊆ indepa, for everyϕ
′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈
X a and all C^a ⊆ Ca,
if S ∪ {ϕ ′, ϕC^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥, then S ∪ {ψC^a} ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥. (C.2)
Now, suppose 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ for some propositional ϕ. We will build a
model M such that M is a model for Da that does not satisfy ϕ.
Let M = 〈W,Ra〉 be such that W = valuations(S ), and Ra be such that for all
w,w ′ ∈W, wRaw
′ if and only if
• |=
M
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ca such that |=Mwϕi; and
• |=
M
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a 6; ℓ and |=
M
w
¬ℓ.
We have that M is a ;-model, by the definition of Ra. By the definition of W, M is a
model of S . We have that M is a model of Ea and Ia, too: for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ca
and every world w ∈ W, if |=
M
w
ϕi, then, by the definition of Ra, |=
M
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈ W
such that wRaw
′. Moreover, M is also a model of X a: for every ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and
every world w ∈W, if |=
M
w
ϕi, then
Ea(w) = {ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea : |=Mwϕi}, and indepa(w) = {¬ℓ : a 6; ℓ and |=Mw ¬ℓ}
are such that S ∪ {ϕi, ϕEa(w)} ∪ indepa(w) 6|=CPL ⊥, where
ϕEa(w) =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)}
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From this and (C.2), we have S ∪ {ψEa(w)} ∪ indepa(w) 6|=CPL ⊥, where
ψEa(w) =
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)}
AsW is maximal, there existsw ′ such that |=
M
w′
ψEa(w) ∧ indepa(w). As Ra is maximal by
definition, we have wRaw
′. Hence there exists at least one w ′ such that wRaw
′, and
|=
M
w
〈a〉⊤.
Hence, M is a model of Da. Clearly 6|=
M
ϕ, by the definition of W. Hence Da 6|= ϕ.
Therefore Da satisfies Postulate PS.
Proof of Theorem 7.5
Let Iaimp be the output of Algorithm 7.2 on input D
a = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉. If Da
satisfies Postulate PS, then Da satisfies Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
Let Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 be an action theory for action a. For every
E^a ⊆ Ea we define:
ϕE^a =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ E^a}
ψE^a =
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ E^a}
Moreover, let indepa = {¬ℓ : a 6; ℓ}.
Lemma C.7
If S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a) → [a]⊥ and S ∪ {ψE^a} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥, then there is χ ∈
NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) such that S ,I
a 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥ and a 6; ℓi for all ℓi ∈ χ.
Proof:
Let S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a) → [a]⊥. Then there is a PDL-model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such
that |=
M
S ∧ Ia and 6|=
M
(ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a)→ [a]⊥. This means that there is a possible world
v ∈W such that |=
M
v
ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥. From |=
M
v
ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a, it follows
S ∪ {ϕE^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ (C.3)
From hypothesis S ∪ {ψE^a } ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥ and Lemma C.1, we get
S ∪NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥
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and from this and Lemma C.2 we have that there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) such that
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep ′a |=CPL ⊥ (C.4)
From (C.3), (C.4) and classical logic, there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) such that
S ∪ {ϕE^a } ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep
′
a |=CPL ⊥
From this and Lemma C.5 it follows that there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψE^a ,S ) such that
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕE^a } ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} 6|=CPL ⊥
and
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬ℓi : ℓi ∈ χ and a 6; ℓi} |=CPL ⊥
This and Lemma C.6 gives us that for all ℓi ∈ χ, a 6; ℓi.
Now, because M above is such that |=
M
v
ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a, from this and S ∪ {χ} ∪
indep ′a |=CPL ⊥, we have that |=
M
v
ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ. Because 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥, we therefore have
S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥.
Proof of Theorem 7.5
We are about to prove that ifDa satisfies Postulate PS, thenDa satisfies Postulate PI
if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
(⇒): Straightforward, as every time Da |= ϕ → [a]⊥, we have 〈LPDL, |=
PDL
,S ∪ Ia〉 |=
ϕ→ [a]⊥, and then Iaimp never changes.
(⇐): Suppose that Iaimp = ∅. Therefore for all subsets E^a ⊆ Ea, we have that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψE^a ,S ), if S ,I
a 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥,
then there exists ℓi ∈ χ such that a ; ℓi
(C.5)
From (C.5) and Lemma C.7, it follows that for all E^a ⊆ Ea,
if S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕE^a ∧ indep
′
a)→ [a]⊥,
then S ∪ {ψE^a} ∪ indep
′
a 6|=CPL ⊥.
(C.6)
Suppose 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I
a〉 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥ for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then there exists a
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PDL-model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ia and 6|=
M
ϕ→ [a]⊥. This means that there
is a possible world v ∈W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥.
(We are going to build a model of Da, and hence conclude that Da 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥.)
For givenw ∈W, we define:
Ia(w) = {ϕi→ [a]⊥ ∈ Ia : |=Mwϕi}
Because Da satisfies Postulate PS, we can extend M to a big model M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′a〉
such that W = valuations(S ), and R ′a is defined such that for all w,w
′ ∈ W ′, wR ′aw
′ if
and only if
• |=
M ′
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a 6; ℓ and |=
M ′
w
¬ℓ;
• |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea such that |=M ′w ϕi; and
• Ia(w) = ∅.
By definition, M ′ is a ;-model. We also have |=
M ′
S , by the definition of W ′. M ′ is
a model of Ea, too: for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then
|=
M ′
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈ W ′ such that wR ′aw
′. Clearly M ′ is also a model of Ia: for every
ϕi → [a]⊥ ∈ Ia and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then Ia(w) 6= ∅ and R ′a(w) = ∅. M ′ is a
model of X a, too: for every ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and everyw ∈W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then
Ea(w) = {ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea : |=Mwϕi}, and indepa(w) = {¬ℓ : a 6; ℓ and |=Mw ¬ℓ}
are such that S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w))→ [a]⊥, where
ϕEa(w) =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)}
The justification is that S ,Ia |=
PDL
(ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥ would imply Da |=
(ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥, and as long as ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a, Da |= ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕEa(w) ∧
indepa(w)). As by hypothesisD
a satisfies PS, ¬(ϕi∧ϕEa(w)∧ indepa(w)) ∈ S , and then
w /∈W ′.
Hence, from S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥ and (C.6), it follows that
S ∪ {ψEa(w)} ∪ indepa(w) 6|=CPL ⊥, where
ψEa(w) =
∧
{ψi : ϕi→ [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)}
As W ′ is maximal, there exists w ′ such that |=
M ′
w′
ψEa(w) ∧ indepa(w). As R
′
a is maximal
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by definition, we havewR ′aw
′. Hence there exists at least onew ′ such thatwR ′aw
′, and
then |=
M ′
w′
〈a〉⊤.
Therefore, M ′ is a model of Da.
Looking at v ∈ W ′, we must have S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
(ϕEa(v) ∧ indepa(v)) → [a]⊥, because
otherwise Ra(v) = ∅, against the hypothesis that 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥. Hence, from (C.6) it follows
that S ∪ {ψEa(v)}∪ indepa(v) 6|=CPL ⊥, and then there exists at least one v
′ such that vR ′av
′,
and then |=
M ′
v′
〈a〉⊤. From this it follows that Da 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥. Therefore Da satisfies
Postulate PI.
Appendix D
Long Proofs of Chapter 8
Proof of Theorem 8.3
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfy Postulate PS*. D satisfies Postulate PI* if and
only if Da = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 satisfies Postulate PI for all a ∈ Act.
(⇒): Suppose that Da |= ϕ → [a]⊥, i.e., S , Ea,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥. By monotonicity,
S , E ,X ,I |=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥, too. Now suppose that 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥, i.e.,
S ,Ia 6|=
PDL
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there exists a possible worlds model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such
that |=
M
S ∧ Ia and there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥. Let
M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′〉 be such that W ′ = W, and R ′a ′ = ∅, for all a
′ 6= a, and R ′a = Ra. Then
|=
M ′
S ∧ I , and then S ,I 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥. Hence D does not satisfy PI*.
(⇐): Suppose that D does not satisfy Postulate PI*. Then there exists ϕ ∈ Fml such
that D |= ϕ→ [a]⊥ and 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I〉 6|= ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Claim: Da |= ϕ→ [a]⊥.
(Proof of the claim): Suppose Da 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥, i.e., S , Ea,X a,Ia 6|=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then
there exists a ;-model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia and 6|=
M
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
This means that there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥, i.e., there
is v ′ ∈W such that Ra(v) = v
′.
(We extend M to all other actions D speaks of and obtain a model of D .)
Given w ∈W, for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj→ [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mwϕj}
X ai (w) = {ϕj→ 〈ai〉⊤ ∈ X ai : |=Mwϕj}
Let M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′〉 be such that W ′ = W, and R ′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a ′ 6=a Ra ′ , where for each
a ′ 6= a and every w,w ′ ∈W ′, wRa ′w
′ if and only if
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• |=
M ′
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a ′ 6; ℓ and |=
M ′
w
¬ℓ.
• |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a ′]ψi ∈ Ea ′ such that |=M ′w ϕi; and
• Ia
′
(w) = ∅;
By definition,M ′ is a model of the dependence relation ;. Because, by hypothesis,D
satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W
′,
if Iai (w) 6= ∅, then X ai(w) = ∅. Then, as W ′ = valuations(S ), M ′ is a model of S .
We have that M ′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea, and given a ′ 6= a, for every
ϕi → [a ′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then |=M ′w′ ψi for all w ′ ∈ W ′ such that
wRa ′w
′. Clearly M ′ is also amodel of I : it is a model of Ia, and given a ′ 6= a, for every
ϕi→ [a ′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then Ia ′(w) 6= ∅ and Ra ′(w) = ∅. M ′ is a
model of X , too: besides being a model of X a, for every a ′ 6= a and all worlds w ∈ W ′
such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra ′ , because Ra ′(w) = ∅ in this
case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as long
as PS* is satisfied. Thus |=
M ′
S∧E∧X ∧I , but if this is the case, S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ→ [a]⊥,
hence we must have S , Ea,X a,Ia |=
;
ϕ → [a]⊥, and then Da |= ϕ → [a]⊥. (End of the
proof of the claim.)
From 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ I〉 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥ it follows 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ → [a]⊥.
Putting all the results together, we have that Da does not satisfy Postulate PI.
Proof of Theorem 8.5
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → [a]ψ if and only
if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ [a]ψ.
(⇒): Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfy Postulate PS*, and also suppose that
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ → [a]ψ, i.e., S , Ea,Ia 6|=
;
ϕ → [a]ψ. Then there exists a
;-model M = 〈W,Ra〉, such that |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia and 6|=
M
ϕ → [a]ψ. This means that
there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]ψ, i.e., there is v ′ ∈ W such
that Ra(v) = v
′ and 6|=
M
v′
ψ.
(We will extend M to obtain a model of D and thus show that D 6|= ϕ→ [a]ψ.)
Given w ∈W, for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj→ [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mwϕj}
X ai (w) = {ϕj→ 〈ai〉⊤ ∈ X ai : |=Mwϕj}
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Let M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′〉 be such that W ′ = W, and R ′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a ′ 6=a Ra ′ , where for each
a ′ 6= a and every w,w ′ ∈W ′, wRa ′w
′ if and only if
• |=
M ′
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a ′ 6; ℓ and |=
M ′
w
¬ℓ.
• |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a ′]ψi ∈ Ea ′ such that |=M ′w ϕi; and
• Ia
′
(w) = ∅;
By definition,M ′ is a model of the dependence relation ;. Because, by hypothesis,D
satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W
′,
if Iai (w) 6= ∅, then X ai(w) = ∅. Then, as W ′ = valuations(S ), M ′ is a model of S .
We have that M ′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea, and given a ′ 6= a, for every
ϕi → [a ′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then |=M ′w′ ψi for all w ′ ∈ W ′ such that
wRa ′w
′. Clearly M ′ is also a model of I : besides being a model of Ia, given a ′ 6= a,
for everyϕi→ [a ′]⊥ ∈ I and everyw ∈W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then Ia ′(w) 6= ∅ and Ra ′(w) = ∅.
M ′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a, and for every a ′ 6= a and all worlds
w ∈W ′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra ′ , because Ra ′(w) = ∅ in
this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as
long as PS* is satisfied. Thus |=
M ′
S ∧E ∧X ∧I . Because there are v, v ′ ∈W ′ such that
|=
M ′
v
ϕ, vRav
′ and 6|=
M ′
v′
ψ, we have S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ→ [a]ψ, and then D 6|= ϕ→ [a]ψ.
(⇐): Suppose D 6|= ϕ → [a]ψ, i.e., S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ → [a]ψ. Then there is a ;-
model M such that |=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and 6|=
M
ϕ → [a]ψ. Then, given a, we have
|=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia, and then |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia. Hence S , Ea,Ia 6|=
;
ϕ→ [a]ψ, and then
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ→ [a]ψ.
Proof of Theorem 8.6
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ if and only
if 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X
a〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
(⇒): Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfy Postulate PS*, and suppose that
〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X
a〉 6|= ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, i.e., S ,X a 6|=
PDL
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. Then there exists a
PDL-model M = 〈W,Ra〉, such that |=
M
S ∧ X a and 6|=
M
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. This means that
there is a possible world v ∈W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
〈a〉⊤.
(We extend M to build a model of D and then conclude that D 6|= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.)
Given w ∈W, for each ai ∈ Act we define:
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Iai (w) = {ϕj→ [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mwϕj}
X ai (w) = {ϕj→ 〈ai〉⊤ ∈ X ai : |=Mwϕj}
Let M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′〉 be such that W ′ = W, and R ′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a ′ 6=a Ra ′ , where for each
a ′ 6= a and every w,w ′ ∈W ′, wRa ′w
′ if and only if
• |=
M ′
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a ′ 6; ℓ and |=
M ′
w
¬ℓ;
• |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a ′]ψi ∈ Ea ′ such that |=M ′w ϕi; and
• Ia
′
(w) = ∅.
By definition,M ′ is a model of the dependence relation ;. Because, by hypothesis,D
satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W
′,
if X ai (w) 6= ∅, then Iai(w) = ∅. Then, as W ′ = valuations(S ), M ′ is a model of S .
We have that M ′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea, and given a ′ 6= a, for every
ϕi → [a ′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then |=M ′w′ ψi for all w ′ ∈ W ′ such that
wRa ′w
′. Clearly M ′ is also a model of I : it is a model of Ia, and given a ′ 6= a, for
every ϕi → [a ′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then Ia ′(w) 6= ∅ and Ra ′(w) = ∅.
M ′ is a model of X , too: besides being a model of X a, for every a ′ 6= a and all worlds
w ∈W ′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra ′ , because Ra ′(w) = ∅ in
this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as
long as PS* is satisfied. Hence |=
M ′
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I . Because there is v ∈ W ′ such that
|=
M ′
v
ϕ and 6|=
M ′
v
〈a〉⊤, we have S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, and then D 6|= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
(⇐): Suppose D 6|= ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, i.e., S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. Then there is a ;-
model M such that |=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and 6|=
M
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. Then, given a, we have
|=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧X a ∧ Ia, and then |=
M
S ∧X a. Moreover, by definition, M is a PDL-model.
Hence S ,X a 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, and then 〈LPDL, |=PDL ,S ∪ X a〉 6|= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
Proof of Theorem 8.8
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ if
and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an〉 |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]ψ.
Lemma D.1
If D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ, then there is ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an−1]ϕ ′
and D |= ϕ ′ → [an]ψ.
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Proof:
Let D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ. If D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]⊥, the result immediately fol-
lows. Then, given a model M = 〈W,R〉 of D such that |=
M
w
ϕ for some w ∈ W, if
|=
M
w
〈a1; . . . ; an〉⊤, there must be at least one w
′
n−1 such that |=
M
w′
n−1
[an]ψ. Take all such
w ′n−1 and let ϕ
′ be ∨
|=
M
w′
n−1
[an]ψ
w ′n−1
Then we have D |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an−1]ϕ ′, and D |= ϕ ′ → [an]ψ.
Proof of Theorem 8.8
(⇒): The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 1. As D satisfies Postulate PS*, the result follows from Theorem 8.5.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; ak]ψ, then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪
Ea1,...,ak ∪ Ia1,...,ak 〉 |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; ak]ψ.
Step: let D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ. By Lemma D.1, there is a classical formula ϕ ′
such that D |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an−1]ϕ ′ and D |= ϕ ′ → [an]ψ. From the induction hy-
pothesis, we have that 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an−1 ∪ Ia1,...,an−1〉 |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an−1]ϕ ′
and 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ean ∪ Ian〉 |= ϕ ′ → [an]ψ. This gives us 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪
Ia1,...,an 〉 |= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]ψ.
(⇐): Suppose D 6|= ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ, i.e., S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ. Then there
is a ;-model M such that |=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and 6|=
M
ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ. Then, given
a1, . . . , an, we have |=
M
S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧ X a1,...,an ∧ Ia1,...,an , and then |=
M
S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧
Ia1,...,an . Hence S , Ea1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an 6|=
;
ϕ → [a1; . . . ; an]ψ, and then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪
Ea1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an〉 6|= ϕ→ [a1; . . . ; an]ψ.
Proof of Theorem 8.9
If D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ if
and only if 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪ X a1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ.
Lemma D.2
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I〉 satisfy Postulate PS*. If D |= ϕ→ 〈a〉ψ is the case,
then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a〉ψ.
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Proof:
Let D satisfy Postulate PS* and suppose 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea ∪ X a ∪ Ia〉 6|= ϕ → 〈a〉ψ,
i.e., S , Ea,X a,Ia 6|=
;
ϕ → 〈a〉ψ. Then there exists a ;-model M = 〈W,Ra〉, such that
|=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧X a ∧Ia and 6|=
M
ϕ→ 〈a〉ψ. This means that there is a possible world v ∈W
such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
〈a〉ψ.
(We extend M to build a model of D and then conclude that D 6|= ϕ→ 〈a〉ψ.)
Given w ∈W, for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj→ [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mwϕj}
X ai (w) = {ϕj→ 〈ai〉⊤ ∈ X ai : |=Mwϕj}
Let M ′ = 〈W ′,R ′〉 be such that W ′ = W, and R ′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a ′ 6=a Ra ′ (we extend M to
all other actions D speaks of), where for each a ′ 6= a and every w,w ′ ∈ W ′, wRa ′w
′ if
and only if
• |=
M ′
w′
¬ℓ for all ℓ such that a ′ 6; ℓ and |=
M ′
w
¬ℓ;
• |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every ϕi→ [a ′]ψi ∈ Ea ′ such that |=M ′w ϕi; and
• Ia
′
(w) = ∅.
By definition,M ′ is a model of the dependence relation ;. Because, by hypothesis,D
satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W
′,
if X ai (w) 6= ∅, then Iai(w) = ∅. Then, as W ′ = valuations(S ), M ′ is a model of S .
We have that M ′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea, and given a ′ 6= a, for every
ϕi → [a ′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then |=M ′w′ ψi for all w ′ ∈ W ′ such that
wRa ′w
′. Clearly M ′ is also a model of I : it is a model of Ia, and given a ′ 6= a, for
every ϕi → [a ′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M ′w ϕi, then Ia ′(w) 6= ∅ and Ra ′(w) = ∅.
M ′ is a model of X , too: besides being a model of X a, for every a ′ 6= a and all worlds
w ∈W ′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra ′ , because Ra ′(w) = ∅ in
this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as
long as PS* is satisfied. Hence |=
M ′
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I . Because there is v ∈ W ′ such that
|=
M ′
v
ϕ and 6|=
M ′
v
〈a〉ψ, we have S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ→ 〈a〉ψ, and then D 6|= ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
Lemma D.3
If D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ, then there is ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−1〉ϕ ′
and D |= ϕ ′ → 〈an〉ψ.
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Proof:
The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 2. Suppose D |= ϕ→ 〈a1; a2〉ψ. Then D |= ϕ→ 〈a1〉〈a2〉ψ. For every model
M = 〈W,R〉 of D and for every w ∈ W such that |=
M
w
ϕ, there is w ′ ∈ W such that
wRa1w
′ and |=
M
w′
〈a2〉ψ. Let ϕ
′ be
∧
{ℓ : ℓ ∈ w ′} and the result follows.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if D |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; ak〉ψ, then there is ϕ ′ ∈ Fml
such that D |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; ak−1〉ϕ ′ and D |= ϕ ′ → 〈ak〉ψ.
Step: let D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ. Then D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−1〉⊤. By the induction
hypothesis, there is ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−2〉ϕ ′ and D |= ϕ ′ →
〈an−1〉⊤. Because D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ, given a model M = 〈W,R〉 of D such that
|=
M
w
ϕ for some w ∈ W, there must be w ′n−2 ∈ W such that |=
M
w′
n−2
〈an−1〉〈an〉ψ. Then we
can safely take ϕ ′ as
∧
{ℓ : ℓ ∈ w ′n−2}. Now, D |= ϕ
′ → 〈an−1〉〈an〉ψ. By the base step,
there is ϕ ′′ ∈ Fml such thatD |= ϕ ′ → 〈an−1〉ϕ ′′ andD |= ϕ ′′ → 〈an〉ψ. Putting all the
results together, we get D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−1〉ϕ ′′ and D |= ϕ ′′ → 〈an〉ψ, for some
ϕ ′′ ∈ Fml.
Proof of Theorem 8.9
(⇒): The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 1. As D satisfies Postulate PS*, the result follows from Lemma D.2.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; ak〉ψ, then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪
Ea1,...,ak ∪ X a1,...,ak ∪ Ia1,...,ak 〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; ak〉ψ.
Step: let D |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ. By Lemma D.3, there is ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that D |=
ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−1〉ϕ ′ and D |= ϕ ′ → 〈an〉ψ. By the induction hypothesis, we have
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an−1 ∪ X a1,...,an−1 ∪ Ia1,...,an−1〉 |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an−1〉ϕ ′ and also
〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ean ∪ X an ∪ Ian〉 |= ϕ ′ → 〈an〉ψ. Then, this gives us 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪
Ea1,...,an ∪ X a1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an〉 |= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ.
(⇐): Suppose D 6|= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ, i.e., S , E ,X ,I 6|=
;
ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ. Then
there is a ;-model M such that |=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and 6|=
M
ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ.
Then, given a1, . . . , an, we have |=
M
S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧ X a1,...,an ∧ Ia1,...,an , and hence
S , Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an 6|=
;
ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ. Then 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ Ea1,...,an ∪
X a1,...,an ∪ Ia1,...,an〉 6|= ϕ→ 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ψ.
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Appendix E
Long Proofs of Chapter 9
Proof of Theorem 9.1
LetΦ be a formula that has the form of one of the three laws. For all models M ′, if M ′ ∈ M −Φ
for some M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
D , then |=
M ′
D−Φ.
Let M be such that |=
M
D and let M ′ ∈ M −Φ. We analyze each case.
Suppose Φ is ϕ, for some propositional ϕ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W ′,R〉, where
W ′ = W⊖valuations(ϕ). Becausewe have assumed the syntactical classical contraction
operator⊖ is sound and complete w.r.t. its semantics, M ′ is a model of S−. As ; and
E have not changed, clearly M ′ remains a ;-model and a model of E . M ′ is also a
model of X−: for every w ∈ W ′ and every (ϕi ∧ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X−, |=M ′w ϕi ∧ϕ implies
Ra(w) 6= ∅, because |=
M
w
ϕi→ 〈a〉⊤. Hence |=M ′S− ∧ E ∧ X−, and then |=M ′D−ϕ.
Let now Φ have the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W,R ∪ R ′a〉 such
that R ′a ⊆ {(w,w
′) : |=
M
w
ϕ}. It is enough to show that M ′ is a model of E− and of
the new dependence relation ; ′. Clearly it is a model of ; ′, since it is a ;-model
and ;⊆; ′. Now, for all w ∈ W and every (ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ) → [a]ψi ∈ E−, if |=M ′w ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ,
then |=
M ′
w
ϕi, from what it follows |=
M
w
ϕi, and because |=
M
E , |=
M
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈ Ra(w).
Moreover, as 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ, we have 6|=
M
w
ϕ, and then R ′a(w) = ∅. Putting both results together,
it follows |=
M ′
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈ Ra(w), and then |=
M ′
E−. Hence |=
M ′
D−
ϕ→[a]ψ.
Now let Φ be of the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W,R \ R ′a〉,
such that R ′a ⊆ {(w,w
′) : wRaw
′ and |=
M
w
ϕ}. It suffices to show that M ′ is a model
of X−. For all w ∈ W and every (ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X−, if |=M ′w ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ, then |=M ′w ϕi,
from what it follows |=
M
w
ϕi, and because |=
M
X , there exists w ′ ∈ W such that wRaw
′.
Because 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ, 6|=
M
w
ϕ, and then R ′a(w) = ∅. Putting both results together, it follows
|=
M ′
w
〈a〉⊤, and thus |=
M ′
X−. Hence |=
M ′
D−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤.
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Proof of Lemma 9.2
Let D = 〈LPDL, |=
;
,S ∪ E ∪ X 〉 be modular, and let Φ be a formula of the form of one of the
three laws. Then D−Φ is modular.
We analyze each case.
LetΦ beϕ, for some propositionalϕ ∈ Fml, and supposeD−ϕ is not modular. Then
there exists ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that D−ϕ |= ϕ
′ and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S
−〉 6|= ϕ ′, i.e., S−, E ,X− |=
;
ϕ ′ and S− 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′. As the original X has been weakened and the syntactical proposi-
tional contraction operator ⊖ has been assumed to satisfy Katsuno and Mendelzon’s
postulate Cn(S ⊖ϕ) ⊆ Cn(S ), we must have S , E ,X |=
;
ϕ ′. Because D is modu-
lar, it holds S |=
CPL
ϕ ′. Then we have at least valuations(¬ϕ ′) ⊆ valuations(¬ϕ), for
S− 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′. This means S , E ,X |=
;
ϕ→ ϕ ′, and then ⊖ has not worked as expected.
Let now Φ have the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, and suppose D−
ϕ→[a]ψ is not
modular. Then there existsϕ ′ ∈ Fml such thatD−
ϕ→[a]ψ |= ϕ ′ and 〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ ′,
i.e., S , E−,X |=
;
′ ϕ
′ and S 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′.
Claim: If S , E−,X |=
;
′ ϕ
′, then S , E−,X |=
;
ϕ ′.
(Proof of the claim): Straightforward: suppose S , E−,X 6|=
;
ϕ ′. Then there exists a
possible worlds model M = 〈W,R〉 such that M is a ;-model, |=
M
S ∧ E− ∧ X , and
6|=
M
ϕ ′. Because ;⊆; ′, M is a ; ′-model, too. Hence, S , E−,X 6|=
;
′ ϕ
′. (End of the
proof of the claim.)
Claim: S , E ,X |=
;
S ∧ E− ∧ X .
(Proof of the claim): We show that there is no ;-model M such that |=
M
S ∧E ∧X and
6|=
M
S ∧ E− ∧ X . Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a ;-model such that 6|=
M
S ∧ E− ∧ X . Then there
exists w ∈ W such that 6|=
M
w
S ∧ E− ∧ X . If 6|=
M
w
S or 6|=
M
w
X , the result follows. Consider
6|=
M
w
E−. Then, there is some E^− ⊆ E− such that
|=
M
w
∧
(ϕi∧¬ϕ)→[a]ψi∈E^−
(ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)
and there exists w ′ ∈W such that wRaw
′ and
6|=
M
w′
∧
(ϕi∧¬ϕ)→[a]ψi∈E^−
ψi
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Then
|=
M
w
∧
(ϕi∧¬ϕ)→[a]ψi∈E^−
ϕi
Taking the obvious corresponding E^ ⊆ E , we get
|=
M
w
∧
ϕi→[a]ψi∈E^
ϕi and 6|=
M
w′
∧
ϕi→[a]ψi∈E^
ψi
Hence, 6|=
M
w
E , and then 6|=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X . (End of the proof of the claim.)
From S , E ,X |=
;
S∧E−∧X , and S , E−,X |=
;
ϕ ′, it follows S , E ,X |=
;
ϕ ′. Because
S 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′, D is not modular.
Now supposeΦ has the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml, and supposeD−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
is not modular. Then there exists ϕ ′ ∈ Fml such that we have D−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ |= ϕ ′ and
〈LCPL, |=CPL ,S〉 6|= ϕ
′, i.e., S , E ,X− |=
;
ϕ ′ and S 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′.
Claim: S , E ,X |=
;
S ∧ E ∧ X−.
(Proof of the claim): We show that there is no ;-model M such that |=
M
S ∧E ∧X and
6|=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X−. Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a ;-model such that 6|=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X−. Then there
exists w ∈ W such that 6|=
M
w
S ∧ E ∧ X−. If 6|=
M
w
S or 6|=
M
w
E , the result follows. Consider
6|=
M
w
X−. Then, there is some X^− ⊆ X− such that
|=
M
w
∧
(ϕi∧¬ϕ)→〈a〉⊤∈X^−
(ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)
and Ra(w) = ∅. Then
|=
M
w
∧
(ϕi∧¬ϕ)→〈a〉⊤∈X^−
ϕi
Taking the obvious corresponding X^ ⊆ X , we get
|=
M
w
∧
ϕi→〈a〉⊤∈X^
ϕi
Because Ra(w) = ∅, 6|=
M
w
X , and then 6|=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X . (End of the proof of the claim.)
From S , E ,X |=
;
S∧E∧X−, and S , E ,X− |=
;
ϕ ′, it follows S , E ,X |=
;
ϕ ′. Because
S 6|=
CPL
ϕ ′, D is not modular.
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Ceci n’est pas un re´sume´
I love French wine, like I love the French language. I have sampled every
language, French is my favourite – fantastic – language, especially to curse
with. Nom de Dieu de putain de bordel de merde de saloperie de connard
d’encule´ de ta me`re ! You see, it’s like wiping your ass with silk, I love it.
—Merovingian, in Matrix Reloaded
Pourquoi on est la` ?
Dans les approches de repre´sentation de connaissances base´es sur la logique, la con-
naissance concernant un domaine est habituellement de´crite par des ensembles de for-
mules logiques (the´ories). Dans le raisonnement sur les actions nous nous inte´ressons
a` des the´ories qui de´crivent le comportement d’actions sur des proprie´te´s du monde.
Nous appelons de telles the´ories the´ories d’action ou descriptions de domaine.
D’habitude, une the´orie d’actions est un ensemble d’e´nonce´s ayant la forme : “ si
contexte, alors effet apre`s chaque exe´cution d’action ” ; et “ si pre´-condition, alors action
exe´cutable ”. Le premier type d’e´nonce´ est utilise´ pour exprimer des lois d’effet, c’est-
a`-dire des formules qui relient une action a` son re´sultat, e´tant donne´ un contexte par-
ticulier. Le second type d’e´nonce´ repre´sente des lois d’exe´cutabilite´, qui e´tablissent les
conditions suffisantes sous lesquelles une action est exe´cutable. Leur dual fournit les
conditions ne´cessaires pour qu’une action soit exe´cutable : “ si pre´-condition, alors ac-
tion impossible ”. Finalement, dans une repre´sentation d’un domaine dynamique, nous
avons e´galement des e´nonce´s qui nementionnent aucune action. Ceux-ci repre´sentent
des lois sur la partie statique dumonde, c’est-a`-dire les contraintes qui de´terminent les
e´tats possibles. Nous appelons ce type de contraintes les lois statiques du domaine.
Lorsque l’on de´crit des the´ories d’action, l’objectif est de doter un agent de la
capacite´ a` raisonner dans un domaine dynamique et d’agir de manie`re rationnelle.
Parmi les diffe´rents types de raisonnement qu’un agent peut avoir, nous identifions
la ve´rification de la consistance de sa the´orie ; la pre´vision des effets des actions ;
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l’explication de l’observation d’un effet donne´ ; l’e´laboration d’un plan pour accom-
plir un but ; la ve´rification de l’exe´cutabilite´ ou de l’inexe´cutabilite´ d’une action donne´e ;
et la re´vision et mise a` jour de ses connaissances sur le comportement d’une action.
A priori la consistance est le seul crite`re fourni par la logique formelle pour ve´rifier
la qualite´ des the´ories d’action. Dans ce travail, nous arguons que toutes les approches
existantes dans la litte´rature sont tre`s libe´rales dans le sens ou` nous pouvons avoir des
the´ories d’action satisfiables qui sont intuitivement incorrectes. Donc une notion au-
dela` de la consistance est ne´cessaire pour e´valuer des descriptions de domaine.
Le modulaire c’est le bon
La modularite´ est devenue un des mots d’ordre de nombreux domaines en informa-
tique. C’est aussi le cas pour la repre´sentation de la connaissance et le raisonnement,
ou` des descriptions monolithiques se sont montre´es d’utilisation tre`s complexes.
Les dernie`res anne´es ont vue la parution de plusieurs travaux qui, demanie`re plus
ou moins implicite, abordent des concepts tels que module, intelligibilite´, e´valuation,
tole´rance a` l’e´laboration, et d’autres. La plupart de ces termes sont emprunte´s de
l’inge´nierie de logiciel, parfois sans une notion claire des impacts qu’ils peuvent avoir
quand ils sont transpose´s dans des domaines ou` leur emploie n’est pas une question
d’intuition, mais ils doivent plutoˆt s’accommoder avec des cadres formels bien e´tablis.
Dans ce travail nousmontrons que ce n’est pas une taˆche simple, en particulier lorsque
la logique constitue le cadre formel dans lequel la connaissance est repre´sente´e.
Ainsi, la question qui e´merge naturellement est “ comment pouvons-nous faciliter
la taˆche de l’inge´nieur de connaissances pour de´crire un domaine ” ? Une re´ponse,
en suivant e´videmment la tendance diviser-et-conque´rir, est la “ modularisation de la
the´orie d’action ”. Par contre, de meˆme qu’en programmation oriente´e objet, mod-
ulariser une the´orie d’action ne s’agit pas seulement de la de´couper en plusieurs
morceaux. Un tel de´coupage doit eˆtre fait de sorte a` ce que la the´orie re´sultante ait
des proprie´te´s inte´ressantes. Dans cette the`se nousmontrons que pour eˆtre conside´re´s
comme de bons modules, ils doivent satisfaire certains desiderata.
Quoi, dinde immortelle ?!
Conside´rons un sce´nario ou` nous avons une dinde et quelqu’un qui peut la mettre
en marche ou bien lui tirer dessus avec un revolver. On peut formaliser ce sce´nario
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a` travers des formules logiques qui disent que “ si la dinde est en marche, alors elle
est vivante ”, “ si l’arme est charge´e, alors apre`s tirer la dinde meurt ”, “ en attirant la
dinde elle se mets a` marcher ”, “ si la dinde est morte, alors l’attirer ne la ressuscite
pas ”, et “ on peut toujours attirer la dinde ”.
Maintenant, du fait que “ attirer la dinde la fait marcher ” et “ une dinde qui
marche est vivante ” on conclut “ apre`s attirer la dinde, elle est vivante ”. A partir
de c¸a et de l’information “ si la dinde est morte, alors l’attirer ne la ressuscite pas ”,
on de´duit que “ si la dinde est morte, alors apre`s l’attirer elle est a` la fois vivante et
morte ”, c’est-a`-dire une contradiction. Donc il n’est pas possible d’attirer une dinde
morte. De c¸a et e´tant donne´ que c’est toujours possible d’attirer la dinde, on de´duit
que la dinde n’est jamais morte, c’est-a`-dire, elle est immortelle !
Cet exemple, aussi simple soit il, illustre bien un proble`me important qui peut
arriver dans des descriptions de domaine en raisonnement sur les actions : des in-
teractions impre´vues entre des formules. La pre´sence de telles conse´quences sont un
signe de que la the´orie d’action n’a pas e´te´ bien spe´cifie´e. Dans notre exemple, le
proble`me est duˆ au fait qu’on avait dit que c’e´tait toujours possible d’attirer la dinde,
ou alors au fait qu’on n’a pas comple`tement spe´cifie´ le contexte ou` l’action d’attirer la
dinde la mets vraiment en marche.
Dans ce travail nous e´nonc¸ons des postulats que toute the´orie d’action doit sat-
isfaire pour e´viter que des situations comme celle ci-dessus se produisent. En plus,
nous concevons aussi des algorithmes qui aident le concepteur du syste`me a` de´cider
si une description de domaine satisfait l’ensemble de postulats et lui permettent de
de´couvrir quelle partie de la the´orie doit eˆtre modifie´e pour la corriger.
Au dela` du coˆte´ intuition, nous montrons aussi que des the´ories modulaires dans
notre sens posse`dent des proprie´te´s computationelles inte´ressantes.
Il faut bien pouvoir changer la the´orie
Supposons une situation ou` un agent a toujours cru que si l’interrupteur est en haut,
alors il y a de la lumie`re dans la chambre. Supposonsmaintenant qu’un jour il observe
quemeˆme si l’interrupteur est dans la position supe´rieure, la lumie`re est e´teinte. Dans
un tel cas, l’agent doit changer sa the´orie au sujet de la relation entre les propositions
“ l’interrupteur est en haut ” et “ il y a de la lumie`re ”. Cet exemple est une instance du
proble`me de changement des bases de croyance propositionnelles, et il est largement
aborde´ dans la litte´rature sur la re´vision et la mise a` jour de croyances.
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Ensuite, supposons que notre agent croit que chaque fois que l’interrupteur est en
bas, apre`s l’avoir bascule´, il y a de la lumie`re dans la chambre. Ceci signifie que si la
lumie`re est e´teinte, dans chaque e´tat du monde qui suit l’exe´cution de basculement
de l’interrupteur, la chambre est e´claire´e. Puis, pendant une panne, l’agent bascule
l’interrupteur et la chambre reste e´tonnamment dans l’obscurite´.
Pour comple´ter les expe´riences de notre agent dans la de´couverte du com-
portement du monde, supposons qu’il a cru qu’il est toujours possible de basculer
l’interrupteur, e´tant donne´e la satisfaction de certaines conditions comme eˆtre assez
proche de lui, avoir une main libre, l’interrupteur n’est pas casse´, etc. Cependant, un
beau jour l’agent de´couvre que quelqu’un a mis de la colle sur l’interrupteur et, par
conse´quent, il n’est plus possible de le basculer.
Les derniers exemples illustrent des situations ou` le changement de croyances sur
le comportement de l’action de basculer l’interrupteur est obligatoire. Dans le pre-
mier, basculer l’interrupteur, d’abord vu comme e´tant de´terministe, doit maintenant
eˆtre vu comme e´tant non de´terministe, ou demanie`re alternative vu comme ayant des
re´sultats diffe´rents dans un contexte spe´cifique (par exemple, si la centrale e´lectrique
est surcharge´e). Dans le deuxie`me exemple, l’exe´cutabilite´ de l’action conside´re´e est
remise en question a` la lumie`re d’une nouvelle information montrant un contexte in-
connu qui empeˆche son exe´cution.
De tels cas de changement de the´orie sont tre`s importants quand on manipule
des descriptions logiques de domaines dynamiques : il peut toujours arriver qu’on
de´couvre qu’une action a en fait un comportement diffe´rent de celui qu’on a toujours
cru qu’elle avait.
Jusqu’ici, le changement de the´orie a e´te´ e´tudie´ principalement pour les bases de
connaissances dans les logiques classiques, en termes de re´vision et de mise a` jour.
Dans ce travail nous faisons donc un pas vers le changement de lois d’actions et pro-
posons un cadre qui traite la mise a` jour des the´ories d’action.
Or, qu’avons-nous fait ?
Notre contribution est double : ge´ne´rale, car nous pre´sentons des postulats qui
s’appliquent a` tout formalisme en raisonnement sur les actions ; et spe´cifique, car
nous proposons des algorithmes pour une solution existante au proble`me du de´cor.
Dans cette the`se nous avons identifie´ et fait une critique des approches principales
de la modularite´ pour des descriptions de domaine, en pre´cisant leurs caracte´ristiques
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et en montrant pourquoi elles ne capturent pas comple`tement la modularite´ dans le
sens ne´cessaire aux descriptions en raisonnement sur les actions. Nous avons argue´
que la modularite´ telle qu’utilise´e usuellement en programmation ou de´finie dans
les travaux sur la logique formelle n’est pas approprie´e dans le raisonnement sur les
actions. Dans le premier cas, ceci est en raison des restrictions d’expressivite´. Dans le
second cas, c’est parce que la modularite´ des the´ories logiques est habituellement trop
forte et elle ne se montre pas tre`s utile si la the´orie est une description d’un sce´nario
dans le raisonnement sur les actions.
Nous de´finissons donc notre concept de modularite´ pour les the´ories d’action et
mettons en e´vidence les proble`mes qui surgissent s’il n’est pas satisfait. En particulier,
nous arguons que la partie non-dynamique des the´ories d’action pourrait influencer
mais ne devrait pas eˆtre influence´e par la partie dynamique.
Nous avons propose´ quelques postulats, et en particulier nous avons essaye´ de
de´montrer que lorsqu’il y a des lois implicites, alors on s’est plante´ en concevant la
the´orie d’action en question. Comme montre´, une solution possible de´coule de nos
algorithmes, qui peuvent nous donner quelques directives lors de la correction d’une
the´orie d’action si ne´cessaire. Aumoyen d’exemples, nous avons vu qu’il y a plusieurs
alternatives de correction, et choisir le bon module a` modifier aussi bien que fournir
l’information intuitive qui doit eˆtre ajoute´e est au concepteur du syste`me.
Dans ce travail, nous avons illustre´ par quelques exemples ce que nous pouvons
faire pour rendre une the´orie intuitive. Ceci implique la modification de la the´orie.
Nous avons pre´sente´ une me´thode ge´ne´rale pour changer une description de do-
maine, e´tant donne´e une formule que nous voulons contracter.
Nous de´finissons donc une se´mantique pour la contraction de the´ories et
pre´sentons e´galement sa contrepartie syntaxique a` travers des ope´rateurs de contrac-
tion. L’ade´quation et la comple´tude de tels ope´rateurs par rapport a` la se´mantique
ont e´te´ e´tablies. En particulier, nous montrons que notre notion de modularite´ est une
condition suffisante pour qu’une contraction soit re´ussie.
Dans ce travail nous avons utilise´ une version faible de PDL, mais nos notions et
re´sultats peuvent aussi bien s’appliquer a` d’autres cadres logiques.
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“ Il en a reˆve´, il l’a fait. ”
